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The medieval conception of monotheistic creation is this: God voluntarily creates 
the universe from nothing. Endorsed by medieval philosophers, this conception of creation 
is in tension with their understanding of causation more generally. Each theory of causation 
available—Aristotelian efficient causation in which an agent acts upon a patient, and 
Neoplatonic emanation in which beings are produced through a series of emanations—have 
attractive explanatory features, but neither theory aligns perfectly with divine creation. Since 
God acts to create, efficient causation seems to include creating; yet, efficient causation is 
not causation ex nihilo. Since emanation accounts for producing being ex nihilo, it seems to 
include creating, but emanation is neither voluntary nor non-necessary production. Thus, 
medieval philosophers face what I call the ‘problem of creation’: they must either (a) deny 
the apparent contradiction; (b) modify their understanding of creation; or (c) develop an 
entirely new account of causation that is compatible with creation.  
In my dissertation, I examine the causal theories of two prominent philosophers, 
Avicenna and Aquinas. Both attempt to articulate comprehensive causal theories which 
include an analysis of God’s creation of the universe. Despite their distinct cultural and 
religious milieus, both men describe creating as an action performed by God. I examine how 
vi 
each navigates commitments to his faith tradition and to both Neoplatonic emanation and 
Aristotelian efficient causation. On the surface, their theories appear similar: they each 
attempt to solve the problem of creation by selecting option (a). However, this similarity 
masks underlying differences: each privileges one causal theory in his creation account, and 
this has implications for understanding their causal theories. 
In chapter one, I clarify the problem of creation by discussing each of these 
traditions in detail. To both Avicenna and Aquinas, solving the problem by selecting option 
(b) is undesirable, for each would be loath to jettison the claim that God creates either ex 
nihilo or voluntarily. Option (c) is equally undesirable given the medieval inclination to retain 
as much of one’s heritage as possible. Each selects option (a), but they do so in distinct ways 
that are explored in chapters two and three.  
In chapter two, I contend that Avicenna assumes the truth of Neoplatonic 
emanation as a model of causation in creation, but he explains that Neoplatonic emanation is 
not incompatible with divine creation. Avicenna does not take every characteristic of 
Neoplatonic emanation to be essential to that model, explaining that God emanates 
voluntarily and non-necessarily (that is, God’s action is subject to no internal or external 
constraints). He also speaks of creating in terms of Aristotelian efficient causation, although 
to do so, he must develop (and defend developing) the implications of Aristotle’s explication 
of efficient causation. Efficient causation can be natural—involving an agent activating some 
potentiality in a patient—or metaphysical—involving an agent producing being ex nihilo. I 
argue that Avicenna prefers Neoplatonic emanation in understanding divine creation.  
In chapter three, I contend that Aquinas assumes the truth of Aristotelian efficient 
causation as a model of causation, but he explains that Aristotelian efficient causation is not 
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incompatible with the Christian conception of creating. Aquinas, like Avicenna, develops the 
implications of Aristotelian efficient causation, and Aquinas understands efficient causation 
to be an action performed by an agent. Aquinas also speaks of creating in terms of 
emanation, which is both voluntary and non-necessary. Ultimately, Aquinas denies every 
characteristic of Neoplatonic emanation except that (i) God emanates and (ii) God produces 
being ex nihilo. I argue that not only does Aquinas prefer Aristotelian efficient causation as 
the manner of discussing and understanding creating, but Aquinas strips from his 
conception of emanation its uniquely Neoplatonic connotations and implications. 
In the final chapter, I offer an analysis of Avicenna’s and Aquinas’s discussions of 
causation in creation. I offer a careful analysis of their theories of causation, including the 
relation between Aristotelian efficient causation and Neoplatonic emanation. Fundamentally, 
I make clear that it is overly simplistic to assert that Avicenna or Aquinas have philosophies 
that are purely Aristotelian or purely Neoplatonic. Both adopt the language of each theory, 












 In this chapter, I set up the problem explored in this dissertation, namely how 
Avicenna and Aquinas attempt to explain God creating the universe1 in philosophical terms, 
using philosophical concepts that seem not to align with the monotheistic conception of 
divine creation to which both men subscribe. First, I will examine the monotheistic 
conception of divine creation, paying particular attention to those numerous points on 
which Avicenna’s Islamic and Aquinas’s Christian traditions agree. Given the fact that both 
traditions rely heavily upon the account of divine creation provided in the Hebrew bible, 
these similarities are somewhat unsurprising. Next, I will discuss the two prominent 
philosophical accounts of causation that could be applied to God’s creative activity. The first 
is the broadly Aristotelian account, primarily Aristotle’s account of efficient causation, and 
the second is the Neoplatonic account of causation by emanation. In this chapter, I do not 
attempt to explicate the historical Aristotle or any one strain of Neoplatonic thought; 
instead, I discus the Aristotelian and Neoplatonic models that served as a source for 
Avicenna’s and Aquinas’s views. These three traditions—the account of creation derived 
from the Hebrew Scriptures, along with the two philosophical accounts of causation—shape 
                                               
1 In what follows, I use the term ‘universe’ as a catch-all term meaning the physical universe—the empyrean 
heavens, the terrestrial realm, and all that populates them—and the immaterial beings other than God (beings 
that, according to Avicenna and Aquinas, exist). When speaking of a particular part of the universe (such as the 
terrestrial realm versus the celestial realm), I will specify that I am doing so. 
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how Avicenna and Aquinas approach explaining how God might have brought about the 
existence of the universe and what populates it. 
II. Creation 
“In the beginning, God created the heavens and the earth,” begins Genesis 1: 1, the 
first book of the Hebrew bible.2 In this section, I address the widespread agreement 
regarding creation in the two monotheistic religions that I shall be concerned with here, an 
agreement that is grounded in the Hebrew bible’s account of the origination of the universe. 
There are three basic tenets common to monotheistic accounts of divine creation that are 
important for this discussion: that God is the ultimate being; that God creates ex nihilo; and 
that God creates voluntarily. Each of these tenets will be discussed in detail below, 
highlighting the basis of commitment to these doctrines within Islam and Christianity.  
A. Monotheistic agreement 
Despite the theological differences among the two monotheistic faiths in question—
Christianity and Islam—there exists widespread agreement on several doctrines central to 
the doctrine of creation and on the doctrine of creation itself. Much of this agreement stems 
from the reliance of each tradition upon the Hebrew Scriptures for some understanding of 
God and of creating.3 According to David Burrell, the primary message garnered from the 
opening chapters of the Hebrew bible is the “specific sense of contingency” of what exists. 
By this, Burrell means that the Genesis account seems to say that the production of what 
populates the earth occurs purely because God determines to make it; thus, it seems that if 
                                               
2 Gen 1: 1, Biblica Hebraica Stuttgartensia. 
3 David Burrell, Freedom and Creation in Three Traditions (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1993), 
15. 
3 
God did not decide to make something, that thing would not exist.4 The overarching theme 
of the first few chapters of Genesis is the dependency of what exists upon God. 
Furthermore, there exists widespread agreement among the Abrahamic traditions 
both that (a) what God does in bringing forth and shaping new life is good and (b) God 
deliberately brings about this new life. After God brings forth something new on each day 
that God works—light, fish, plants, humans, etc.—God is said to have called God’s works 
good.5 The production of beings by God is described as purposeful actions on God’s part, 
and the result of each of these actions is something good. In this, the creation account in the 
Hebrew bible is distinct from a number of other accounts of the origination of the universe, 
one such being the Enuma Elish, to which the Genesis account stands in sharp relief.6 There, 
the gods Tiamat and Apsu wage war against each other with the help of their children. 
Tiamat is slain by the god Marduk, and her body is divided to make the earth and the sky.7 In 
the Enuma Elish, the production of the corporeal universe is a byproduct of divine infighting; 
in the Genesis account, the shaping8 and production of the earth is a deliberate act of God 
to provide a habitable environment for creatures. 
From this basic agreement—that what exists is contingent upon God, what God 
produces is good, and what God produces, God produces deliberately—springs forth a 
robust doctrine of divine creation. The commonalities between the doctrines of creation in 
                                               
4 Burrell, Freedom and Creation, 15. 
5 See Genesis 1: 4, 10, 12, 18, 21, 25, and 31. 
6 Burrell, Freedom and Creation, 16. 
7 Enuma Elish, tablet IV, in Myths from Mesopotamia: Creation, the Flood, Gilgamesh, and Others, trans. Stephanie 
Dalley (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 228-277. 
8 The Genesis account does not, on face value, support the doctrine of creation ex nihilo (despite the fact that 
each of the Abrahamic traditions endorse creation ex nihilo); instead, it addresses God’s shaping of the pre-
existing waters and earth. For a discussion of creation ex nihilo in Islam and Christianity, see section C below. 
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the Abrahamic religions can be distilled into three points.9 First, God is the ultimate being, 
which can be understood two ways. God is the ultimate being insofar as God is the first 
being, and God is the ultimate being insofar as God is the greatest being. This latter type of 
ultimacy can be described in terms of the omnis—omnipotence, omniscience, and 
omnibenevolence. As the ‘ultimate being,’ God is the maximally existing, maximally 
powerful, maximally knowledgeable, and maximally good being. Accordingly, it must be the 
case that God’s nature is different from human nature in significant ways. Furthermore, 
given God’s omnipotence, it seems that God must be logically independent of what God 
creates. If God is not logically independent of creation, then God depends on something other 
than God, which, at best, conflicts with God’s omnipotence.10 Second, God creates ex nihilo. 
Though not clearly articulated in the Genesis text, the doctrine of creation ex nihilo took root 
in each of the Abrahamic traditions. Each tradition appeals to certain scriptures to bolster 
the claim that God creates ex nihilo, but these scriptural appeals are often augmented by 
additional philosophical or theological arguments. Third, God produces what God produces 
voluntarily. Within each tradition, precisely how to understand the voluntariness of God’s 
creating has been a matter of dispute, and the basic contours of some of these disputes will 
be explored below. In what follows, I discuss each of these points in greater detail, offering 
support for each point from Islam and Christianity, the religious faiths of Avicenna and 
Aquinas, respectively.  
 
                                               
9 Here, I follow Parviz Morewedge’s analysis of creation in his commentary on The Metaphysica of Avicenna (ibn 
Sīnā) (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973), 269-70. I have consolidated Morewedge’s list of the essentials 
of creation from six distinct essentials—God is the ultimate being; God creates ex nihilo; God is logically 
independent of the world; God is conscious of what happens in creating; God can intervene; and God’s nature 
is not like human nature—into three, retaining the force of Morewedge’s analysis within those three essentials. 
10 At worst, God not being logically independent from the world suggests that God is identical to the world. 
The identity between God and the world would be undesirable for a Muslim, for example, who believes that 
God is unique and above all else (See Qur’an 57: 3). 
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B. God is the Ultimate Being 
 That God is the ultimate being is a central belief in Islam and Christianity. This belief 
manifests itself in a number of ways in these traditions: talk of the eternity of God, the 
oneness or simplicity of God, the greatness of God, the goodness of God, and the power of 
God. Eternity can be understood in at least three ways (which are not necessarily jointly 
compatible) by adherents of Islam or Christianity: first, as the claim that God is a being that 
exists in time and exists as long as time exists; second, as the claim that once God begins to 
exist, God will not cease to exist; or third, as the claim that God is an atemporal being that is 
outside of time.11 God, in both Islam and Christianity, is understood to be distinct from the 
universe.12 The distinction between God and the universe is manifest in the formal qualities 
of God—God’s simplicity, for example. Both Christians and Muslims endorse the notion 
that God is simple in that God is one, and the multiplicity and variety of creatures God 
produces according to accounts in the Hebrew bible, the Christian scriptures, and the 
Qur’an imply strongly that the universe is not simple.13 What support found within Islam and 
Christianity for the belief that God is the ultimate being will now be explored. 
1. Islam 
The uniqueness of Allah is emphatically asserted in Islamic doctrine. The first pillar 
of Islam addresses the unity of Allah. Allah’s Oneness distinguishes Allah from other 
spiritual beings (such as jinn) and from corporeal beings. There is no other deity like Allah, 
                                               
11 I do not intend to endorse any specific view of divine eternity; instead, I want to document the presence of 
the belief in God’s eternality (however it is understood) within Islam and Christianity. 
12 Burrell, Freedom and Creation, 5; Burrell makes use of the phrase, “the distinction,” a manner by which Robert 
Sokolowski discusses the strong distinction Christians in particular have drawn between God and creation. See 
Robert Sokolowski, The God of Faith and Reason: Foundations of Christian Theology (Notre Dame: University of 
Notre Dame, 1982), especially chapters three and four (pp. 21-40). 
13 Burrell, Freedom and Creation, 10. While one can mount an argument for Monism, it should be noted that 
neither early Christians (who were instrumental in shaping the doctrine of creation ex nihilo) nor Muslims 
responding to the Qur’an did so.  
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and there are no other beings that, like Allah, are entirely simple.14 To believe in Allah is to 
believe that Allah is One, perfect, and deserves glory.15  
Part of why Allah is deserving of glory is that Allah is sovereign over all that exists.16 
Allah is sovereign both because Allah is greater than creatures and because Allah has 
produced all other creatures.17 In the Qur’an, it says that “[Allah is] Creator of the heavens 
and the earth. He has made for you from yourselves, mates, and among the cattle, mates; He 
multiplies you thereby. There is nothing like unto Him, and He is the Hearing, the Seeing.”18 
Allah’s sovereignty lays bare Allah’s power: Allah has produced what exists, and Allah 
rightfully governs what exists. Everything other than Allah is dependent upon Allah, and this 
dependency suggests for Muslims that Allah alone—as the supreme being—is eternal.19  
2. Christianity 
Christians, like Muslims, echo the Jewish belief that God is One in their own way. 
Discussions of divine oneness within Christianity typically occur within the context of 
discussions of the Trinity, the Christian doctrine that God is one substance but exists in 
three persons.20 The Nicene Creed, a fourth century creed initially produced at the Council 
of Nicea, which helped to settle orthodox Christian teaching on the divinity of Jesus Christ, 
begins by attesting to the oneness of God.21 The creed reads, “We believe in one God the 
                                               
14 Qur’an 3: 2 and 42: 11 address God’s uniqueness; ‘Abdullāh ibn ‘Abdul-Hamīd al-Athari, Islamic Beliefs: A 
Brief Introduction to the ‘Aqīdah of Ahl as-Sunnah wal-Jamā‘ah, trans. Nasiruddin al-Khattāb (Riyadh: International 
Islamic Publishing House, 2005), 78. 
15 al-Athari, 68. 
16 al-Athari, 69. 
1717 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, An Introduction to Islamic Cosmological Doctrines (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1964), 9. 
18 Qur’an 42: 11, Sahih International Translation. 
19 Qur’an 39: 62; al-Athari, 121. Here, I follow al-Athari’s assertion that God is eternal. By discussing the 
eternality of God, I mean to indicate a formal feature of God rather than to indicate God’s relationship to time. 
That is, whether God is or is not bound by time, God always exists.  
20 For an overview of Christian Trinitarian doctrine, see the eponymous chapter in Stanley Grenz, Theology for 
the Community of God (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1994). 
21 The text of the creed was later expanded at the council of Constantinople; however, the portion quoted 
below was not changed at this later council.  
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Father Almighty, maker of all things visible and invisible,” smoothly moving from the 
assertion of the oneness of God to God’s role as creator.22 
As in Islam, there is an emphasis in Christian teaching on the sovereignty of God, 
which highlights God’s power and God’s eternality.23 “Heaven is my throne, and the earth is 
my footstool,” God is purported to say in the book of Isaiah.24 In the book of Job, God 
speaks of laying the cornerstone of the earth, of moving the stars through the heavens, and 
directing the weather.25 In the book of Matthew, Jesus causes an unfruitful fig tree to wither 
and heals the maladies of men, women, and children.26 God has this sovereignty over the 
universe because God is greater than God’s creatures.27  
C. God makes the universe ex nihilo 
Despite the lack of direct textual support for the doctrine of creation ex nihilo in 
either the Christian or Islamic tradition, creation is understood primarily in terms of 
production out of nothing in each tradition. There are several sayings in the Qur’an that 
allude to something like creation ex nihilo. Within the Christian tradition, there are also 
several texts that are applied to creation ex nihilo by later interpreters. The influence of 
philosophical arguments regarding the eternity of the universe raised debates within the 
                                               
22 Leo Donald Davis, The First Seven Ecumenical Councils (325-787): Their History and Theology (Collegeville: 
Liturgical Press, 1983), 60. The creed continues, “and in one Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God, begotten of 
the Father, only-begotten, that is, from the substance (homoousios) of the Father, God from God, Light from 
Light, True God from True God, begotten, not made, of one substance with the Father, through Whom all 
things were made” (Davis, 60). By asserting that the Father and the Son share one substance, Christians 
addressed both the (a) divinity of Jesus Christ and (b) the oneness of God. 
23 Janet M. Soskice, “Creatio ex nihilo: its Jewish and Christian Foundations,” in Creation and the God of Abraham, 
David Burrell, et. al. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 26-7. 
24 Isaiah 66: 1, NIV. 
25 See Job, chapter 38. 
26 Matthew 21: 19; examples of Jesus healing are found in Matthew 4: 23, Mark 1: 41, Luke 13: 13, and John 9: 
7, among others. I provide these examples to illustrate that Christians believe Jesus to have power over other 
beings, a power that Jesus shares with God the Father. 
27 Burrell, Faith and Freedom: An Interfaith Perspective (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), 10. 
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Christian tradition regarding whether the universe is eternal, and the doctrine of creation ex 
nihilo figures heavily in those debates.  
1. Islam 
Within Islam, there has long been the belief that Allah is responsible for producing 
everything that exists. Muslim philosophers debated whether the ultimate dependence of 
everything upon Allah means that (a) Allah must have produced something initially ex nihilo 
or (b) Allah must have produced the universe itself ex nihilo. The belief that Allah does 
produce the universe ex nihilo receives support from the statements in the Qur’an that say 
that Allah provides all that exists. Allah is called the “all-Provider,” and Islamic theologian al-
Athari uses this name for Allah as support for the claim that everything but Allah has Allah 
as its ultimate source.28  
In addition to Allah’s role as the “all-Provider,” interpreters such as David Burrell 
and Parviz Morewedge emphasize those passages in the Qur’an that address how Allah 
brings about the existence of things.29 “Allah says ‘be,’ and it is,” is a phrase repeated in the 
Qur’an, and Burrell and Morewedge take this phrase to be indicative of creation ex nihilo.30 
Just as in the Genesis account, Allah is able to speak anything into existence. Since “[Allah] 
has created everything,” it seems that ultimately, Allah is responsible for everything that 
exists.31 Creation ex nihilo is one way to express Allah’s supreme responsibility for what 
exists, for even if Allah produced something out of pre-existing material, Allah would have 
to also be responsible for producing that material as well.  
                                               
28 al-Athari, 78; Qur’an 51: 58. 
29 See Burrell, Faith and Freedom 151 and 224; Morewedge’s commentary in The Metaphysica of Avicenna (ibn 
Sīnā), 269. 
30 Qur’an 2: 117; 19: 35; 40: 68; See Burrell, Faith and Freedom 151 and 224; Morewedge’s commentary in The 
Metaphysica of Avicenna (ibn Sīnā), 269. 
31 Qur’an 25: 2; al-Athari, 121-122. 
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2. Christianity  
Christians, too, lack clear, absolute scriptural authority for the doctrine of creation ex 
nihilo.32 However, as within Islam, the belief that God creates ex nihilo grows out of the belief 
that God is the ultimate source of everything that exists.33 In response to Gnostic Christians, 
who, unlike orthodox Christians, did not believe the material world was good, Christians 
reexamined their doctrine of creation.34 Theophilus of Antioch appeals to Genesis 1: 2—the 
formlessness of the deep—in his claim that God is the origin of all matter.35 Other 
Christians applied Romans 4: 17, which says that God “calls into being things that were 
not”, and Hebrews 11: 3, which says that the universe was “formed at God’s command”, to 
creation ex nihilo.36 
Later theologians see creation ex nihilo as a corollary to the beliefs that God is simple 
and eternal. For example, Stanley Grenz asserts that if God is entirely separate from the 
universe (as orthodox Christians believe), then God must either create ex nihilo or not at all.37 
Furthermore, the doctrine of creation ex nihilo reinforces the belief that God needs nothing 
else to create. God has the power to produce being immediately, which means that God can 
produce being out of no pre-existing matter.38 
 
 
                                               
32 Burrell, Freedom and Creation, 16. A scriptural passage that can be used to support the notion of creation ex 
nihilo is Colossians 1: 16, which reads, “ For in him all things were created: things in heaven and on earth, 
visible and invisible, whether thrones or powers or rulers or authorities; all things have been created through 
him and for him.”  
33 Gerhard May, Creatio ex nihilo: The Doctrine of ‘Creation out of Nothing’ in early Christian thought (Edinburg: T&T 
Clark, Ltd, 1994), 26. 
34 May, 30-35. 
35 Theophilus, Apology to Autolycus, trans. Marcus Dods, http: 
//www.logoslibrary.org/theophilus/autolycus/index.html (accessed July 24, 2013), II.10; May, 162.  
36 May, 27. 
37 Grenz, 98. 
38 Grenz, 99. 
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D. God makes the world voluntarily 
The final essential characteristic of monotheistic creation is that God produces the 
universe voluntarily. What it means for God to create voluntarily is that God’s creating is 
dependent upon God’s will to create. It is possible that an agent could will to do something 
necessarily, though God’s will to create is often discussed as a free voluntary creation. ‘Free 
voluntary creation’ could mean either lack of external compulsion or lack of internal 
compulsion. Alternately, ‘free voluntary creation’ could mean that God had the ability to do 
otherwise than God did. In either case, if creating depends entirely on God’s essence, nature, 
or existence, then it seems that creating would not be voluntary. God’s will must be a causal 
factor for God’s creating in order for divine creating to be voluntary. Within Islam and 
Christianity, precisely what it means to say that God creates voluntarily has been a source of 
debate despite the widespread acceptance of the general claim.  
1. Islam 
Islamic doctrine includes the belief that Allah cannot be compelled by something 
external to Allah to do something. Because Allah is greater than everything else that exists, it 
is simply impossible for Allah to be compelled by something outside of Allah. Thus, it seems 
that Allah creates voluntarily at least insofar as Allah is not compelled to create by some 
external force. 
It is possible, though, that Allah is also without internal compulsion. In the saying 
that “Allah creates what [Allah] wills,” it seems that Allah is not bound by any internal 
compulsion because Allah’s will guides whatever Allah does.39 Allah’s will is powerful, 
powerful enough to guide what happens in the universe.40 Since Allah determines what Allah 
                                               
39 Qur’an 24: 45. 
40 Al-Athari, 120; Qur’an 81: 29. 
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wills, it seems that Allah might also be without internal compulsion. Thus, creation is free 
insofar as Allah wills it without external or internal constraint. 
The mere lack of internal and external compulsion, however, is not universally taken 
to qualify Allah’s creating as a voluntary action. Al-Ghazali understands the Qur’an to say 
not only that Allah lacks internal and external compulsion but that Allah also is able to create 
or not create.41 In his “Aims of the Philosophers,” Ghazali condemns other Muslims for 
denying that Allah could either create or not create.42 He seems to say that because Allah’s 
will is powerful enough to determine the outcome of human actions on earth, Allah’s will is 
powerful enough to determine not to do something that would be in accordance with Allah’s 
character. For Ghazali and those like him, ‘free voluntary creation’ would mean an act of 
creation that Allah could opt not to perform. 
2. Christianity  
Within Christian teaching on creation, there is a similar dismissal of the notion that 
God could be compelled to do something by some force outside of God. God is 
omnipotent, and thus God is not subject to the control of some external being. So, like in 
Islam, it seems that every Christian ought to endorse the claim that God creates voluntarily 
and freely at least insofar as God is not compelled to create by some external force. 
Christian theologians also regularly deny that God is subject to some internal 
compulsion to create. Were God to be subject to such an internal compulsion, Grenz notes, 
God would no longer be separate from the world. What it would mean for God to be God 
would be to create; this means that God requires something in addition to God in order to 
be God. This thing in addition to God—the universe—would exist as long as God exists. 
                                               
41 Burrell, Faith and Freedom, 152. 
42 Burrell, Faith and Freedom, 152. 
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On Grenz’s analysis, this runs dangerously close to collapsing the distinction between God 
and the world because they must exist concurrently.43 There is no need in God to create, as 
Karl Barth argues in his Church Dogmatics.44 These theologians seem to believe that God 
creates voluntarily and freely because God is not subject to internal constraint.  
The denial of internal compulsion in God to create, however, does not cleanly solve 
the issue of divine ‘free voluntary creation’. Barth goes on to say that God has no need to 
create, but because God is a loving God, God will create.45 The love of God is a free love, 
however, because it is not compelled by something outside of God.46 Similarly, Grenz assets 
that God chooses to create because God is love.47 God loves God’s own self, and God loves 
all that God creates. What these accounts of God’s creating being rooted in God’s love 
obscure is that God, as an eternal, simple being is also an immutable being; this suggests that 
God could not be otherwise than God is. And if God could not be otherwise than God is, 
God could not choose otherwise regarding creation than God does. So, while some Christian 
theologians employ the language of choice, it is not utterly clear that they intend to say that 
God is free do otherwise than create.  
E. Summary 
While the accounts may differ with regard to some of the details, the monotheistic 
accounts of creation found in Islam and Christianity include three key elements. The first is 
that God is the ultimate being. The second is that God produces the world out of nothing, a 
doctrine that develops out of the scriptural claims that God speaks and produces being. The 
                                               
43 Grenz, 100. 
44 Karl Barth, Doctrine of Creation, volume 3 of Church Dogmatics (Edinburg: T&T Clark, 1958), 230; Burrell, 
Freedom and Creation, 8. 
45 Barth, 230. 
46 Barth, 231. 
47 Grenz, 100-101. 
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third is that God produces the universe voluntarily, that is, that God creating depends upon 
God willing to create. Voluntarily creating must mean that God is not subject to either 
external or internal compulsion to create, but it may also mean that God could have done 
otherwise than create. How this monotheistic account of divine creation aligns with the 
causal theories available to Avicenna and Aquinas is yet to be seen, and that issue will be 
explored after examining both causal theories available to them, Aristotelian efficient 
causation and Neoplatonic emanation. 
III. Aristotelian Efficient Causation 
 In this section, I offer an overview of Aristotelian efficient causation. As a major 
causal theory available to both Avicenna and Aquinas, Aristotelian efficient causation helps 
shape what Avicenna and Aquinas expect causation to be like. In what follows, I briefly 
introduce Aristotle’s four causes. I then explicate efficient causation, attempting to offer a 
picture of Aristotelian efficient causation with which Avicenna and Aquinas would have 
been familiar. Aristotle’s presentation of efficient causation involves several components: an 
agent, a patient, and an action performed by the patient. I will discuss each of these 
components in detail, explaining that efficient causation can either be natural—the 
outgrowth of an agent’s nature—or volitional—the outgrowth of an agent’s will. 
A. Aristotelian Causes 
In Aristotle’s Physics book II and Metaphysics book II, Aristotle classifies four types of 
causes: material, formal, efficient, and final causes. A material cause is that matter out of 
which a thing is made. Imagine a bronze statue: bronze is the material cause of the statue. A 
formal cause is the form in which a thing is made, and the form gives shape and purpose to 
the matter to which it is joined. The statue has the form of Aphrodite. An efficient cause is 
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the thing which brings about change in something else. The statue was made by a sculptor, 
who is the efficient cause of that statue. A final cause is the purpose for which a thing exists, 
the end for which it is intended. The statue was made to be a paperweight, which is the final 
cause of the statue.48  
B. Aristotelian Efficient Causation 
Efficient causation merits further attention as a causal theory that may be used to 
explain the origination of the universe.49 In order to understand the attractiveness of this 
theory for those attempting to explain how God might produce the universe, it is 
worthwhile to examine efficient causation more closely. This section includes a discussion of 
the major components of efficient causation: the agent, the patient, and the action 
performed by the agent.  
1. Agent 
An efficient cause, Aristotle writes, is the agent that is responsible for bringing about 
the sorts of changes described above.50 Aristotle gives several examples of agents. A person 
who deliberates, a father, and a physician are all agents who are efficient causes: the person 
who deliberates makes a decision and acts upon it; the father is the progenitor of a child; the 
physician brings health to her patient through medical intervention.51 While each of these 
agents fit with modern ways of discussing agency, Aristotle also lists semen as an efficient 
                                               
48 Aristotle, Physics II.3, 7 and Metaphysics II.2, 11-12. 
49 Ransome Johnson argues in Aristotle on Teleology that there is a Neoplatonic influence at work on interpreters 
of Aristotle who interpret Aristotle’s Unmoved Mover as an efficient as well as a final cause. For a fuller 
explanation of his thesis, see Aristotle on Teleology (Oxford: Clarendon, 2005), especially chapters one and two. 
See also Robert Wisnovsky’s Avicenna’s Metaphysics in Context (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), 21-144 in 
which Wisnovsky argues that the Neoplatonists Ammonius and Simplicius are among the first to interpret 
Aristotle as though Aristotle argues that God is an efficient cause. 
50 Aristotle, Physics II.3 195a 30. 
51 Aristotle, Physics II.3 194b 29-31; Metaphysics V.2 1013a 29-30. 
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cause, for the semen is what joins with the menstrual blood and produces a new life.52 
Efficient causes are who or what brings about change.53 
Agents must be prior to their effect in some way.54 A father is prior to his child in 
two senses: first, he exists before his child exists; and second, he is ontologically prior to his 
child because his child’s existence depends upon the father’s own existence. A similar pattern 
follows for the physician, the person who deliberates, and semen. Each efficient cause must 
be at least ontologically prior to its effect, but efficient causes can exist simultaneously with 
their effects as well.55 
In several of the cases described thus far, efficient causes are distinct from the object 
upon which they operate.56 A father is distinct from his child; a physician is distinct from her 
patient; sperm is distinct from the new life produced. However, it is possible that in some 
cases, an agent can be an efficient cause that acts upon itself.57 A physician can, of course, 
practice medicine upon herself to a limited degree, for she can determine likely causes of her 
illness and act to alleviate that illness. Were she a surgeon, though, it would be unwise for 
her to be the agent that acts to produce health via surgery!  
As the case of the physician illustrates, it is possible for an agent to be a potential 
efficient cause or an actual efficient cause. A physician has the potential to be an efficient 
cause of health in herself and others because she has the ability to bring about health by 
prescribing medicines and certain activities. She is an actual efficient cause of health in herself 
                                               
52 Aristotle, Metaphysics V.2 1013b 23-24. 
53 Johnson, Aristotelian Teleology, 45. 
54 Aristotle, Physics II.195a 30; Metaphysics V.2 1013b 32-34. 
55 Jonathan Barnes, Aristotle (New York: Oxford, 1982), 54. 
56 Barnes, 54. 
57 Zev Bechler suggests that efficient causes do not differ from the material, formal, and final causes except in 
cases of external causation. When the physician acts upon herself, on Bechler’s analysis, she is an efficient 
cause; however, she is also acting through the power of her form. See Aristotle’s Theory of Actuality (New York: 
SUNY, 1995), especially pp. 50-57. 
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or others when she is prescribing medicines and certain activities. Not every physician is, at 
each moment in time, an actual efficient cause of health. Similarly, not all semen produces 
new life, for semen must meet with the exact right circumstances in order to do so. Semen, 
then, is a potential but not actual efficient cause of new life in most circumstances.  
The abilities that efficient causes have to produce change are discussed by Aristotle 
in terms of powers.58 Aristotle gives several examples of powers, such as the art of building 
and the art of healing.59 These powers often reside in the efficient cause: an architect, not the 
skyscraper he designs, has the art of building, and a physician, not the patient she heals, has 
the art of healing. Sperm has the power to bring about new life, but its power is unrealized 
except in certain circumstances. In some instances, it is appropriate to talk about the powers 
of the patient, but these powers in the patient are always powers to undergo certain changes.  
Not only do efficient causes have powers to perform actions, but they also exercise 
these powers either as a result of an agent’s nature or as a result of an agent’s will. Sperm is 
an agent that acts by nature—by the very nature of sperm, it will join with menstrual blood 
(on Aristotle’s analysis) to create a blastocyst in the right set of circumstances. Sperm does 
not decide to do create new life; given the right circumstances, sperm acting as sperm does will 
produce life. Our physician acts not by nature but by will. The physician’s action requires the 
physician to decide to act in a certain way. She could decide to try to make her patient better, 
or she could alternately decide to decline treatment altogether.  
2. Patient 
The patient is what is acted upon in a change, and hence it is what serves as the 
matter that underlies the change. Aristotle discusses only cases of efficient causation that 
                                               
58 Aristotle, Metaphysics V.12 1019a 15-1020a 6. 
59 Aristotle, Metaphysics V.12 1019a 15-18. 
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involve an agent and a patient, which suggests that the patient is a necessary component of 
efficient causation. The patient is able to be changed because, Aristotle says, it is a certain 
way “potentially.”60 A lump of clay is actually a lump but is potentially a statue. Menstrual 
blood is actually a naturally occurring bodily fluid, but it is potentially a new life. An acorn is 
actually a nut bot potentially a tree. In efficient causation, the matter that underlies the 
change is passive.61 It must be acted upon by some agent, who actualizes the potency within 
the patient.  
3. Action 
An agent actualizes a potentiality in the patient by some action. The agent is the 
“primary source of change or rest” in the patient, meaning that the agent activates some 
potentiality either to do or be a certain way or to refrain from doing or being a certain way.62 
A physician, for example, might actualize the potentiality for health in her patient by 
stimulating movement in the patient’s digestive system. By the physician’s action, health is 
restored to the patient. Instead of being in potentiality, the patient’s health now exists in 
actuality. It is the agent’s act that causes the change in the patient.63 In cases where an agent 
is a source of “rest” rather than change, the agent prevents further change in a patient. 
Imagine a chemist mixing chemicals in the lab. By adding the right solution, she arrests the 
chemical change and preserves the chemical compound of this new mixture. A less benign 
example might be someone detaining someone else. By physically restraining someone, our 
agent is now the source of motionlessness—rest—in the person whom he has tied up.  
                                               
60 Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption I.9 327b 23-35. 
61 Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption I.7 324b 18. 
62 Aristotle, Physics II.3 194b 29-31. 
63 Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption I.7 324b 13-18. 
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An efficient cause, then, is an agent that brings about a change in some underlying 
patient through its action on that patient. An efficient cause must be prior to its cause in 
some way, and an agent can act by nature or by will. The patient is passive and persists 
through the change. The agent’s action changes the patient, activating some potentiality 
within that patient. To summarize, an efficient cause C is the cause of some change in 
patient P if C is in some way prior to P and some action of C brings about change to P.  
IV. Neoplatonic Emanation 
 In this section, I offer an introduction to the Neoplatonic theory of emanation. As a 
major causal theory available to both Avicenna and Aquinas, Neoplatonic emanation helps 
shape what Avicenna and Aquinas expect causation to be like, particularly in the context of 
the production of the universe. In what follows, I briefly introduce Neoplatonic thought. I 
then explicate the two major Neoplatonic conceptions of emanation, attempting to offer a 
view of the types of Neoplatonic emanation with which Avicenna and Aquinas would have 
been familiar. However, from Avicenna’s writings, it seems that he was most familiar with 
the Plotinian strain of Neoplatonic emanation, though he may not have been entirely 
ignorant of the Proclean strain. Aquinas seems to have been familiar with both strains, 
though he follows the Proclean strain most closely. Neoplatonic emanation has several 
important characteristics, namely that the maximally good being emanates, and this 
emanation is cast as necessary. The emanator produces new being without operating on any 
patient. Intermediaries are an important part of the process of emanation, and their role in 
the emanatory scheme helps explain how a universe filled with numerous qualitatively and 
quantitatively distinct beings comes to exist.  
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A. Introduction to Neoplatonism 
The term ‘Neoplatonism’ applies to the theories of a group of interpreters of Plato 
whose interpretations share a number of characteristics.64 Two prominent Neoplatonists 
whose works influence Avicenna and Aquinas are Plotinus and Proclus. In addition, the 
work known as the Theology of Aristotle, one of the works in a series of works referred to as 
the Arabic Plotinus, seems to have influenced Al-Kindi’s, Al-Farabi’s, and Avicenna’s 
philosophical thought. In the Latin west, the Liber de Causis, a work purported to be written 
by Dionysius that contained many of Proclus’s propositions from his Elements of Theology, was 
influential in Aquinas’s philosophical thought, as was the On the Divine Names, another 
Pseudo-Dionysian work. In these and other Neoplatonic works, two general concerns that 
are important for the purposes of this study are manifest. First, the study of metaphysics 
involves the study of the hierarchy of all beings. The universe consists of a hierarchy of 
being, and those entities higher up the hierarchy are more powerful than entities lower down 
the hierarchy. Second, causal explanations appeal to higher entities, and the search for causal 
explanations involves vertical movements along the hierarchy. So, to explain the existence of 
entities on one ‘level’ of existence, one will appeal to entities on a higher level of existence.65 
In the discussion of Neoplatonic emanation that follows, the presence of these concepts in 
Neoplatonic thought on emanation will be obvious. 
Emanation is deeply engrained within Neoplatonic thought. Neoplatonic emanation 
begins with the One (hen), who is above all intellect, all being, and all perfection. It is 
impossible to completely describe the One, but it is possible to talk about the One because 
                                               
64 Paulina Remes, Neoplatonism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), 1. 
65 Remes, 3. 
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we, as effects of the One, reflect the One.66 The metaphysical ‘layers’ of being are 
proliferated through the process of emanation: the initial emanation by the One produces 
one ‘layer’ with one entity, and that entity produces another layer, and so on.67 Those beings 
which are metaphysically prior—higher up the chain of being—are more powerful than, 
better than, and simpler than those beings below them. While Neoplatonists endorse the 
metaphysical reality of external objects, they assert that everything that exists is connected in 
some way to the human soul. Thus, understanding the makeup of the universe tells humans 
something about themselves. In the Neoplatonic worldview, each entity strives for 
perfection. What is emanated turns toward its emanator, reflecting upon it and attempting to 
imitate it.68 Ultimately, all things will return to the One in the great reditus.69  
B. Facets of Neoplatonic Emanation 
Though not entirely monolithic, Neoplatonic emanation has several facets, each of 
which will be discussed in detail below. Neoplatonic emanation begins with the One: the 
One emanates, and the reason for this emanation will be explored below. Despite an avowal 
of necessary emanation by Plotinus, Neoplatonic emanation is often presented as though the 
One’s emanation is necessary. The One produces new being not by operating on some 
underlying patient; instead, the new being is produced out of the power and goodness of the 
One. To explain the varieties of extant beings, Neoplatonists often appeal to intermediary 
causes between the One and material beings.  
 
 
                                               
66 Plotinus, Enneads VI.9.3 49-55; Dominic O’Meara, Plotinus: An Introduction to the Enneads (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1993), 52. 
67 Remes, 7. 
68 Remes, 8. 
69 Proclus, Elements of Theology, trans. E.R. Dodds (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), proposition 31; Remes, 51. 
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1. The One emanates 
In the Enneads, Plotinus asserts that the one is ultimately ineffable and beyond 
being.70 It is also completely simple—completely unified.71 The One is entirely complete, and 
thus it is appropriate to describe the One as perfect. It is possible to discuss the One—albeit 
in ways that poorly reflect the One’s greatness—because all things that exist are dependent 
upon it. Insofar as effects resemble their causes, human beings reflect the One.  
Plotinus and later Neoplatonists draw upon a principle more specific than that of 
likeness between effects and their causes. They endorse what O’Meara terms the Principle of 
Prior Simplicity.72 According to this principle, each ‘level’ on the hierarchy of being has a 
different gradation of complexity. The lower levels are occupied by complex creatures who 
may be composites of physical matter and soul. As mentioned above, causal explanations 
involve an appeal to higher levels in the hierarchy of being. The lower, more complex beings 
are produced by beings that are less complex. The higher a being is in the chain of being, the 
less complex it will be. Humans, then, are able to consider their own complexity and use this 
as a starting point to contemplate what the One, which is at the top of the chain of being, 
must be like. 
The One emanates, and the explanation of its emanation often involves an appeal to 
its perfection or completeness.73 Perfection is associated with goodness by Neoplatonists, 
and Proclus asserts that the One is identical to the Good.74 In proposition 25 of the Elements 
of Theology, Proclus asserts that “whatever is complete proceeds to generate those things 
                                               
70 Plotinus, Enneads VI.9.3 36-45; O’Meara, 54-55. 
71 Plotinus, Enneads III.8.9; Remes, 38. 
72 O’Meara, 62; see Enneads V.4.1. 5-15. 
73 Note that the Latin perficio literally means to perform thoroughly. This word adequately captures the relation 
between completeness and perfection presupposed in discussions of the One’s completeness.  
74 Proclus, Elements of Theology proposition 13. 
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which it is capable of producing.”75 Though discussing lower creatures, Proclus and other 
Neoplatonists seem to apply this sort of thinking to the One as well. So this simple, perfect, 
self-subsistent One emanates, and from this original emanation eventually springs forth 
beings populating the entire hierarchy of being.  
2. The One emanates necessarily 
The emanation from the One is often discussed by modern interpreters in terms of 
necessity.76 Approaching Neoplatonic emanation as a necessary emanation requires some 
explanation in light of Plotinus’s treatise in the Enneads on the One’s will and free will in 
producing being.77 There, it seems clear that Plotinus believed the One to have a will. 
Furthermore, it seems that Plotinus believed that the One’s will is not bound to necessity 
like human will might be. O’Meara argues that interpreting Neoplatonic emanation as 
necessary depends upon a too simplistic reading of the images used by Neoplatonists.78 
Because the issue regarding the necessity (or lack thereof) in the One’s emanation bears on 
the later discussions of creation and causation in Avicenna and Aquinas, I will discuss 
support for the standard picture of necessary Neoplatonic emanation by distinguishing 




                                               
75 Proclus, Elements of Theology, 29. 
76 See, for example, William Hasker’s article, “Creation and Conservation, the Religious Doctrine of,” in the 
Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy or David Burrell’s early work (such as Freedom and Creation in Three Traditions 
(Notre Dame: Notre Dame, 1993), 8-9)—note, however, that Burrell has determined his earlier interpretation 
of emanation as necessary was overly simplistic. In Wilberding’s Plotinus’ Cosmology, Wilberding concludes that 
the emanation is a necessary product of the One. See James Wilberding, Plotinus’ Cosmology (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2006), 49.  
77 Plotinus, Enneads VI.8. 
78 O’Meara, 68. 
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a. Types of necessity 
In his article, “Primary Causation and ibdā’ (creare) in the Liber de causis,” Richard 
Taylor distinguishes three types of necessity. First, there is extrinsic necessity. In this type of 
necessity, an agent is bound by external forces to perform a certain action. Second, there is 
the necessity of nature. In this type of necessity, an agent’s actions are determined by its 
nature.79 Third, there is transcendent necessity. In this type of necessity, an agent’s existence 
necessitates certain effects.80  
To determine whether the emanatory scheme described by Neoplatonists depends 
upon a necessary emanation from the One—and to determine which type of necessity might 
apply to that emanation—it is helpful to look more closely at Plotinus’s account of free will 
and the One’s will in the Enneads. As O’Meara notes, Plotinus discusses human freedom as a 
way to understand what freedom in general means. When addressing the higher beings, 
Plotinus seems to say that acting in accord with one’s nature and striving toward the good 
are things that higher beings can do freely.81 When discussing the One, Plotinus seems to say 
that the One is above striving for the Good since it itself is the Good.82 Since the One is above 
everything else, it simply cannot be the sort of being that is bound to external constraints. 
Additionally, the One does not, strictly speaking, have a nature because it is above being.83 So, 
                                               
79 In Plotinus’s Enneads, Plotinus denies that the One has a nature. In later discussions of emanation—such as 
in Avicenna and Aquinas—appeals to God’s nature are made despite each philosopher claiming that God’s 
nature cannot be positively known. The simple denial that God has a nature at all, then, is not a route either 
takes when discussing whether God produces the world necessarily. In fact, Aquinas attributes to Avicenna the 
belief that God emanates by nature—something that Plotinus would deny. It seems also that Taylor would 
deny that any Neoplatonist would endorse the view that the One emanates by nature. See his “Primary 
Causality and ibdā‘ (creare) in the Liber de causis” for a fuller discussion of his views. 
80 “Primary Causality and ibdā‘ (creare) in the Liber de causis,” Wahrheit und Geschichte. Die gebrochene 
Tradition metaphhyischen Denkens. Festschrift zum 7-. Geburtstag von Günther Mensching, hrsg. Alia 
Mensching-Estakhr and Michael Städtler ( Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2012), 127-129. 
81 Plotinus, Enneads VI.8.4. 
82 Plotinus, Enneads VI.8.8. 
83 Plotinus, Enneads VI.8.8. 
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when the One emanates, it cannot emanate by nature. Plotinus also says that the One is 
above will—though he repeatedly describes the One as having and exercising will—so it 
seems incorrect to say that the One emanates by will, either.84 The only remaining way in 
which the One could emanate necessarily, according to Taylor’s analysis, is if the One 
emanates simply because it exists. Whether this is the case is the question to which we now 
turn. 
b. Necessity in Neoplatonic Emanation 
The One emanates, but must it emanate? It seems inappropriate to attribute either of 
the first two types of necessity of the One’s emanation, but it may still be possible to 
attribute the third type of necessity to it. From a perusal of Neoplatonic literature—including 
Plotinus’s Enneads—it seems likely that the One does emanate because of this sort of 
necessity. What it means for the One to be the One is to be something that emanates. When 
discussing whether the One could be otherwise, Plotinus denies that this is possible: to be 
otherwise would mean that the One was not the best.85 It seems that Plotinus would have to 
respond the same way if asked whether the One could do otherwise than it does. To be 
consistent, it would seem that Plotinus should respond that such a thing is impossible, for to 
do otherwise than the One does would mean that it would not do what is best. Elsewhere in 
the Enneads, Plotinus talks as though the existence of things below the One is inevitable.86 
The One’s will—assuming this is an acceptable way to talk about the One—is identical to its 
existence, which means that even if the One emanates by will, the One could not will 
                                               
84 Plotinus, Enneads VI.8.9. 
85 Plotinus, Enneads VI.8.9. 
86 Plotinus, Enneads VI.6; A.C. Lloyd, The Anatomy of Neoplatonism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), 98. 
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something different than to emanate.87Further, the One’s emanation of being external to 
itself is a corollary of its internal contemplation.88 To exist and to be what it is, then, the One 
will emanate.  
In Proclus’s works, the One’s emanation is described in terms of an overflow of 
being from the superabundance of the One.89 What it means, then, for the One to be the 
One is to be the sort of thing that has superabundance. Thus, the One simply is the sort of 
thing that will emanate.90 The One emanates because it is the Good, and it is good for being 
to be proliferated.91 It seems, then, that for the One to be what it is, the One must emanate. 
The One cannot fail to exist and emanate. This scenario accords with Taylor’s transcendent 
necessity. 
3. No patient  
The One produces new being by emanation, and it does not have recourse to any 
material that underlies this new being. The source of the new being is the One, but upon 
producing new being, the One is not lessened or depleted in any way.92 Because the One 
produces being from no underlying material, it seems that emanation can be described as ex  
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88 Lloyd, 99; Remes, 51. 
89 Proclus, Elements of Theology proposition 30. 
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nihilo.93 Lower beings act as representatives of higher beings, for they reflect that which is 
their cause.94 
4. Intermediaries 
The aforementioned Principle of Prior Simplicity helps explain the attractiveness of 
the notion of intermediaries in the chain of being. If the cause is better than the effect, then 
it seems that the first cause must be radically better than that which produces material beings. 
Each effect comes from something less complex than itself.95 Again, when discussing the 
cause of different sorts of beings, Neoplatonists contend that a being ‘higher’ up the chain 
of being is responsible for that being. Intermediaries populating the chain of being are a 
helpful way to explain how physical beings can be produced: a simple being produces more 
                                               
93 Perhaps one might object that emanation is not production ex nihilo: just as light comes from the sun, being 
comes from the One, which means that the One is intimately involved in the production process. The One 
seems to be what underlies this change, for the One is the “stuff” out of which new being is produced. To this 
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used to produce anything, however. Moreover, if the monist’s supposition is accepted, then the monotheistic 
belief that there is a distinction between God and the world—that God and the world are made out of different 
sorts of ‘stuff’—would have to be abandoned (Burrell, Faith and Freedom, 205). Third, the Neoplatonist could 
challenge the monist regarding whether emanation (according to the monist’s understanding) would involve 
production of new being at all. It seems that at least some monists do not endorse ‘bringing about the existence 
of some thing,’ for they are not talking about the existence of x after (in an ontological, not temporal, sense) 
the complete non-existence of x and of the components out of which x is made; instead, they mean the 
transformation of y into x. It is true that x comes into being, but x comes into being and is composed of some 
pre-existing material (the same material as everything else!). At least in the case of the entities in the highest 
echelons of the Neoplatonic hierarchy, it is not the case that these beings are transformed out of something 
that already existed. Instead, new existence springs forth out of nothing.  
94 Lower beings are also said to participate in their cause(s) by simply having being. See Rijk, 7. 
95 O’Meara, 46. 
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complex being, which produces more complex being, and so on until beings that have 
physical, terrestrial matter as a component of one of their parts.96 There remain two 
important issues to discuss: first, how such intermediaries have the power to produce new 
beings; and second, whether Neoplatonists all appeal to intermediary emanators. 
a. Primary causation 
Despite the prevalence of intermediaries in Neoplatonic explanations of the origins 
of what exists, these intermediaries are not entirely independent causal agents. Instead, the 
intermediaries are able to bring about effects through the causal power of the One. Its power 
of causation is in everything that is produced by the One, which means that when something 
produced by the One produces something else, that third thing is also produced by the power 
of the One.97 This cycle of dependence is non-reciprocal: entities ‘lower’ than the One 
depend upon it, but it does not depend upon them.98 Additionally, any entity ‘lower’ than 
another entity can be said to depend upon the ‘higher’ entity. Ultimately, though, the causal 
power of the One is present in anything it produces or anything produced by that thing, 
which means that the power of the One is present in anything that is produced.99 Even if 
there are intermediary entities between, say, humans and the One, humans are ultimately 
                                               
96 Corrigan, 45; Remes, 59-65. 
97 Michael Wagner, Neoplatonism and Nature: Studies in Plotinus’ Enneads (New York: SUNY, 2001), 190; 
Wilberding, 58. See Plotinus, Enneads II.4.1 and Proclus, Elements of Theology proposition 98. 
98 Remes, 43-44. 
99 Rijk, 10. The precise way to understand the presence of that causal power is disputed. One alternative is that 
the causal power from the One sustains the lower beings, and this sustaining act is enough to attribute causal 
power to the One. Another alternative is that the One and the lower beings jointly cause the effect of the lower 
being in question. For a fuller discussion of these alternatives, see Rudi te Velde, Participation and Substantiality in 
Thomas Aquinas (New York: Brill, 1995) 159-169. 
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produced by the power of the One.100 The primary and ever-present cause is the One, and 
through the One’s power, intermediaries are able to act.101  
b. Varieties of Approaches 
Although Neoplatonists seem to think that intermediaries are useful for explaining 
how complex beings come into existence, not every strain of Neoplatonic thought appeals to 
intermediaries in the same way. There are two strains of thought that develop in the middle 
ages. The first develops out of the Plotinian tradition. The Theology of Aristotle, which includes 
both propositions from and commentary upon Plotinus’s Enneads, includes intermediaries in 
the explanation of the existence of the multiplicity of qualitatively and quantitatively distinct 
beings. Wayne Hankey argues that this appeal to intermediaries to explain this multiplicity 
occurs because of another principle present in the Theology of Aristotle: the notion that from 
one simple being, only one simple being can be produced. 102 Because the One is a simple 
“being,” the One can produce only one simple being directly. This being, in turn, is able to 
produce something else. This causal chain of production continues until what is produced 
no longer has the capacity to produce something simple. The hierarchy of being noted above 
is useful for explaining why, at some point, what is produced will not have the capacity to 
produce something simple. Each new being that is produced is of lesser metaphysical quality, 
so to speak, than that which produces it. A useful metaphor is photocopying a copy: if you 
photocopy a copy, the quality degrades. If you use the most recently produced copy for each 
additional copy you make, the quality will continue to degrade. Eventually, what is produced 
                                               
100 Proclus, Elements of Theology proposition 11. See also propositions 12 and 13. 
101 Note, however, that this is not occasionalism. The intermediaries really are acting, and they really are causing 
things. Their power, though, stems from the One. Without the One’s power present in them, they would be 
able to do nothing (and, of course, they would not exist at all).  
102 Wayne Hankey, “Ab Uno Simplici Non Est Nisi Unum: The Place of Natural and Necessary Emanation in 
Aquinas’s Doctrine of Creation,” in Divine Creation in Ancient, Medieval, and Early Modern Thought: Essays Presented 
to the Rev’d Dr. Robert D. Crouse, ed. Michael Treschow, Willemien Otten, and Walter Hannam (New York: Brill, 
2007), 316-7. 
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will barely resemble the original document. A being far down the causal chain of production 
will be far down the hierarchy of being, and it will lack the capacity to itself produce 
something simple. At this point, complex beings (or a complex being) are introduced into 
existence.  
In the strain of Neoplatonism emphasizing the Proclean heritage, the principle that 
from one simple being, one simple being can be produced is de-emphasized. In the Liber de 
Causis, a pseudo-Dionysian work that includes much from Proclus’s Elements of Theology, there 
are intermediaries. However, their role is diminished, and there is no direct appeal to the 
principle that one simple thing can give rise to only one simple thing. Instead, Pseudo-
Dionysius appeals to the distinctions between the First Cause, Soul, and Intelligence to 
explain gradations of being in existence (such as distinctions between humans and other 
animals). The First Cause is said to give rise to Intelligence, but it is also said to produce Soul 
as well; that it produces Soul indirectly through the mediation of Intelligence is not always 
clear.103 It is conceivable that Intelligence, for example, could produce multiple things 
directly. So, while intermediaries are present in both strains, it is not clear that (a) a large 
number of intermediaries are required or (b) intermediaries are required at all to explain the 
multiplicity of qualitatively and quantitatively diverse beings in existence. 
Neoplatonic emanation, then, is an explanation of the origins of the universe in 
which an entity that is perfect, simple, and self-subsistent emanates, and it seems that this 
perfect, simple, self-subsistent entity cannot fail to emanate. Whether directly or indirectly, 
this emanation leads to the existence of multiple qualitatively and quantitatively distinct 
beings, including the sorts of beings that exist today. In producing these beings, there need 
                                               
103 See, for example, Dionysius [pseud.], The Book of Causes, trans. Dennis Brand (Milwaukee: Marquette, 1984), 
III.32-33 and IV.37-48. 
30 
not be any material out of which to form them—it is possible to bring them forth without 
an underlying substrate. In short, the causation in Neoplatonic emanation can be 
summarized thusly: agent E produces effect I if E’s existence invariably leads to the 
existence of I and E initiates an emanation (which involves no underlying patient) that, 
directly or indirectly, results in the existence of I. 
V. Problem of Creation 
 Avicenna and Aquinas are both committed to upholding the traditional doctrine of 
creation and are aware of the different causal models distinguished above. As they recognize, 
however, although each of these models has elements desirable for explaining creation, 
neither can be adopted without qualification. Precisely why this is the case is explored in 
greater detail below, and that exploration leads to the Problem of Creation. 
A. Aristotelian Efficient Causation and Creation 
 Aristotelian efficient causation is potentially a desirable way to explain divine creating 
for several reasons. Components of this causal theory seem to easily cohere to the 
monotheistic understanding of creation. Primarily, in Aristotelian efficient causation, an 
agent is responsible for bringing about a change. This agent can, in the context of divine 
creating, be understood as God. By acting, God brings about the existence of the universe 
by acting; thus, God is an agent in a manner similar to the sculptor being an agent that 
produces a statue. God as agent producing the universe precisely aligns with the 
monotheistic account of divine creating. 
 Additionally, Aristotelian efficient causation can be used to explain how God, as 
agent, can bring about the existence of the universe voluntarily. While an efficient cause can 
act either by nature or by will, the monotheistic conception of creating entails that God 
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creates voluntarily. The monotheistic conception of creation also includes the belief that 
God creates freely and voluntarily, and Aristotelian efficient causation can be used to explain 
how an agent can act voluntarily, which is the first step toward showing the action to be free. 
Thus, Aristotelian efficient causation is attractive way to explain divine creating because it 
provides philosophical support for the theological convictions that God creates and that 
God creates voluntarily.  
 Aristotelian efficient causation begins to be an unattractive way to explain divine 
creating when one considers the other component of change, the patient. In every instance of 
efficient causation discussed by Aristotle, the agent operates upon some pre-existing matter. 
A sculptor works upon a lump of bronze rather than producing, from no other matter, the 
bronze upon which it works. A builder constructs a house out of timber and clay, but the 
builder must procure those resources rather than produce them out of no other pre-existing 
material. Even in the generation of new life, there exists material out of which that new life is 
formed, namely semen and menstrual blood. From Aristotle’s account of efficient causation, 
then, it seems impossible to understand creating as efficient causation because in creating, 
God produces the universe out of no pre-existing material. God acts upon no patient, which 
seems to mean that God’s act cannot be explained in terms of Aristotelian efficient 
causation. 
B. Neoplatonic Emanation and Creation 
 Given that Neoplatonic emanation allows for causation without any underlying 
patient, it seems to allow for a type of causation essential to explaining creation and hence 
succeed where the Aristotelian model fails. Islamic and Christian doctrine state that in 
creating, God brings the very being of the universe about in creation. Neoplatonic 
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emanation fits with the monotheistic conception of divine creating because in emanation, 
something comes to exist that did not previously exist. In contrast to Aristotelian efficient 
causation, in which an actor acts on a patient, emanation neither requires nor presupposes 
the existence of something like a patient in order for God to act. Thus, Neoplatonic 
emanation might allow Avicenna and Aquinas to bypass any tensions arising between the 
assertion of creation ex nihilo and the Aristotelian account of efficient causation. 
 The notion of an emanation or flowing forth seems to fit with much of the 
monotheistic conception of creation. The mode of creation as described in the Hebrew bible 
and mentioned in the Christian scriptures and the Qur’an does assert that God brings forth 
these new beings, but it neither includes nor denies emanation as this mode of bringing 
forth. According to the Hebrew bible, God speaks, and this speech act results in the 
existence of something new. It is at least conceivable that one can describe what results from 
this speech act as being the result of an emanation.  
The Neoplatonic conception of emanation begins to deviate from the monotheistic 
conception of creating on the necessity of creating. In the monotheistic conception of 
creating, creating is a voluntary act of God that is also understood as a free act of God. As 
noted above, there are some passages in the Neoplatonic corpus that could be used to argue 
that the One wills what the One does. Thus, it is possible that Neoplatonic emanation can 
account for the volitional aspect of divine creating. However, given that Neoplatonic 
emanation is understood as a necessary flowing forth of the One—the One, being the One, 
cannot fail to emanate—it is not immediately evident that Neoplatonic emanation can 
account for God’s free creation of the universe. In fact, it seems implausible that Neoplatonic 
emanation can account for a free emanation on God’s part because the Neoplatonic account 
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entails that, as a facet of the One’s existence, the One must emanate. Neither the Christian 
nor Islamic conception of God’s free creation of the universe align with this Neoplatonic 
notion that God simply must emanate because God is God. Thus, it seems that Neoplatonic 
emanation is an unattractive theory of causation for explaining how God creates the universe 
despite the theory having some useful or attractive features. The centrality of freedom in the 
monotheistic understanding of divine creating suggests that Neoplatonic emanation would 
not be a helpful theory for explaining God’s creating the universe. 
C. The Problem of Creation 
 What I have termed the ‘Problem of Creation’ should now be becoming evident. 
Each of the philosophical theories to which Avicenna and Aquinas have recourse as means 
to explain how God created the universe clearly align in certain respects but not in other 
respects with the monotheistic conception of creating to which both are beholden. 
Explaining divine creating in terms of Aristotelian efficient causation would accurately 
reflect the beliefs that God acts in creating and that this action is voluntary; however, it 
seems that Aristotelian efficient causation requires a patient, a requirement that conflicts 
with the monotheistic conception of God creating ex nihilo. Explaining divine creating in 
terms of Neoplatonic emanation would accurately reflect the belief that God produces new 
being ex nihilo, but such an explanation seems to imply that God creates not because God 
wills to create but because God must create. Each philosophical theory of causation captures 
and expresses something important from the monotheistic conception of creating, but each 
philosophical theory also fails to express something equally important from the monotheistic 
conception of creating.  
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 In short, Aristotelian efficient causation seems to imply that divine creating cannot 
occur ex nihilo, and Neoplatonic emanation seems to imply that divine creating is something 
that God must do. It seems that in order to speak of God as efficient cause of the world, 
one would have to deny creation ex nihilo—an important tenet of Avicenna’s and Aquinas’s 
theological traditions. Because the Neoplatonic theory of emanation seems to entail that the 
maximally good thing emanates in virtue of what it is—a maximally good thing—such an 
emanation seems to be a necessary result of God’s essence or existence; thus, it seems not to 
be contingent upon God’s will, which means it is not a voluntary emanation. It seems that, 
by endorsing Neoplatonic emanation as a causal model of divine creating, one must deny 
voluntary creating, a central element of the monotheistic account of divine creating. 
 1. The Problem 
 It seems, then, that Avicenna and Aquinas have access to causal models that do not 
fit neatly with the monotheistic concept of divine creating. Creating, as understood in both 
Islam and Christianity, is the bringing about of existence of the universe by God, who acts 
voluntarily and who brings about the existence of the universe ex nihilo. While emanation fits 
with creation ex nihilo, creation by emanation does not seem to be voluntary. While 
Aristotelian efficient causation fits with creation being voluntary, such creation would not be 
ex nihilo because Aristotelian efficient causation seems to require a patient. These facts raise 
what we might think of as the ‘problem of creation’: neither of these causal theories seems 
compatible with creation, so Avicenna and Aquinas seem to be faced with a difficult  
choice. They must either 
(a) deny the apparent incompatibility; 
(b) modify their understanding of creation; or 
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(c) develop an entirely new account of causation that is compatible with creation. 
In order to address how God creates from a philosophical perspective, it seems that 
Avicenna and Aquinas will each be forced to select one of these options. 
 2. Proposed Solutions 
I argue that both Avicenna and Aquinas solve the problem of creation by selecting 
solution (a), to deny the apparent incompatibility between the monotheistic conception of 
divine creating and the philosophical accounts of causation. Avicenna and Aquinas address 
the apparent incompatibility between the monotheistic creation account and each 
philosophical theory of causation. Although they select the same approach and attempt to 
solve each apparent incompatibility, their specific methods for solving the problem of 
creation are not identical. 
Perhaps the fact that they each select solution (a) is somewhat unsurprising given 
some peculiarities of the medieval approach to philosophical thought. Jettisoning any 
significant portion of their theological or philosophical heritages would likely be undesirable 
for Avicenna or Aquinas given three closely related beliefs that motivate much of Medieval 
philosophers’ work. First is the belief that all truth coheres. Whatever is true, then, will not 
contradict other true statements. Within the scope of this project, it is important to note that 
medieval philosophers believed that if reason, nature (what we might today class as natural 
science), and religion reveal truth about the world, then those revelations of truth must not 
contradict each other. The second closely related belief is that different sources or different 
fields of study can be harmonized. The belief that all truth coheres lead medievals to believe 
that, when properly understood, different fields of study would not come to radically 
different conclusions on identical topics. The expectation that truth could not be 
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contradictory led medievals to attempt to explain how apparent contradictions were not 
actual contradictions. Additionally, medievals believed that it was worthwhile to hold onto 
the knowledge gained by those who came before. Retaining the knowledge of their 
predecessors—particularly work that supported or aligned with their religious or 
philosophical viewpoint—was desirable for medieval thinkers. The approach to learning—a 
quest for wisdom and truth—remained important throughout the medieval period in both 
the East and the West.104 Islamic philosophers enriched their religious studies with 
philosophy and natural science.105 Throughout the medieval period, the inclination to retain 
as much of one’s philosophical and theological heritage as possible was strong. 
The option, then, of solving the problem of creation by selecting solution (b), to 
modify their understanding of creation, would run counter to these medieval inclinations. As 
noted, it seems that in order to explain creating in terms of Aristotelian efficient causation, 
one would have to deny creation ex nihilo. Given that creation ex nihilo is a central 
component of the monotheistic conception of creating, Avicenna and Aquinas would be 
purging an important aspect of the monotheistic understanding of divine creating. They 
would be abandoning an important part of their theological heritages in denying creation ex 
nihilo. However, were they to endorse Neoplatonic emanation as the causal explanation of 
divine creating, it seems that they would have to deny that God creates voluntarily. The 
belief in God creating voluntarily (rather than as the result of God’s essence or nature) is 
also central to the monotheistic conception of creating, which means that explaining creation 
in terms of Neoplatonic emanation seems to also require that Avicenna and Aquinas 
abandon an important part of their theological heritage. If Avicenna or Aquinas were to pick 
                                               
104 Marrone, 16, 20-21. 
105 Marrone, 21. 
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option (b), it seems that they would need to abandon either the belief that God creates ex 
nihilo or the belief that God creates voluntarily. Because these beliefs are important elements 
of the monotheistic conception of creating, Avicenna and Aquinas would be altering—
perhaps substantially—their understanding of divine creating.  
Solving the problem of creation by selecting solution (c), to develop an entirely new 
account of causation that is compatible with creation, runs counter to these medieval 
inclinations. While much innovation happens even when medieval cast their views as 
statements of traditional positions, developing an entirely new account of causation would 
require them to deny, to abandon, or to contradict central elements of the causal theories 
with which they were already familiar. In light of the medieval inclination to harmonize and 
to retain as much of their heritage as possible, this approach would have required them to 
abandon significant elements of the philosophical heritage embodied in Aristotelian and 
Neoplatonic thought.  
c. Perceived Solution 
As will be further explored in much greater detail in chapters two and three, I argue 
that Avicenna and Aquinas each solve the problem of creation by denying that the apparent 
incompatibility between divine creating and philosophical theories of causation is a genuine 
incompatibility. While Avicenna and Aquinas both solve the problem by denying the reality 
of the incompatibility, they do not do so in identical ways. Avicenna addresses the problem 
raised by the apparent incompatibility of Neoplatonic emanation and divine creating, namely 
that it seems that Neoplatonic emanation entails that divine creating occur because God 
must create rather than because God wills to create. According to Avicenna, Neoplatonic 
emanation properly understood does not preclude God emanating voluntarily: God emanates 
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because God wills to emanate; this emanation does not occur merely as a result of God’s 
nature or essence. Interestingly, Avicenna also addresses the apparent incompatibility 
between Aristotelian efficient causation and divine creating, asserting that, when properly 
understood, Aristotelian efficient causation must include efficient causation ex nihilo. These 
solutions are examined in great detail in chapter two. The controlling assumptions guiding 
Avicenna’s interpretation of Aristotelian efficient causation are rooted in his conceptions of 
necessity and of the distinction between being and essence, conceptions that are heavily 
influenced by Neoplatonic thought. So, while Avicenna does answer the problem of creation 
by denying the incompatibility between creation and each philosophical account of 
causation, I maintain that his primary focus is solving the problem of necessary creation. 
Aquinas has a different primary focus. Instead of concentrating on addressing the 
purported necessity of creation in Neoplatonic emanation, Aquinas addresses creating ex 
nihilo. Aquinas speaks of creation primarily in terms of Aristotelian efficient causation, and 
thus Aquinas must explain how it is possible for an Aristotelian efficient cause to act without 
a patient. Aquinas seems to think that a proper understanding of Aristotelian efficient 
causation entails that one takes action to be the primary indicator of efficient causation. Thus, 
when an agent acts—with or without a patient upon which to act—that agent is an efficient 
cause. Aquinas also speaks of creation as emanation, though it seems that his understanding 
of emanation bears little resemblance to Neoplatonic emanation. Both Aquinas’s explanation 
of creation ex nihilo as Aristotelian efficient causation and his explanation of creation as 
emanation are explored in chapter three. Even when explaining creation as emanation, 
Aquinas makes use of Aristotelian language and concepts, which suggests that the 
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fundamental way in which Aquinas understands God creating is through Aristotelian terms, 
as I argue in chapter four.  
VI. Conclusion 
 Avicenna and Aquinas are faced with the daunting prospect of retaining their 
philosophical and religious heritages while solving the problem of creation, which arises out 
of the apparent incompatibility of the monotheistic conception of divine creating and the 
philosophical conceptions of causation embodied in Aristotelian efficient causation and 
Neoplatonic emanation. Though both philosophers solve this problem of creation by 
asserting that any incompatibility is merely apparent—and offering detailed explanations for 
why this is the case—their approaches are yet distinct. Avicenna focuses on solving the 
problem of necessary creation, and in so doing, he is also able to solve the problem of 
creation ex nihilo. Aquinas focuses on solving the problem of creation ex nihilo, and in so 
doing, he is able to solve the problem of necessary creation as well. These distinct 
approaches to solving the problem of creation reveal different controlling assumptions in 
Avicenna’s and Aquinas’s philosophies. Before exploring these controlling assumptions, 
which I examine in chapter four, it is necessary to study Avicenna’s and then Aquinas’s 











 In this chapter, I defend the claim that Avicenna assumes the truth of Neoplatonic 
emanation as a model of causation and explains that Neoplatonic emanation is not 
incompatible with creation. Avicenna’s creation account reveals that he holds a version of 
the Neoplatonic emantionist model of creation, but he does not take all of the characteristics 
of Neoplatonic emanation to be essential to Neoplatonic emanation. Next, I address what 
appears to be an obvious problem for the application of this model to creation—namely, 
that creation as emanation seems to be non-voluntary. Finally, I explain the relationship 
between Avicenna’s creation account, understood as voluntary emanation, and ordinary 
Aristotelian efficient causation.  
II. A Neoplatonic Approach 
Avicenna presents his account of the Necessary Existent’s—that is, God’s—creative 
act in book nine of his Metaphysics of the Healing, which is a loose commentary on Aristotle’s 
Metaphysics. In the Metaphysics of the Healing, Avicenna addresses both the details of Aristotle’s 
discussions of metaphysical topics and the implications of Aristotle’s metaphysics. Avicenna 
begins the Metaphysics of the Healing by delineating what the subject matter of metaphysics is. 
The primary subject is being as such, but a discussion of being calls for a discussion of the 
production of being. When distinguishing between possible beings—beings which are 
dependent on something else for their existence—and necessary beings—beings which 
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cannot fail to exist, which can be necessary in themselves (that is, they cannot fail to exist) or 
necessary through another (that is, they are dependent beings but cannot fail to exist because 
of the being on which they are dependent)—Avicenna reasons that all contingent beings 
have a cause, and this cause is God.106 A first cause exists and causes the existence of all 
other beings.107 This first cause is itself uncaused.108 This uncaused cause is a necessary being, 
and Avicenna appeals to the existence of this necessary being to explain the existence of all 
possible and contingent beings.  
Having spent the first several chapters of the Metaphysics of the Healing explaining that 
there is a necessarily existing being that is immaterial, entirely simple, and self-subsisting, 
Avicenna discusses how beings come to exist which are material, complex, transient, and not 
self-subsistent. “The being of all things which exist is from the [Necessary Existent],” 
Avicenna states at the beginning of fourth chapter of book nine of his Metaphysics of the 
Healing, where he begins to explain God’s creative act.109 God, who is an immaterial being, 
acts to create by an act of its intellect, specifically by apprehending its own essence. 
According to Avicenna, because God exists necessarily, God has the best possible existence; 
here he clearly follows his Neoplatonic forerunners.110  
                                               
106 Avicenna, Metaphysics of the Healing II.2 p. 48 1-2. 
107 Avicenna, Metaphysics of the Healing VIII.1 p. 259 12-16. 
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4.  
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Since God’s existence is the best possible existence, God apprehending God’s 
essence is identical to God apprehending “the order of the good in existence.”111 God 
apprehends the order of good in existence when God apprehends God’s own essence 
because God’s essence is the principle of the order of good in existence. As the best possible 
being—that is, a being which exists necessarily—God is an essence that includes all possible 
goodness. All goodness, then, is present in God. God recognizes that God’s own necessary 
existence is the best sort of existence, but God also recognizes that things which would exist 
contingently would also be good. God is able to consider all such aspects of goodness and 
existence including the potential goodness of possible beings, that is, any being which could 
possibly exist.112 So, when God apprehends God’s own existence, God recognizes the 
goodness of what exists and the order of goodness in what could possibly exist.113 
God apprehends God’s own existence (and, therefore, the good in existence) in one 
intellectual act. God does not intellectually apprehend God’s own existence in an 
apprehension that moves from potentiality to actuality or an apprehension of one intelligible 
thing, then an apprehension of another, then another, et cetera. If God were to apprehend 
God’s own existence in multiple intellectual acts, then God’s initial apprehension would not 
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being but contains in its simplicity the knowledge of all other possible beings in the knowledge it has of itself. 
See Jon McGinnis, Avicenna, Great Medieval Thinkers, ed. Brian Davies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2010).  
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be fully actualized. Avicenna has already explained that God lacks any potentiality— God is 
fully actualized—and thus God’s actions must be as well. So, God must apprehend God’s 
own existence and all corollary information about God’s own goodness and the potential 
goodness of possible beings in one intellectual act.114 
God apprehends both that the order of good in what would exist contingently and 
that these beings could possibly exist; in addition, God apprehends that the best thing would 
be for all of these possible beings to exist. Having apprehended the order of good in what 
would exist possibly, that these possible beings could come to exist, and that it would be 
good for these things to exist, God brings about the existence of those beings. So, this single 
intellectual act is the cause of all other beings which exist. 
God’s intellectual act causes the existence of these possible beings, Avicenna says, 
because God’s will is the same as God’s knowledge and power. So, if God apprehends the 
order of good in possible beings, the fact that possible beings could come to exist, and the 
goodness of them existing, God wills for these things to be so. Additionally, if God wills for 
these things to be so, God makes these things so. Thus, God brings about the existence of 
these possible beings “by way of a necessity of his existence,” and it is a “necessary 
consequence of his existence.”115 God, apprehending Godself, cannot fail to know that God 
is maximally good, that God is the principle of the order of good in possible beings, that 
such possible beings could come into existence, and that it would be good if such beings did 
                                               
114 Avicenna, Metaphysics of the Healing IX.4.4. By apprehending this at one time, God performs a fully actualized 
action that does not threaten divine immutability. Further, since all that exists are God and the thought God 
thinks, Avicenna does not believe that this threatens divine simplicity; God is one, and God thinks one large 
thought (which seems to be a string of conjoined or disjoined propositions). Perhaps one might object that the 
thought God thinks entails that there are already a multiplicity of existing things: there is God, and there is the 
thought. Avicenna does not share this viewpoint. He does not assert that the thought apprehended by God 
introduces multiplicity into existence; instead, he seems to treat the thought as a property that God has—not 
something which can properly be said to exist. What exists (and exists necessarily) is God.  
115 Avicenna, Metaphysics of the Healing IX.4.4; Liber de Philosophia Prima sive Scientia Divina V-X A402 89-90 p. 479: 
“secundum viam comitandi”, “necesse esse omnibus siuis modis”.  
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exist. Being a necessarily existing being, God necessarily has all of the aspects of God’s 
existence. Since for God to know is to will is to do and since God cannot be otherwise than 
God is, God necessarily brings about the existence of the universe, by which I mean 
separated intellects, the celestial realms, the terrestrial realm, and all material beings.116 The 
universe117 and all that is in it is a “necessary concomitant” of God.118 
God brings about the existence of the universe via the emanation of something 
distinct from God’s own essence. This act of emanating, however, does not directly produce 
all beings other than God. Instead, Avicenna notes that what is emanated is something like 
God.119 God is a unified, simple being, so what is emanated directly by God must also be a 
unified, simple being. Because a simple being is (by definition) not composed of parts, a 
simple being cannot immediately produce a being which can be divided into parts—either 
                                               
116 Avicenna, Metaphysics of the Healing IX.4.4. That God emanates as a result of its essence is a theme developed 
by Beatrice H. Zedler in “Saint Thomas and Avicenna in the De Potentia Dei” Traditio VI (1948): 105-159. 
Zedler contrasts Avicenna’s conception of the creative emanation as a “natural” emanation with Aquinas’s 
conception of the creative emanation as voluntary. Given the discussion which follows in section two of this 
chapter, Zedler’s interpretation seems short-sighted. While Avicenna does say that God emanates because of 
what it is, Avicenna also asserts that God emanates because it wills to. Thus, it seems incorrect to assert that 
Avicenna’s Necessary Existent emanates as a result of nature rather than as a result of will. See section two of 
this chapter for a more detailed discussion of this point.  
117 As noted in chapter 1, I use the term ‘universe’ as a catch-all term meaning the physical universe—the 
empyrean heavens, the terrestrial realm, and all that populates them—and the immaterial beings other than 
God (beings that, according to Avicenna and Aquinas, exist). When speaking of a particular part of the universe 
(such as the terrestrial realm versus the celestial realm), I will specify that I am doing so. 
118 Avicenna, Metaphysics of the Healing IX.4.18. “Concomitant” is a technical term; the meaning and usage of this 
term will be discussed in detail below. For now, suffice it to say that as long as God exists, the universe also 
exists. Additionally, this process of emanation, it must be noted, is not a process that begins after God has 
existed by itself. According to Avicenna, God is eternal, which means that God self-subsists, is fully actual, and 
is not bound by time. God cannot change, for change is dependent upon the passage of time. Accordingly, 
there is no time ‘before’ the universe began to exist. God emanates for as long as God exists, but this does not 
make the universe eternal. The universe is sempiternal because it is ontologically posterior to God. So, while it is 
true that the universe always exists, God nonetheless is the ontologically superior being. See Avicenna, 
Metaphysics of the Healing IV.1 p. 124-126; Acar, Talking about God and Talking about Creation: Avicenna’s and Thomas 
Aquinas’ Positions, Vol. 58, Islamic Philosophy Theology and Science: Texts and Studies, eds. H. Daiber and D. 
Pingree,144 (Boston: Brill, 2005), 90-91. 
119 See Liber de Philosophia Prima sive Scientia Divina V-X IX.4, p. 481; Metaphysics of the Healing IX.4.5; Wayne 
Hankey, “Ab Uno Simplici non est nisi Unum: The Place of Natural and Necessary Emanation in Aquinas’s 
Doctrine of Creation,” in Divine Creation in Ancient, Medieval, and Early Modern Thought: Essays Presented to the 
Revered Dr. Robert D. Crouse, Michael Treschow, et. al, eds. (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 323-328. 
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into matter and form or into multiple distinct beings.120 In order for a multiplicity or for a 
composite being to be produced, those new beings must come from a producer that has 
different aspects to its essence. It is these different aspects of an agent’s essence that 
accounts for the diversity in the effect(s).121 If an agent has a unified being, that agent can 
directly produce neither multiple beings nor composite beings. Such an agent cannot 
produce multiple beings because this would involve multiple actions, and multiple actions 
imply multiplicity in the agent. Avicenna provides two reasons why a unified agent cannot 
produce composite beings. First, a being composed of form and matter would be produced 
because the form and the matter correspond to distinct aspects of the agent’s essence; since 
the agent in question is unified, it cannot have such distinct aspects.122 Second, Avicenna says 







                                               
120 God cannot produce a being that is composed of matter and form because such a being would have 
composite parts. Additionally, even if it were possible for God to produce a material being, God would not do 
such a thing. Matter is passive, Avicenna says, and thus it would be impossible for a material being to cause the 
existence of other beings. Further, Avicenna asserts that the being which God creates must be permanent, and 
a material being comes to be from matter and form. The so-called permanent part of a material being is its 
form, and thus even if a material being could cause the existence of other beings, the material being would be 
doing what, properly speaking, only its form can do. See Metaphysics of the Healing IX.4.8. 
121 Metaphysics of the Healing IX.4.5. 
122 Metaphysics of the Healing IX.4.5. 
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beings than the agent, for no material being can be a unified being.123 Because God’s essence 
is unified, God cannot be a producer of a multiplicity or of a composite being.124 
Accordingly, God can emanate one simple being—a being which is one in number, simple, 
and immaterial. This being is called the First Intellect.125  
A. Additional Emanations 
As a result of God’s emanation of the First Intellect, two simple, immaterial beings 
now exist. Despite the fact that the First Intellect is like God, God and the First Intellect are 
fundamentally different. God is a being whose existence does not depend upon any being: 
God does not owe God’s existence to any other being, and God is self-subsistent. 
Accordingly, Avicenna calls God a being that is necessary in itself. The First Intellect is a 
being whose existence depends upon another being, namely God. Avicenna calls this type of 
dependent being a being that is possible. Because the First Intellect is dependent upon 
                                               
123 See Metaphysics of the Healing IX.4.18. Avicenna asserts that a unified being cannot produce a composite being 
because that composite being would belong to a different species than the unified being. The unstated principle 
upon which he relies is Aristotle’s principle that a being always produces its like; that is, a dolphin can produce 
a dolphin but not a horse. It might seem that Avicenna is saying that an immaterial being cannot produce a 
material being; however, this is not an accurate interpretation. Instead, he says that a simple being cannot 
produce a material being. He acknowledges that the Intellects are not entirely simple—they are possible in 
themselves and necessary through another—and this multiplicity in their natures allows them to produce 
something corporeal (the celestial spheres and, eventually, the terrestrial sphere).  
124 See Metaphysics of the Healing I.7 for Avicenna’s arguments regarding why God must be one simple being. See 
also chapter 38 in Avicenna’s Metaphysica, in The Metaphysica of Avicenna: A critical translation-commentary and 
analysis of the fundamental arguments in Avicenna’s Metaphysica in the Danish Nama-i ‘ala’i, trans. Peter Morewedge 
(New York: Colombia, 1973) (henceforth, Metaphysica) for further discussion of the principle that from one 
simple being, one simple being can be emanated. According to Hankey, Avicenna emphasizes the likeness 
between the emanator and what is emanated. Because what is emanated is like the emanator, what is emanated 
must have some properties similar to the properties of the emanator. God, as a necessarily existing being, can 
only have certain properties: it must be self-subsistent, simple, and a single, unified being. What is emanated 
cannot be self-subsistent, for it is originated by another being. However, it must be simple and a single unified 
being if it is to be like God at all. As a result of his adherence to the principle that the effect must be like the 
cause, Avicenna argues that from a simple, unified being, only one thing—another simple, unified being—can 
be produced. This principle, ab uno simplici non est nisi unum, deviates from Farabi’s understanding of the 
emanation from the First [being]. Farabi stated that the First directly emanates all that exists, and many of these 
beings are unlike the First in that they are corporeal (and thus not simple). See Al-Farabi, On the Perfect State: Abu 
Nasr Al-Farabi’s Mabadi’ ara’ ahl al-medina al-fadila, transl. R. Walzer (Oxford: Oxford, 1985), 95, 112. See 
Hankey, 323-326 for a continued discussion. 
125 Avicenna, Metaphysics of the Healing IX.4.4-6. 
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something else for its origination, when considered in itself, the First Intellect could either 
exist or could not exist. It does not have the power to bring itself into existence.126  
Avicenna also considers the First Intellect’s existence from the perspective of God. 
God cannot fail to bring about the existence of the First Intellect, and thus the First 
Intellect’s existence, when considered from the perspective of the relationship between God 
and the First Intellect, is necessary. Once a being that is necessary through another comes 
into existence by the powers of this other agent, it continues to exist by the power of its 
originator. So, the First Intellect is a being which is necessary through another and possible 
in itself: it is a being that is necessary through another because it is dependent God for its 
existence (but God cannot fail to bring about the existence of the First Intellect), and it is a 
being possible in itself because it exists but does not have the power to bring itself into 
existence or keep itself existing.127 Despite the fact that the First Intellect is like God insofar 
as it is a simple, immaterial being, the First Intellect differs from God because God is being 
which is necessary in itself while the First Intellect is a being which is necessary through 
another and possible in itself. 
The source of numerical multiplicity and qualitative difference that can be seen in the 
universe must still be explained. From God originates multiplicity and qualitative difference 
insofar as God emanates the First Intellect. From the First Intellect, however, originates 
multiplicity and qualitative difference found in the celestial and terrestrial universe insofar as 
                                               
126 Avicenna, Metaphysics of the Healing I.6 p. 31 7-38-p. 33 1-20. 
127 Avicenna distinguishes between two modalities of being: those which are necessary and those which are 
possible. A being can be necessary through itself or through another. A being that is necessary through itself is 
a being that cannot fail to exist. It exists and subsists through its own power. A being that is necessary through 
another is a being that is brought about by another agent and is sustained by that agent. A possible being can is 
a being that can either exist or fail to exist. A possible being is a non-necessary being. According to Avicenna’s 
schema, a being that is necessary through another is also a possible being insofar as it could theoretically not 
exist. Its essence is dependent on another, just like any other possible being. A being that is necessary through 
another, though, will not fail to exist. For why this is, see section C below, where Avicenna’s theory of efficient 
causation is explored.  
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the First Intellect emanates a plurality. The First Intellect, being intellect, contemplates its 
own existence and the existence of God. As a result of this reflection, there arises a plurality 
in the First Intellect.128 The First Intellect intellectually apprehends its own existence and the 
existence of God. When the First Intellect considers its own existence, it apprehends that its 
existence is necessary through another but possible in itself. Apprehending its existence as a 
possible, dependent existence, the First Intellect emanates a celestial body, namely the 
outermost sphere of the stars. It is because the First Intellect intellectually grasps its own 
dependent existence that it emanates the outermost celestial sphere and the matter of which 
it is composed. Avicenna associates matter with potency, and thus the material celestial 
sphere arises from the First Intellect’s apprehension of its own (limited) potentiality.129 
Apprehending its existence as necessary through another, the First Intellect emanates 
the soul of this outermost sphere. The First Intellect recognizes that although it is a 
dependent being, it is a dependent being that cannot fail to exist from the perspective of 
God. As a result of this recognition, the First Intellect emanates something immaterial, 
namely the soul which inhabits the outermost sphere of the stars. This immaterial soul 
                                               
128 Avicenna, Metaphysics of the Healing IX.4.19. Here, I disagree with McGinnis. McGinnis asserts that God made 
the First Intellect with multiplicity inherently in it. Avicenna contends that the First Intellect is, like God, an 
entirely simple being. The multiplicity of the First Intellect does not, Avicenna asserts, come from God. 
Instead, the multiplicity of the First Intellect is a result of the ontological status of the First Intellect. Unlike 
God, which is a being that is necessary in itself, the First Intellect is originated by another being. So, even 
though the First Intellect is necessary through another, it is still a possible being. Even though it is necessary 
through God, the First Intellect, when considered in itself, could either exist or not exist. When the First 
Intellect realizes this fact about itself, the First Intellect emanates. So, from one perspective—that is, the 
perspective of the First Intellect’s essence—the First Intellect is simple. From another perspective—that of the 
First Intellect’s ontological status—the First Intellect is not simple. The First Intellect’s ontological status is 
what leads to the First Intellect emanating both its sphere and the soul of that sphere. I do not think that 
Avicenna believed that the First Intellect was a complex being as emanated from God. Any complexity in the 
First Intellect is dependent on a matter of perspective rather than an essential feature of its essence. Further, 
Avicenna is clear that the multiplicity in the universe originates from the fact that the First Intellect has this dual 
ontological status not with the fact that the First Intellect has this dual ontological status. That is, Avicenna says 
that the First Intellect being both necessary (in one way) and possible (in another) gives rise to multiplicity and 
qualitative difference; the First Intellect’s ontological status is not presented by Avicenna to be that multiplicity 
and qualitative difference. See McGinnis, 204. 
129 Avicenna, Metaphysica, §53 p. 99. 
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reflects the circumscribed necessity of the First Intellect’s existence; God cannot fail to bring 
about the existence of the First Intellect, and thus the First Intellect is necessary through 
another.130 
Apprehending the existence of God, the First Intellect emanates the Second 
Intellect.131 Its reflection upon the fact that God’s existence is necessary in itself causes the 
First Intellect to emanate a being that is similar (in some ways) to God. The First Intellect 
emanates an immaterial, simple being that has powers of intellection; however, because the 
First Intellect apprehends the existence of God imperfectly, this Second Intellect is a lesser 
being than the First Intellect. There now exists both qualitatively and quantitatively different 
beings: God, the First Intellect, the outermost celestial sphere and its soul, and the Second 
Intellect. From this initial plurality—which is does not arise because of any plurality in the 
essence of God—it is possible to derive the multiplicity of qualitatively different things 
found in the universe including what is found in the terrestrial realm.  
 Although the First Intellect emanates a multiplicity of things with qualitative 
differences, this emanation does not directly result in the existence of the each of the 
celestial spheres or the terrestrial universe. The terrestrial realm arises after a chain of 
emanations from the Intellects. The Second Intellect, also being intellect, goes through a 
process of intellectual apprehension similar to that of the First Intellect. When the Second 
Intellect considers itself as a possible being, as a being necessary through another, and then 
considers God, it emanates a second sphere of the heavens, the soul of that sphere, and a 
Third Intellect, respectively. This process continues until ten intellects have been 
                                               
130 Avicenna, Metaphysics of the Healing IX.4.11. 
131 Avicenna, Metaphysics of the Healing IX.4.11. 
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emanated.132 The tenth is the Agent Intellect, also known as the Giver of Forms.133 For 
Avicenna, the metaphysical distance, so to speak, between the Agent Intellect and God is so 
great that the Agent Intellect cannot emanate a heavenly sphere.134 According to Avicenna, 
the later emanations have less reality and more dependency than the former emanations. 
Thus, the Agent Intellect lacks the reality to emanate a heavenly sphere and instead emanates 
a terrestrial sphere, the lunar sphere. In addition, it emanates the soul of the lunar sphere. 
Given the metaphysical distance, so to speak, between the Agent Intellect and God, the 
Agent Intellect does not have the ability to emanate something entirely immaterial. So, the 
Agent Intellect emanates mixed beings—beings that are both material and immaterial.135 
These possible beings require a substrate to exist, which accounts for the matter of the 
matter-form composite.136 It is these possible beings which are subject to change.137 
According to Avicenna, the emanative process cannot continue ad infinitum because lesser 
emanations lack the ability to emanate immaterial beings.  
The existence of multiple beings and qualitatively different beings and the universe 
which they populate, then, can ultimately be traced back to God. God is the ultimate but not 
direct cause of all that exists. God directly causes the existence of neither the celestial realms, 
                                               
132 Avicenna does not consistently assert that ten intellects are produced. In his Danishnama ‘alā'i, for example, 
he does not number the emanations. Avicenna, Metaphysica, §39 p. 78-79. 
133 As Kara Richardson mentions in her dissertation, The Metaphysics of Agency: Avicenna and his Legacy, Avicenna 
does not use the name “Giver of Forms” regarding the Tenth Intellect in Metaphysics of the Healing IX.5; 
however, Avicenna describes the work of such a being as giving forms in Metaphysics of the Healing VI.2. Thus, it 
seems that the principle who bestows forms must be the same principle as the Agent Intellect. See Kara 
Richardson, “The Metaphysics of Agency: Avicenna and his Legacy” (Ph.D. diss., University of Toronto, 
2008), 6-7. Richardson is responding to Jules Janssen’s article “The Notions of Wāhib al-Suwar (Giver of 
Forms) and Wāhib al-‘Aql (Bestower of Intelligence) in Ibn Sīnā,” In Actes du XIe Congrès International de 
Philosophie Médiévale de S.I.E.P.M., 2002, eds. M. Pacheco et J. Meirinhos. (Turnhout:  
Brepols, 2006), 551-562.  
134 In the Danishnama ‘ala'i, Avicenna states that the more potentiality a being has, the farther it is from the 
primary being. Avicenna, Metaphysica, §53 p. 99. 
135 Avicenna, Metaphysics of the Healing IX.4; IX.5. 
136 Avicenna, Metaphysics of the Healing IV.2. 
137 Avicenna, Metaphysics of the Healing IX.4.19. 
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the terrestrial realm, or all other beings (whether material or immaterial), but God does 
produce the being that initiates the chain of production that results in the existence of 
additional Intellects, the celestial realms, the terrestrial realm, and what populates the 
terrestrial realm. Each of the Intellects are causes in their own right, for each produces either 
a celestial or terrestrial realm and the soul of that realm. The Giver of Forms directly 
produces not only the lunar realm and its soul but also the beings that populate that realm. 
God is the ultimate but not immediate source of all that exists—immaterial beings, celestial 
realms, the terrestrial realm, and material beings. Everything else that exists other than God 
exists as the result of God’s action and the unfolding of that action.138  
Avicenna’s account closely matches the account of medieval Neoplatonic emanation 
given in the previous chapter. An emanation from God explains the origins of beings other 
than God; God, a simple being, can emanate only one simple being; the Intellects act as 
intermediaries, and it is through the emanation of these intermediaries that the physical 
universe is created. Further, it appears that God’s emanation is necessary: God emanates 
because it apprehends its own goodness, which, as an intellectual being who is maximally 
good, it cannot fail to do. 
B. Emanation as Voluntary 
From the account above, it seems that Avicenna asserts that God emanates necessarily, 
that is, God cannot fail to emanate the First Intellect. If God plays a role analogous to 
Plotinus’s Good, then God must emanate. In discussions of whether God emanates 
necessarily, attention is most commonly drawn to whether God must emanate because of 
                                               
138 For a discussion of how God is ultimately responsible for all that exists in the texts of the Arabic Plotinus, 
see Peter Adamson, The Arabic Plotinus: A Philosophical Study of the Theology of Aristotle (London: Duckworth, 
2002), 137-149. Contrary to Adamson’s reading of the Theology of Aristotle, Avicenna does not expressly state 
that God is directly responsible for all that exists; instead, he states that God is ultimately responsible for all that 
exists.  
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some feature of God’s nature. Since God’s will is identical to God’s knowledge and God’s 
essence, then it seems that God cannot fail to emanate precisely because of what God’s 
essence is. This line of thought—that God emanates necessarily because of some feature of 
God’s nature—is defended by Beatrice Zedler, among others. Zedler contends that since 
Avicenna’s God can emanate only one simple thing because God is a simple being, God 
emanates by nature rather than by will. She also contends that Avicenna specifically denies 
that God intends to emanate, and thus God does not emanate voluntarily.139  
If Zedler’s interpretation is correct, then Avicenna faces a serious problem: his 
account of God’s creative act as a necessary emanation directly contradicts his Islamic 
heritage. According to Islamic doctrine, Allah voluntarily creates all that exists. Creating is 
voluntary because Allah wills to create: Allah creates because Allah decides to create. In the 
Islamic account of creation, creating is also spoken of as voluntary because Allah did not 
have to create: Allah creates voluntarily because there is no compulsion, either internal or 
external to Allah. However, it seems that according to initial cursory explication of 
Avicenna’s account of creation, God neither wills to emanate nor could have refrained from 
emanating. In the account given above, Avicenna refers to God’s apprehension of 
Godself—not God’s will—as the origin of the emanative act. Further, Avicenna’s account 
makes clear that God is a necessary being, which implies that God could not be different 
than God is. If so, God would not emanate voluntarily; instead, God would emanate 
necessarily because God is the necessary being.  
                                               
139 Beatrice H. Zedler, “Saint Thomas and Avicenna in the De Potentia Dei,” Traditio VI (1948), 105-159. For 
others assuming that a thing emanating by its nature implies necessity, see any of the following: Rudi Te Velde, 
Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas (New York: Brill, 1995), 110-11; Thomas Aquinas, Aquinas on 
Creation: Writings on the ‘Sentences’ of Peter Lombard, Book 2, Distinction 1, trans. Steven Baldner and William Carroll 
(Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1997), “Introduction” by translators, 1-20; Wayne Hankey, 
“Ab Uno Simplici non est nisi Unum: The Place of Natural and Necessary Emanation in Aquinas’s Doctrine of 
Creation,” in Divine Creation in Ancient, Medieval, and Early Modern Thought: Essays Presented to the Revered Dr. Robert 
D. Crouse, eds. Michael Treschow, et. al. (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 325. 
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Given that Avicenna describes himself as a Muslim and describes God’s causation in 
creation in terms of Neoplatonic emanation, Avicenna faces a difficult choice: either jettison 
the Islamic conception of voluntary creation or deny that a Neoplatonic emanationist 
account of creation entails that creation is necessary. Avicenna opts for the latter; he 
describes a role for God’s will in emanation, and he denies that God creates due to some 
necessity, specifically a necessity owing to God’s nature. Avicenna directly address whether 
God emanates by will or by nature, and he indirectly addresses whether God emanates 
voluntarily or necessarily. To see how Avicenna includes a role for God’s will in emanation, 
we must first explore what the divine will is like according to Avicenna. We will then discuss 
the distinction Avicenna draws between an agent acting from God’s nature or from God’s 
will. Avicenna draws a further distinction between a willing an action and intending an action 
that plays an important role in the debate regarding whether God wills to create. Finally, 
these concepts will be brought together in a discussion of whether God willing to create 
means that God creates voluntarily in that God wills to create without compulsion.  
1. Divine Will  
For Avicenna, the attributes of God are identical to the being of God. God is a 
changeless, simple, immaterial being; as an intellect, God intellectually apprehends Godself. 
140 So, God’s intellect is identical with God’s knowledge, and both are identical to God’s 
essence. God’s will, then, is also identical to God’s knowledge and intellect and essence.141 
Accordingly, since God is simple, God has one intellectual act, which is also God’s act of 
will. God knows Godself and wills God’s own existence.142 That the divine attributes are 
identical reveals that God’s will is (a) simple, meaning that God has one (and only one) act of 
                                               
140 Avicenna, Metaphysics of the Healing VIII.7 p. 291 7-17.  
141 Avicenna, Metaphysics of the Healing VIII.7 p. 295 29-36. 
142 Avicenna, Metaphysics of the Healing VIII.7 p. 291 7-11; see also VIII.7 p. 292 5-9. 
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will; (b) eternal; (c) immutable, meaning that God’s will cannot change; (d) self-directed, 
meaning that God wills only Godself directly; (e) unique, meaning that God’s will, unlike 
human wills, has no final cause and depends upon nothing external to itself.143  
The simplicity, eternity, and immutability of the divine will are relatively 
straightforwardly related to the other divine attributes. Avicenna explains that God’s will 
must be simple because God is simple. God has one act of will, and because God is eternal, 
God’s act of will is eternal. The fact that God’s will is immutable follows from the fact that 
God is pure act. Were God’s will to change, God would move from potency to act in some 
way.144  
 That the divine will is self-directed and unique deserves further exploration. 
Regarding the self-directed nature of the will, Avicenna notes that divine knowledge is self-
directed. In God’s one intellectual act, God intellectually apprehends Godself. Insofar as 
God knows other beings, God knows them as the effects of its causation, for to know the 
cause is to know its effects.145 This knowledge of other beings is not separate from God’s 
self-knowledge: by knowing Godself, God knows Godself as the principle of existence of 
everything that exists.146 Similarly, the will is entirely self-directed. God wills and loves 
Godself. God wills God’s own existence.147 Just as God knows other beings by knowing 
Godself, God wills the existence of other beings by willing Godself. God does not explicitly 
or directly will anything except God’s own existence, but as a result of willing God’s own 
                                               
143 Avicenna, Metaphysics of the Healing VIII.7, passim. In constructing this list, I build upon Rahim Acar’s 
analysis in his article, “Avicenna’s Position on the Divine Creative Action,” The Muslim World 94 (2004), 67 and 
his book, Talking about God and Talking about Creation, 136. 
144 Avicenna, Metaphysics of the Healing VIII.7 p. 291 7-15; VIII.6 p. 288 1-4. 
145 Avicenna, Metaphysics of the Healing VIII.6 p. 287 15-17; Avicenna, Metaphysica §29-32, p. 60-66; § 38 p. 76-78; 
Michael Marmura, “Some Aspects of Avicenna’s Theory of God’s Knowledge of Particulars,” Journal of the 
American Oriental Society 82.3 (1962), 302. 
146 Avicenna, Metaphysics of the Healing VIII.6 p. 288 8-14. 
147 Avicenna, Metaphysics of the Healing VIII.7 p. 292 1-9. 
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existence, God causes the existence of other beings. God’s will is entirely self-directed, and 
any additional effects of that volitional act are ancillary effects.148 
The self-directed nature of the will helps one explain how the divine will is unique. 
Unlike humans, who will something for a particular end or benefit, God is not influenced by 
such desires. God’s will has no final cause—some reason or good for which it is willed.149 
God does not will God’s own existence for some purpose, for if God’s will had some 
purpose, then God would be seeking to complete some deficiency God had. But because 
God is perfect—beyond perfect, Avicenna says—God cannot (by definition) be in need of 
any completion.150 Because God wills and loves Godself, God’s will has only Godself as an 
object. Having only Godself as an object, God’s will is independent of any other being. 
2. Acting from Natural Necessity versus Acting from Volition and Intention 
While there is broad agreement regarding the characteristics of God’s will, such 
broad agreement does not extend to the role God’s will plays in emanation. From the first 
few paragraphs of Avicenna’s explanation of divine emanation, some have argued that God’s 
will does not play a role in emanation at all.151 Instead, they argue that Avicenna presents 
emanation as though it was necessitated by God’s nature. Their proposal rests upon a 
misunderstanding of the distinction Avicenna draws between an act done by nature, an act 
done voluntarily, and an act done by intention to argue thus. 
An agent performs an action by way of its nature when the agent’s nature is the 
principle of its action. An act performed by way of an agent’s nature has two characteristics. 
First, such an act does not involve the agent’s knowledge (ma‘rifa/cognitionem). Second, 
                                               
148 Avicenna, Metaphysics of the Healing VIII.7 p. 295.1-14. 
149 Avicenna, Metaphysics of the Healing VIII.7 p. 292 1-8. 
150 Avicenna, Metaphysics of the Healing VIII.6 p. 283 9-10. 
151 Zedler, 105-159. 
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such an act does not involve the agent’s approbation or consent (ridā/beneplacitum).152 
Instead, the agent produces its effect in a manner similar to how fire begets fire. When fire 
spreads, it does so by its nature: fire devours combustibles whenever the appropriate 
circumstances (that is, there is enough oxygen; there is sufficient airflow; etc.) arise. Fire can 
neither know nor consent to its act; fire does what it does because it is what it is. When an 
agent acts by nature, then, it neither knows nor consents to the action it performs.  
In contrast, an agent performs a voluntary action when the agent (a) has knowledge 
of the action and (b) consents to the action.153 Avicenna’s definition of voluntary action 
entails that only cognizant or intellectual beings could possibly perform voluntary actions. If 
an agent is incapable of having knowledge of the action it is performing, then the agent 
cannot act voluntarily. Avicenna, then, denies that plants can act voluntarily. He also 
implicitly denies that an intellectual agent acts voluntarily when that agent is not cognizant of 
the action it performs. An example that illustrates this difference is as follows: a dog is not 
acting voluntarily when, while sleeping, the dog’s nose twitches or paws move. If that dog—
in a particularly deep sleep—manages to bark while asleep and then awakens suddenly and 
begins searching for that barking dog who woke him, it quickly becomes obvious that the 
dog had no knowledge of his action as his action. Clearly, the dog does not know that he 
woke himself up by barking. Thus, on Avicenna’s analysis, the dog’s action cannot be  
 
 
                                               
152 Avicenna, Metaphysics of the Healing IX.4 p. 327 1-3; Liber De Philosophia Prima IX.4. 
153 Avicenna, Metaphysics of the Healing IX.4 p. 327 1-3; Liber De Philosophia Prima IX.4. 
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voluntary because the dog did not have knowledge of it.154 So, while only cognizant or 
intellectual beings can meet the knowledge requirement, not every cognizant being (or every 
cognizant being’s action) does meet the requirement. 
Along with knowledge of the action, an agent performing a voluntary action must 
consent to the action being performed. This second criterion helps to clarify that coerced 
actions—someone being forced to assist bank robbers, for example—are not voluntary 
actions. While the agent may have knowledge that they are helping rob a bank, the agent 
likely does not consent to or approve of the act of helping rob a bank.155 Avicenna seems to 
link the lack of impediment or aversion in an agent’s essence to consent.156 If an agent’s 
essence does not include any impediment or provide any aversion to an action and the agent 
performs the action, then the agent consents to the action.157  
In light of the distinction Avicenna makes between actions performed by nature and 
actions performed voluntarily, one can see how actions performed by nature can be 
                                               
154 Imagine another scenario: a dog it is asked to choose which owner it prefers when its owners end their 
romantic relationship. What the dog experiences is two individuals calling him by name and asking him to 
come to them. If the owners—let us call them Jerry and Keisha—are each standing at opposite ends of the 
room and the dog—let us call him Buster—is in the middle, what Buster experiences is Keisha calling him and 
Jerry calling him. Buster can chose to go to either Keisha or Jerry, but there is nothing to indicate that Buster is 
able to understand that by going to Keisha, Buster will be living permanently with Keisha. The fact that canines 
have limited cognitive capabilities suggests that their actions will not always be voluntary. Dogs do not always 
have knowledge of their actions.  
155 A more difficult case is a person who suffers from a disorder similar to Restless Leg Syndrome (RLS). 
During an RLS attack, a person experiences symptoms ranging from tingling discomfort in her legs to the 
spontaneous movement of her legs. She knows what her legs are doing, but she does not consent to the action. 
In this case, it seems that the action is not voluntary.  
156 Avicenna, Metaphysics of the Healing IX.4 p. 327 9-10; Liber De Philosophia Prima IX.4. 
157 McGinnis offers a similar explanation of Avicenna’s notion of consent. See his Avicenna, 207. What is 
unclear is whether Avicenna’s definition of voluntary action includes actions that a person performs while 
giving little conscious though to those actions. An action performed by habit—checking your blind spot before 
changing lanes while driving; straightening a stack of books sitting on your desk; etc.—may not require 
conscious thought from the agent. Because Avicenna stresses that consent involves the lack of impediment or 
aversion to the action in the agent’s essence, it seems likely that such habitual actions would classify as actions 
done with the agent’s consent. As long as the action is not contrary to the agent’s nature and the agent 
performs the action, the agent consents to the action. 
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associated with necessity.158 An agent who performs action by nature cannot control her 
action because she cannot also control her nature. Her nature, then, determines which 
actions she performs. So, it seems that her actions are necessitated by her nature. A 
volitional action, however, is performed by an agent when the agent has knowledge of the 
act and the agent’s essence lacks any impediment or aversion to that act. The agent’s nature 
is important when the agent acts voluntarily because only certain actions are live possibilities 
for agents with certain natures, but the agent’s knowledge is equally important.159  
Although Avicenna writes that a volitional act, generally construed, occurs when an 
agent has knowledge of the act and consents to the act, Avicenna distinguishes volitional 
acts from intentional acts. An intentional act is a specific type of volitional act. Avicenna lists 
three criteria for forming an intention, and says that an intentional act is simply the action 
that carries out this intention. First, to form an intention, there must be something distinct 
from the agent.160 An agent cannot form an intention without intending x, x being 
something distinct from the agent. Intention cannot be self-reflexive. This thing which is the 
object of the intention is said to be the cause of the intention in this sense: without that x, 
the agent would not intend x. In the case of a human agent, a person intends to learn a 
foreign language. The object of the intention is the acquisition of the knowledge of this 
foreign language.  
The second criterion for intending is simply that the agent actually forms the 
intention in question. To do so, the agent acts to form that intention. Avicenna writes that 
there must be some act by which the intention is acquired by the agent. This criterion seems 
                                               
158 It might yet seem like an action could be voluntary but also necessary—an agent could know and consent to 
an action but that action had to be performed nonetheless. This possibility is discussed in section 3 below. 
159 Zedler is one who speaks of “natural necessity.” See 105-159. 
160 Avicenna, Metaphysics of the Healing IX.4 p. 326 32-35. 
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obviously—almost trivially—true, for in order to intend something, an agent must form an 
intention. In the case of our human agent, the person must form an intention to learn a 
foreign language.161 
The third criterion for intending is that there is some benefit for which the thing is 
intended. So, Avicenna asserts that if an agent intends something, that agent does so because 
the agent will benefit in some way from the intention being carried out. A person who 
intends to learn a foreign language will acquire some benefit from learning the language. The 
benefit could be a good grade in a class, a new way to impress potential romantic interests, 
the ability to translate an interesting text, or any number of other benefits one might acquire 
by learning a language. Intentions, then, always have an object of the intention, an act by 
which the intention is acquired, and a benefit toward which carrying out the intention 
aims.162  
These three types of actions—an action done by nature, a volitional action, and an 
intentional action—are the potential ways in which God could have brought about God’s 
creative emanation. Avicenna considers whether God emanates either by intention, by 
nature, or by will. He is quick to dismiss the notion that God emanates by nature, and he 
also dismisses the notion that God emanates by intention.163 
God does not emanate by nature. Since an action performed by nature is an action 
that occurs without the agent’s knowledge and without the agent’s consent, God would have 
to emanate without knowledge of the emanation and without consenting to the emanation. 
According to Avicenna, God intellectually apprehends Godself. Included in this self-
apprehension is the apprehension of Godself as the principle of everything else that might 
                                               
161 Avicenna, Metaphysics of the Healing IX.4 p. 326 32-35. 
162 Avicenna, Metaphysics of the Healing IX.4 p. 326 31-35. 
163 Avicenna, Metaphysics of the Healing IX.4 p. 326-327 17-35; 1-17. 
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exist. God knows Godself, and in knowing Godself, God knows that God is the cause of the 
existence of anything which might exist. In knowing Godself, God knows everything that is 
a concomitant164 of its existence.165 Because God has this knowledge, God fails to meet the 
first criterion of an act by nature.166 
God also fails to meet the second criterion of an act by nature, for God does consent 
to the emanation. God is free from any impediment to emanating, and thus God consents to 
the emanation.167 Avicenna notes that God, knowing God’s own perfection and goodness, 
knows and loves Godself. Because knowing its own essence entails knowing the necessary 
concomitants168 of its essence, God also loves the necessary concomitants of God’s essence 
by extension. God’s object of knowledge and love is Godself, but God is aware of and 
approves of those things which follow from God’s essence.169 Accordingly, God consents to 
and approves of God’s emanation. 
If God has knowledge of God’s emanation and consents to God’s emanation, then, 
by Avicenna’s definition of ‘voluntary,’ God emanates voluntarily. However, this voluntary 
emanation is not an intentional emanation. Intending, Avicenna states, is the manner in 
which human beings will something. Human agents have an object of their willing, form the 
intention, and aim to gain some benefit from their act. In contrast, intending does not 
describe how God wills.170 God does not form intentions. Given the essence of God, God 
                                               
164 ‘Concomitant’ is a used here in Avicenna’s technical sense. See 3b below for a discussion of what Avicenna 
means by ‘concomitant.’ 
165 For a discussion of whether the universe being a necessary concomitant of God’s means that God creates 
necessarily, see the following section. 
166 Avicenna, Metaphysics of the Healing IX.4 p. 327 5-9. 
167 Avicenna, Metaphysics of the Healing IX.4 p. 327 12-15. 
168 Again, this is a technical term that is explained below. 
169 Avicenna, Metaphysics of the Healing IX.4 p. 326 32-35. 
170 This is the mistake Zedler makes: she conflates human willing, which Avicenna describes in terms of 
‘intending,’ with divine willing, which does not involve intending. Though Avicenna denies that God ‘intends’ 
(as humans must), Avicenna does not deny that God wills. 
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cannot have an object of its will that is distinct from God. Were God to intend, God would 
have to (1) intend something distinct from Godself and (2) intend some benefit to occur 
because of God’s action. God would then have to will multiple objects—God would will 
God’s own existence, God would will the existence of the universe, and God would will 
some benefit from the existence of the universe. Avicenna asserts that were God to will both 
Godself and some object distinct from Godself, then multiplicity would be introduced into 
God.171 As Rahim Acar notes, “Since God primarily knows, wills, and loves himself, God’s 
will cannot be directed to an end other than God” and have God’s unity be preserved.172  
Not only would God intending introduce multiplicity by requiring multiple objects of 
God’s will, but God intending would also introduce multiplicity by requiring multiple actions 
of the will. God, according to the definition of intention, would have to form an intention. 
This intention formation is in addition to willing its own existence. Avicenna asserts that it is 
impossible for God to will multiple things because God is entirely simple, meaning that God 
has one act of will.173 
                                               
171 Avicenna, Metaphysics of the Healing IX.4 p. 326 20-29. 
172 Acar, “Avicenna’s Position on the Divine Creative Action,” 69. 
173 Avicenna, Metaphysics of the Healing IX.4 p. 326 20-29. Avicenna maintains that to have multiple acts of will 
introduces multiplicity into God. What he does not explicitly address is why it cannot be the case that God has 
one act of will in which God wills two things in conjunction, such as God willing its own existence and the 
existence of the universe (rather than willing its own existence and willing the existence of the universe). It 
seems that Avicenna must argue that were God to have one act of will with multiple objects, the multiplicity of 
the objects of its will would introduce multiplicity into God. However, if Avicenna were to respond thus, his 
explanation regarding how God can have one act of knowledge—God’s self-apprehension—that includes an 
apprehension of all of the necessary concomitants of God would also seem to introduce multiplicity into God. 
God would have multiple objects of knowledge—itself and its concomitants. Marmura addresses the issue of 
whether God’s knowledge involves a multiplicity in his article “Some Aspects of Avicenna’s Theory of God’s 
Knowledge of Particulars.” There, Marmura interprets Avicenna to be saying that self-knowledge does not 
imply a multiplicity because the self is the only true object of knowledge. Additionally, Marmura notes that 
Avicenna asserts that God has knowledge of the cause of the universe (i.e. itself), and knowledge of the cause 
entails knowledge of the effect. Thus, God is the only object of its knowledge, but in knowing itself, God gains 
knowledge of distinct beings (See Marmura, Some Aspects of Avicenna’s Theory of God’s Knowledge of 
Particulars,” 301-2). So, mutatis mutandis, Avicenna might argue that God has one object of its will—itself—but 
willing itself entails willing the effects of its existence. Thus, God has only one object of its will. 
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Emanation, then, is the result of the divine will. 174 God acts by volition when God 
emanates, but this volitional act is not an action by intention. God does not act by nature 
when God emanates. Strictly speaking, God emanates because God wills to emanate. Thus 
far, Avicenna’s account of creation by emanation aligns with the Islamic conception of 
creation as voluntary insofar as it is willed by God. What must be explored further is 
whether this voluntary emanation is a free voluntary emanation. 
3. Volitional, but Necessary? 
So far, it is clear that Avicenna asserts that God emanates as the result of volition 
and not the result of nature or intention. While scholars who assert that emanation is 
necessary according to Avicenna focus primarily on arguing that God emanates by nature for 
Avicenna, it is worthwhile to explore whether God’s voluntary emanation is a free emanation. 
Freedom in its broadest sense implies a lack of either internal or external constraint. If God 
emanates voluntarily and freely, then nothing in God’s nature or outside of God would 
necessitate God’s emanating. If God emanates voluntarily and necessarily, then something in 
God’s nature or outside of God necessitates God’s emanating. In order to explore whether 
God emanates freely or necessarily, this section will address possible external compulsions 
and possible internal compulsions, including whether God being a necessarily existing being 
entails that God emanates necessarily.  
 
 
                                               
174 This, of course, is contrary to Zedler’s claims. She commits two major errors in her explication of 
Avicenna’s cosmogony. Primarily, she conflates Avicenna’s disavowal of God creating intentionally with a 
disavowal of God creating voluntarily. Secondarily, she follows Aquinas’s reading of Avicenna, which means 
that she insists that Avicenna views God’s creation as the result of the necessity of God’s nature. As my 
analysis has shown, neither Zedler nor Aquinas are accurately representing Avicenna’s thought. See Zedler, 
105-159. 
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a. External Compulsions 
From the discussion above, it is clear that Avicenna does not believe that God’s 
action is necessitated by anything external to God. God wills and knows Godself.175 
Therefore, God is not beholden to things external to Godself. God does not act for any 
reason other than Godself. If there is anything that necessitates God’s emanation, it would 
have to be something internal to God. 
b. Internal Compulsions 
Whether God’s emanation is necessitated by something internal to God is still 
unclear. Given what Avicenna says about the universe being a necessary concomitant of 
God’s essence and the fact that God’s will is identical to God’s knowledge and essence, it 
seems that God must create.176 God’s essence seems like it determines God’s actions. 
Because God’s essence has necessary concomitants, God must bring about those 
concomitants. If this is true, then God has some internal compulsion to create.  
Avicenna discusses concomitants in his Annotations.177 There, he says that a 
concomitant “is a thing that necessarily follows something because of what it is that [the 
thing] is.”178 So, if x is a concomitant of y, then x necessarily follows y. However, it is not the 
case that y subsists through x.179 By denying the subsistence of y through x, Avicenna seems 
to assert that the existence of y does not depend on x, and y does not depend on x to be 
what y is. Despite x being its concomitant, y is still independent of x. Acar offers an analogy 
                                               
175 Avicenna, Metaphysics of the Healing VIII.7 p. 292 1-13. 
176 Acar articulates this sentiment only to argue against it. See Acar, “Avicenna’s Position on the Divine 
Creative Action,” 70. 
177 The work is titled Ta‘līqāt, which means ‘collection,’ and this work appears to be a collection of Avicenna’s 
lectures. 
178 Avicenna, Ta‘līqāt, ed. Abdularahman Badawi (Iran: Miktab al-Ilam al-Islami, 1983), 180; trans. and quoted 
in Rahim Acar, Talking about God and Talking about Creation: Avicenna’s and Thomas Aquinas’s Positions, 
Vol. 58, Islamic Philosophy Theology and Science: Texts and Studies, eds. H. Daiber and D. Pingree,144 
(Boston: Brill, 2005). 
179 Avicenna, Ta‘līqāt, p. 103; translated and quoted in Acar, Talking about God and Talking about Creation, 144. 
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to friendship. Friendship, which can be understood as love between (at least) two people, 
cannot be gained simply by two people helping each other. If Marisol and Fatima help each 
other but do not love each other, they have a business relationship rather than a friendship. 
But friends help those they love; helping each other follows necessarily from friendship. In 
this case, benefit—specifically, being helped by a friend—is a concomitant of friendship but 
is not constitutive of friendship.180 Thus, although x is a necessary concomitant of y, x 
follows from y but is not constitutive of y. 
In his Annotations, Avicenna distinguishes two types of concomitants. The first type 
is a concomitant of some other thing because the concomitant stems from the nature and 
substance of that other thing. Examples of this type of concomitant include light as a 
concomitant of the sun and burning as a concomitant of heat.181 If the cosmos is this type of 
concomitant of God, then God would have some internal compulsion to create. God, being 
what God is, must bring about the existence of the universe. 
However, a concomitant stemming from the nature of a thing is not the only type of 
concomitant. The second type of concomitant stems from the self-knowledge of some other 
thing. It is this concomitance that follows from God. God is “perfect, complete, loved, and 
[God] knows [Godself],” and the things which exist because of God are concomitants of 
God’s self-knowledge.182 Unlike light and heat, which have no will or knowledge, God has 
knowledge, and God’s concomitants exist because of God’s knowledge.183  
Of course, one might object that the identity of divine attributes means that the 
divine knowledge is identical to the divine will and essence. Thus, the concomitant of God 
                                               
180 Acar, Talking about God and Talking about Creation, 144. 
181 Avicenna, Ta‘līqāt p. 103; translated and quoted in Acar, Talking about God and Talking about Creation, 144. 
182 Avicenna, Ta‘līqāt p. 103; translated and quoted in Acar, Talking about God and Talking about Creation, 144. 
183 Acar, Talking about God and Talking about Creation, 145.  
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because of God’s essence as much as God’s knowledge. The concomitants of God follow 
from what God is. So, both types of concomitants follow from the nature of the thing of 
which they are concomitants; however, in the case of God, the divine knowledge is essential 
to what God is.184  
Perhaps one could respond on Avicenna’s behalf to this objection in the following 
manner. An action stemming from a being’s nature depends only on that being’s nature, not 
on its intellect or will. An action that involves an agent’s will (and, accordingly, its intellect) is 
a voluntary action. The involvement of the will, even though it is identical to God’s essence, 
means that God’s action is voluntary rather than natural. What it takes for an action to be 
voluntary is for God to have knowledge of the action and to consent to the action, which 
means that God’s faculty of will is involved in any voluntary action. The identity of God’s 
will, knowledge, and essence does not negate that God’s will is involved in God performing 
the action in question. 
While there are potential explanatory difficulties which arise from Avicenna’s 
distinction between these two types of concomitants, Avicenna straightforwardly denies that 
concomitance follows from God’s nature.185 Instead, concomitance follows from God’s 
knowledge. Accordingly, the universe is a concomitant of God, but God is not compelled to 
create it. The universe exists because of God’s knowledge rather than because of some 
feature of God compelling God to create. 
From Avicenna’s discussion of intention (and subsequent denial that God intends to 
emanate), one can garner further support for the notion that God has no internal 
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Acar, Talking about God and Talking about Creation, 145. Avicenna neither addresses nor even considers this sort 
of objection.  
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compulsion to create. God cannot intend to emanate; otherwise, God would be required to 
have something other than Godself as an object of God’s will. While this fact supports the 
earlier claim that God suffers no external compulsion to create, it also supports the claim 
that nothing within God compels it to create. Were God to hold something else as an object 
of God’s will, some imperfection would be implied in God.186 God wills what is supremely 
good, so if God wills something other than Godself, then God is not supremely good. 
Hence, God holds only Godself as the object of God’s will and is not compelled to create by 
some internal feature of Godself. So, it seems that for some agent, x, to be compelled by 
some object of its will, y, y has to be distinct from x. Since God wills God’s existence, the 
object of God’s will is not distinct from God. Thus, God’s will is not compelled. 
Further, in describing the notion of generosity, Avicenna specifies that generosity is 
giving what is proper without pursuing one’s desires or expecting remuneration.187 Since 
Avicenna describes creation elsewhere as an act of God’s generosity, it is important to note 
that if God were to pursue some desire or to expect repayment for some action, God would 
be imperfect.188 Any agent who can gain something in return for its actions is imperfect 
either with regard to its being or one of its perfections.189 Avicenna explains that God is 
perfect—above perfection, Avicenna says when speaking most carefully—and thus God’s 
emanation must be an act of generosity.190 Because God is perfect, God gains nothing from 
the act of creating. And, since God gains nothing from the act of creating, Avicenna 
concludes that there is nothing in God that compels God to create.  
                                               
186 See Avicenna, Metaphysics of the Healing IX.4 p. 326.15-35; Acar, Talking about God and Talking about Creation, 
145. 
187 Avicenna, Metaphysics of the Healing VI.5 p. 231 36-40- p. 232 1; Acar, Talking about God and Talking about 
Creation, 142. 
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In light of the above, Avicenna denies that there is any external or internal 
compulsion which requires God to emanate. God wills only Godself, so nothing external to 
God could compel God to create. God, according to Avicenna, is not compelled by anything 
internal to God, either. The universe is a necessary concomitant of God, but the universe is a 
necessary concomitant of God’s knowledge (and, by extension, will). Avicenna vigorously 
affirms God’s perfection, which entails that God could gain nothing from creating. There is 
no internal feature of God that is improved by creating, and, by implication, there is nothing 
about God that would be diminished by refraining from creating. If God is not compelled to 
create—and Avicenna seems to think that God is not compelled—then God, if God 
emanates, emanates freely. Not only does God emanate voluntarily—that is, because God 
wills to emanate—but God also emanates freely. Avicenna’s account of creation as 
emanation, then, fits with the Islamic conception of creation as voluntary. However, 
Avicenna’s account of creation as emanation reveals that Avicenna conceives of emanation 
in creation as occurring voluntarily.191 
c. A Necessary Being: necessary in all respects 
Avicenna’s defense of a voluntary and free creation is not yet complete. He 
understands God’s emanation to be the result a divine volition free of either internal or 
external compulsion. However, Avicenna insists that the universe exists necessarily; that is, 
given the fact that God exists, the universe cannot fail to exist.192 Avicenna’s claim that the 
                                               
191 A related question is whether any emanation occurs naturally. It seems that, given Avicenna’s definition of a 
voluntary action being an action of which the agent has knowledge and to which the agent consents, the 
emanations of the Intellects are likely voluntary emanations because they arise from each Intellect’s self-
reflection and reflection upon God. If the Intellects must reflect in order to emanate, then the emanation 
originates from an intellectual act. However, the textual evidence is not conclusive. Avicenna simply does not 
address whether the emanations by the Intellects are necessary or voluntary. It seems possible that other 
emanations could be necessary—such as light emanating from the sun—but any such examples of necessary 
emanation are not clearly and obviously located within the scope of creating by emanating. 
192 Avicenna, Metaphysics of the Healing IX.1 p. 300 6-11. 
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universe is necessary must be reconciled with his claim that God creates freely. If the 
universe must exist, then God cannot fail to bring about its existence. So, God creates 
freely—that is, without internal or external constraints—and necessarily. How Avicenna 
understands the meaning of God creating necessarily must be explained, as does the 
relationship between necessary and free creation. 
The discussions above have focused on how the attributes of God relate to God 
emanating, but God’s ontological status is also important for explaining why God 
emanates.193 Because of what God is—a simple, eternal, changeless being—God can 
emanate one simple being in one act of knowledge and will. Because of how God is—an 
ontologically necessary being—God is necessary in all of God’s respects.194 God is a being 
devoid of potentiality; God is fully actualized, complete, and perfect. Thus, God can neither 
change nor be different than what God is. God is devoid of possibility—there are not options 
for what God could be like or for what God could do. Instead, God is what God is and 
cannot be otherwise.  
Accordingly, God freely wills to create, but God does not freely decide to create.195 
God’s will cannot be otherwise: it, too, is necessary. God, then, cannot do otherwise than 
what God does. Because God cannot be or do otherwise, there are not multiple actions God 
could potentially perform. God can will only one thing—Godself—and it is not possible for 
                                               
193 As Acar notes, Avicenna does not directly address the differences between God’s attributes and ontological 
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God. See Acar, “Avicenna’s Position on the Divine Creative Action,” 73. 
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Marmura, “Some Aspects of Avicenna’s Theory of God’s Knowledge of Particulars,” Journal of the American 
Oriental Society 82.3 (1962), 302. 
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God’s will, knowledge, or essence to be different than what it is. God brings about the 
existence of the universe voluntarily and freely, but God could not have done otherwise.  
Avicenna concludes that because God is a necessary being, God cannot fail to bring 
about the existence of the universe. Given the facts that God exists, God is a necessary 
being, and the universe exists, Avicenna can conclude that the universe must exist as long as 
God exists. Precisely why the divine knowledge and will entail God’s emanation is not 
explained. There is no explanation outside God why God wills to emanate. And, one can 
know that God wills to emanate because the universe exists. And one can know that God 
wills to emanate because the universe exists.  
Emanation, then, is the result of a free act of will by God. While emanation can 
theoretically occur either because of the nature of the emanator or because of the will of the 
emanator, God emanates by will. God suffers no internal or external compulsion to 
emanate, but God cannot opt to act differently because God is necessary in all respects. 
Avicenna presents Neoplatonic emanation as a theory which encompasses both natural and 
voluntary emanation. It is not emanation, per se, which is necessary; instead, it is God who is 
necessary, and thus all of God’s attributes and acts are necessary. Emanation is the act 
performed by God, but God’s emanation is voluntary (insofar as God emanates freely as a 
result of God’s will) and necessary (insofar as God is a fully necessary being).  
III. Emanation as a Type of Efficient Causation 
 The discussion of God’s emanation of the cosmos does not exhaust the ways in 
which Avicenna discusses God’s causation of the cosmos. In addition to explaining that God 
causes the existence of other beings by emanating, Avicenna asserts that God is the efficient 
cause of the cosmos. What is explored here is how Avicenna relates these two ways of 
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talking about causation—causation by emanation and by efficient causation—to each other 
within the context of creation. To understand how emanation and efficient causation are 
related as types of causation, Avicenna’s conception of efficient causation must be explored. 
In this section, the claim that Avicenna says God is the efficient cause of the cosmos is 
defended first. Next, Avicenna’s conception of efficient causation is explained, with 
particular attention paid to divine efficient causation. Once God’s efficient causation has 
been explored, the relationship Avicenna envisions between these two causal theories with 
different historical origins can be explained.  
A. Types of Efficient Causation 
 Though Avicenna speaks of God’s causation exclusively in terms of emanation in his 
extended creation account in Metaphysics of the Healing book nine, elsewhere Avicenna refers 
to God as the efficient cause of the universe. Avicenna uses the specific language of efficient 
causation when describing God’s causation. In a discussion of the divine attributes, 
Avicenna says, 
“If we say [it is] a first efficient principle, or a first absolute principle, then it must 
necessarily be one. If, however, we say [it is] a first material principle and a first 
formal principle and others of this sort, [it] would not have the same necessity of 
being as the necessity of this in God. For none of [these causes] is a first absolute 
cause because God is one and has the status of that [efficient] principle.”196 
 
God is the “first efficient principle” of what exists, and as the “first efficient principle,” God 
must be an entirely simple being. Avicenna here links the concept of God as the principle of 
all other things to the concept of efficient causation.  
                                               
196 Avicenna, Metaphysics of the Healing VIII.3 p. 271 26-35; Liber de Philosophia Prima sive Scientia Divina V-X 
VIII.3 p. 395: “cum dicitur principium primum agens, vel primum principium absolute, necesse est esse unum. 
Cum autem dicitur causa prima materialis et causa prima formalis et cetera huiusmodi, non est necesse esse 
unam quemadmodum hoc debet in necesse esse. Nulla enim earum est causa prima absolute, sed necesse esse 
est principium etiam illarum primarum.” 
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 In Avicenna’s explication of efficient causation, Avicenna again refers to God as an 
efficient cause. Using the term “agent cause,” Avicenna says that some agent causes are “the 
principle and giver of existence of it, just as the Creator to the world.”197 Not only does 
Avicenna again explicitly link being a principle of existence to being a giver of existence, but 
he also uses God as an example of this type of efficient causation. Given the fact that 
Avicenna does use the language of efficient causation to describe God’s creative act, a 
further explanation of what Avicenna takes efficient causation to be is warranted.  
 1. Whether God creates by Natural Efficient Causation 
In Physics of the Healing book two, Avicenna discusses the four kinds of causes. 
Regarding efficient causation, which Avicenna frequently calls agent causation, Avicenna 
says that “in natural things, agent is often said of the principle of motion in another thing 
insofar as it is other.”198 Here, he is appealing to Aristotle’s definition of efficient causation 
in Metaphysics book five.199 Avicenna clarifies that by motion, he means that which moves 
from potency to act in matter.200 So, an efficient cause is a cause that moves some matter 
from potency to act. Avicenna gives the example of a physician curing himself. The 
physician moves something in himself from potency to act: insofar as he is the physician 
affecting the cure, he is the efficient cause; yet, insofar as he is the one whose matter is being 
brought from potency to act, he is the patient—that is, the thing undergoing the change.  
Following Aristotle’s explication, Avicenna’s description of natural efficient 
causation involves an agent who affects the change and a patient which undergoes the 
                                               
197 Avicenna, Metaphysics of the Healing VI.1. p. 195, 1-4; Liber de Philosophia Prima sive Scientia Divina V-X A257 
21-2 p. 292: principium essendi et datorem eius, sicut creator mundi”. 
198 Avicenna, Physics of the Healing I.10 p.64; Liber Primus Naturalium X A 49 16-17 p.86: “et efficiens in rebus 
naturalis aliquando dicitur principium motus in alio a se secundum hoc quod est aliud”. 
199 See Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.12.1019a15ff. 
200 Avicenna, Physics of the Healing I.10 p.64. 
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change by moving from potency into act in some way. This patient is composed of matter 
that subsists through the change of some of its potency into act. Avicenna also follows 
Aristotle’s description of the types of change a material patient can undergo. It can undergo 
a change in its accidental features, that is, a change in its quality, quantity, place, or position. 
So, the physician undergoes an accidental change when he heals himself. Alternately, a 
patient could undergo a substantial change; the material composing the patient could be, as 
Avicenna says, “prepared” to receive a new form.201 In an instance of substantial change, 
what was substance A goes out of existence and substance B comes to exist (and shares the 
matter of A) by the work of the efficient cause. An example of a patient undergoing a 
substantial change is the generation of new life: semen is deposited, and the semen joins with 
the menstrual products to become a new entity.202 There is some matter, which Avicenna 
later specifies to be Prime Matter, that underlies substance A and underlies substance B.203 
From the examples used, it becomes evident that Avicenna, like Aristotle, distinguishes 
between efficient causation which arises from a thing’s nature and efficient causation which 
arises from a thing’s volition. Semen, given the right circumstances, naturally works to 
produce a new life. Physicians, however, must will to cure either themselves or others. 
 Clearly, if every efficient cause is what Avicenna terms a ‘natural efficient cause’ or 
‘natural agent,’ then God is not the efficient cause of the universe. In his creation account, 
Avicenna asserts that God emanates the First Intellect. The First Intellect, as emanated from 
God, is not composed of matter. Instead, matter arises when the First Intellect considers its 
own ontological status. The act of creation, then, cannot be an accidental change because 
                                               
201 Avicenna, Physics of the Healing I.10 p. 65. 
202 Avicenna gives the example of “moving semen during the preparatory states” for procreation in the text. 
Physics of the Healing I.10 p. 65. 
203 Avicenna, Metaphysics of the Healing II.2 p.48-57. 
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there is no patient that underlies God’s emanation of the First Intellect. Instead, something 
new comes into existence. Neither can creation be a substantial change, for there is no prime 
matter underlying God’s emanation of the First Intellect. 
Natural agents, however, are not the only agents of efficient causation that Avicenna 
recognizes. In his Physics of the Healing, Avicenna mentions a distinction between the subject 
matter of natural philosophy, which includes discussing types of causes in order to ascertain 
their effects, and the subject matter of metaphysics, which includes proving that everything 
composite has a cause and discussing both how many causes there are and what those causes 
are like.204 In order to understand why Avicenna thinks there are efficient causes which are 
not natural causes, a short excursus into an explanation of how Avicenna’s theory of what 
has been termed metaphysical efficient causation is not an ad-hoc addendum to his 
understanding of causation but an integral part of how he views metaphysics, ontology, and 
natural efficient causation generally is necessary. 
2. Excursus: Apology for metaphysical efficient causation 
Avicenna defends the existence of natural efficient causes and metaphysical efficient 
causes in his Metaphysics of the Healing. While it might appear that Avicenna introduces this 
metaphysical efficient causation into Aristotle’s theory—thus adulterating it—Avicenna 
would not have agreed with that assessment. The notion of metaphysical efficient causation 
is adumbrated in three aspects of Avicenna’s larger philosophical project. First, in his 
conception of metaphysics as the study of being and separables, Avicenna suggests that 
some efficient causation is not natural efficient causation. Second, in his modal ontology, 
Avicenna implies that something must be able to efficiently cause existence. Third, in his 
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discussion of natural efficient causation, Avicenna highlights several problems with natural 
agent causation that could be avoided if one posited metaphysical agent causation. 
a. Metaphysics is the study of being and separables 
In Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Aristotle discusses what the subject matter is for those who 
study metaphysics. In book four, Aristotle says that metaphysics studies being as such; but 
he notes that, because everything that exists is either substance or is related to substance, 
substance is what is studied in the science of metaphysics.205 Later, in book six, Aristotle says 
that metaphysics is the science of the separable.206 With this Aristotelian background in 
place, it is now necessary to examine Avicenna’s division of the sciences.  
In the first book of Metaphysics of the Healing, Avicenna proposes a division of the 
sciences between practical and theoretical knowledge. He further divides theoretical 
knowledge into natural, mathematical, and divine knowledge, also called metaphysical 
knowledge.207 Natural science and mathematical science involves a study of things that can be 
subject to motion, which includes things which are essentially subject to motion—material 
beings, for example—and things which are merely subject to motion but could at least 
conceivably exist apart from motion—unity or causality, for example. Avicenna gives unity 
and causality as examples of things which can exist apart from motion because each can be 
conceived of apart from motion. It is possible to consider a unified immaterial being, and it 
is possible to consider what causation is (rather than considering specific acts of causation). 
Metaphysical science, however, studies both things which are merely subject to motion and 
                                               
205 Aristotle, Metaphysics IV.2 1003b 5-10; Richardson, 15-16. 
206 Aristotle, Metaphysics VI.1 1025a 3-1026b 32. Richardson, 17. 
207 Avicenna, Metaphysics of the Healing I.1 p. 2 1-18. 
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things which are necessarily not subject to motion—things like God.208 Avicenna closely 
correlates things which are subject to motion to material things, which means that natural 
science and mathematics involve the study of material objects. Things that are studied 
insofar as they are subject to motion/matter are studied in either natural science or 
mathematics. Things that are studied insofar as they are not subject to motion/matter are 
studied in metaphysics.209 Things which can be studied insofar as they are not subject to 
motion involve causation, existence, and God.  
There are, then, subjects which can be studied only by some sort of metaphysical 
investigation. These subjects include substance, which can be conceptualized apart from 
sensible things, and unity per se. Causation, too, can be considered apart from sensible things. 
One can consider what it means for x to be a cause, for example. According to Avicenna, 
these apparently disparate subjects fall under a single topic of study: the study of the existent 
as such.210 So, metaphysics is the study of things which are separable from motion/matter. 
The study of each of these separables involves a study of the existent as such, which, for 
Avicenna, means that the existent as such is the general subject of metaphysics.  
Given the subject matter of the science of metaphysics, it is now clear that the 
discussion of natural agents above suggests that nothing except natural agents are efficient 
causes. Natural agents engender motion in material objects, but such an explanation of 
causation cannot apply to necessary beings or immaterial, separated subjects. Aristotle’s 
discussion of causation concerns physical causation, but Avicenna takes immaterial objects 
and necessary beings to be subjects in discussions of causation as well. Accordingly, 
                                               
208 Avicenna, Metaphysics of the Healing I.1 p. 2 19-33; Richardson, 16; Michael Marmura, “Avicenna on the 
Division of the Sciences in the Isagoge of his Shifa,” Journal for the History of Arabic Science 4.2 (1980), 242-3. 
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Avicenna delineates an additional category of efficient causation that applies to those beings 
which Aristotle has excluded from his metaphysical explanation.  
b. Modal Ontology 
The need for this additional sort of causation is implied by Avicenna’s modal 
ontology. Avicenna distinguishes between two ways to consider beings in themselves. Beings 
are either necessary beings—beings that cannot fail to exist, whether by their own power or 
the powers of another—or possible beings—beings which are dependent on another for 
their existence.211 In the universe, there are a plethora of possible beings, evidenced by the 
fact that beings like Dodo birds once existed but now do not. So, at least some of the beings in 
the universe are possible beings considered in themselves. According to Avicenna, the only 
explanation for the existence of a universe teeming with possible beings is that some 
necessary being exists.212 Whatever comes into existence is a possible being; a necessary 
being must exist.213 In order for a possible being to come into existence, something must 
bring it into existence.214 This now-existing possible being must be brought about in such a 
way that renders its own existence necessary through its creator. Avicenna argues that if a 
possible being is possible in itself and possible through another, then an infinite regress of 
possible beings causes this causal chain. However, Avicenna argues that this must not be the 
case for two reasons: first, an infinity of causes is impossible; and second, possible beings, 
whether possible in themselves or possible through another, can either exist or not exist, 
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which means that in this infinite chain of causes, every possible being would have to exist.215 
This is statistically improbable. Accordingly, Avicenna asserts that a now-existing possible 
being must be possible through itself and necessary through another. Since beings are either 
necessary or possible and since possible beings cannot produce something necessary through 
another, the sort of beings which can produce something necessary through another are 
necessary beings.216 So, in order for the contingent beings with which we are familiar to exist, 
some necessary being must be causing those beings (or at least be a part of the causal chain 
which yields such beings). Avicenna’s additional type of efficient cause, then, is warranted by 
his understanding of necessary and possible beings. 
c. Shortcomings of Natural Efficient Causation  
Further, in Avicenna’s discussion of natural efficient causes, he highlights some 
problematic features of natural agent causation. In “The Metaphysics of Agency,” 
Richardson argues that three features of Aristotelian causation are what warrant Avicenna’s 
expansion of Aristotelian causal agency. First, the way discussions of natural efficient 
causation are framed lead one to think that bringing about the existence of x involves some 
change from potency to act in x itself. When philosophers discuss creation and say creation 
means brining about the existence of x after x’s non-existence, this way of talking wrongly 
suggests that x, before x’s creation, has some potency.217 However, since x does not exist, x 
does not have any potency. To bring about the existence of x is to make x come to exist. No 
potency of x becomes act, for no potency of x existed before x was created. In order to 
explain how x is caused, then, a different conception of efficient causation—specifically, an 
efficient causation that does not posit a change from potency to act—is needed. 
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Second, the way discussions of natural efficient causation are framed lead one to 
think that once y brings about the existence of x, x will continue to exist without y’s 
continued influence.218 Here, Avicenna’s argument relies on the distinction he made earlier 
between beings which are either necessary or possible. A being could be necessary either in 
itself or through another. A being could be possible in itself; Avicenna has already rejected 
the notion that a being could exist and be possible through another.219 After y brings about 
the existence of x, x’s existence is either necessary in itself or possible in itself. If x’s 
existence is possible in itself, then x could either exist or not exist. Accordingly, what x is—a 
being that is possible in itself—cannot account for x’s continued existence after y brings it 
about. The being x, on its own, could either exist or fail to exist; nothing in x is able to keep 
itself in existence. Therefore, if x is possible in itself, then x cannot account for its continued 
existence.220  
Now we consider whether y could bring about x and x be a necessary being. If x is 
necessary in itself, then x must be the sort of thing that cannot fail to exist. Alas! A being 
that is necessary in itself is not the sort of being that can be brought about by another being. A 
necessary being necessary in itself always exists and thus is uncaused. So, x cannot be 
necessary in itself.221 
Since x cannot be possible in itself or necessary in itself, then x is necessary through 
another. Avicenna delineates three options for what this “another” could potentially be. This 
“another” is either (1) the act of origination by which x is brought about; or (2) some 
                                               
218 See Richardson, 32-46 for an extended discussion. 
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attribute of x itself; or (3) something different. According to Avicenna, (1) cannot be the 
thing through which x is necessary, for the act of origination by which x is brought about is 
completed as soon as x exists. The act of origination, he says, ceases to exist upon its 
completion. If (2), then x continues to exist because of some attribute of itself, perhaps the 
attribute of having undergone origination. But, according to Avicenna’s ontology, this 
attribute of x is either a necessary feature of x in itself or of x through another. If this 
attribute of x is a necessary feature of x in itself, then x cannot have come to be because x 
would be necessary in itself. If this attribute of x is a necessary feature of x through another, 
then x gains that feature through another and is necessary through another. So, (2) collapses 
into x being necessary through itself. Option (3) is the only one remaining. The being x is 
necessitated by another, namely by y. According to Avicenna, the fact that x comes to exist 
because y produces it does not mean that what y does is bring x into existence (and nothing 
more). Instead, the fact that x did not exist but now does exist throws into sharp relief the 
picture of y as what makes x exist and continues to make x exist. For Avicenna, saying that y 
is the cause of x means that y gives existence to x, both in that y brings x into existence and 
that y keeps x in existence.222 There must, then, be some type of efficient causation that 
applies to this act, but natural efficient causation does not.  
Third, the way discussions of natural efficient causation are framed lead one to think 
that natural agents are “sufficient to bring about the existence of their purported effects”.223 
Avicenna says that “common people” speak of y causing x at a time when y is not causing 
x.224 For example, people are prone to call Bob, “builder,” even when Bob is lazily reclining 
on his couch watching soccer. Bob deserves the appellation, “builder,” only when he is 
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currently building something.225 Worse yet, people are disposed to say that Bob is the cause 
of a building long after Bob has finished his work. People misattribute the building’s 
existence to Bob. Instead, Avicenna says, the continued existence of the building (or the child 
or the car, etc.) is caused by the thing which actually brought about the existence of the 
building.226 Bob’s actions alone are not sufficient. According to Richardson, Avicenna does 
not think that natural agents bring about the existence of their effects; instead, the Giver of 
Forms plays a role in bringing about the existence of new beings by bestowing x’s form on x 
at the moment of its creation.227 Bob, then, needs to be assisted in his work by the Giver of 
Forms to bring something new into existence. There has to be some type of causation that 
applies to scenarios where the cause is sufficient to bring about its effect, for natural efficient 
causation does not apply to such cases. 
This metaphysical efficient causation which Avicenna proposes is an integral part of 
his larger philosophical project. Based on the subject matter of metaphysics, his modal 
ontology, and his criticisms of the shortcomings of natural efficient causation, it seems that 
Avicenna has good reason to think that there is such a type of causation as metaphysical 
efficient causation. From the fact that Avicenna embraces the rest of Aristotle’s distinctions 
of types of causation and from the way in which Avicenna presents this additional 
metaphysical cause, it is safe to conclude that Avicenna intends to develop the implications 
of Aristotle’s account of causation. Although he never explicitly states this, he would not see 
himself as fundamentally departing from Aristotle’s theories of causation. Instead, Avicenna 
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is making explicit what is implied by the shortcomings of Aristotle’s account of efficient 
causation—there must be an additional type of efficient cause. Avicenna would most likely 
have perceived himself to be remedying an unfortunate oversight made by his predecessor, 
an oversight that can be remedied without deviating from the spirit, so to speak, of the initial 
theory.228 To a description of this metaphysical efficient causation we now turn. 
B. Necessary Existent creates by Metaphysical Efficient Causation  
With this apology for metaphysical efficient causation in place, we can begin an 
examination of this type of causation. In contrast to natural efficient causation, this 
additional type of efficient causation is applied not to an agent responsible for bringing 
about some motion or change in a material patient but instead is applied to an agent 
responsible for bringing about the existence of something.229 Whereas natural efficient 
causes act upon a pre-existing material patient, this ‘metaphysical’ efficient cause does not act 
upon anything pre-existing. The metaphysical efficient cause brings about the existence of 
something that did not previously exist. So, there is no patient which underlies the 
metaphysical efficient cause’s action, material or otherwise. The metaphysical efficient cause 
does not actualize any potency in an object, for before the metaphysical efficient cause 
brings about the existence of this object, there would be no potency there to actualize. The  
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metaphysical efficient cause is still an efficient cause because it is the agent responsible for 
bringing about the existence of a new agent.230 
 God is the paradigm example Avicenna gives of this metaphysical efficient cause. 
The metaphysical efficient cause is the “principle and giver of existence, as in the case of 
God with respect to the world.”231 God brings about the existence of the universe via its 
emanation of the First Intellect. Metaphysicians, Avicenna says, properly apply the term 
“agent”—that is, efficient cause—to God in this instance. Avicenna maintains a strong 
distinction between God and the universe: God is the metaphysical efficient cause, and the 
universe is the effect. God does not become the universe, nor does God become conjoined to 
the universe.232  
 Since God is the metaphysical efficient cause of the universe, God’s causation of the 
universe has the features that suggested scenarios in which natural efficient causation did not 
apply. Because a metaphysical efficient cause does not act upon some pre-existing patient, it 
is clear that the non-existence of the effect is not a causal factor in its eventual existence. As 
noted above, Avicenna asserts that saying that a metaphysical efficient cause brings about 
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the existence of something that did not previously exist could mislead one into thinking 
either that a thing’s nonexistence has a cause or that a thing’s nonexistence is a causal factor 
in the thing’s eventual existence. The metaphysical efficient cause, not the nonexistence of 
the effect, is what brings about the existence of the effect.233 
 Additionally, a metaphysical efficient cause co-exists with its effect.234 The 
metaphysical efficient cause is responsible for the existence of its effect not only as an 
instigator of that existence but also as a sustainer of that existence. As long as the effect 
exists, the cause exists. Avicenna notes that one might object that if the cause and effect 
must co-exist, it is hard (if not impossible) to distinguish the cause from the effect.235 
However, the co-existence of the cause and the effect applies to the duration of their 
existence not to their ontological statuses.236  
 A metaphysical efficient cause necessitates its effects. The effect, as discussed above, 
is necessary through the cause when the effect is the existence of something. A metaphysical 
efficient cause necessitates its effects because the metaphysical efficient cause brings about 
the existence of its effect. As long as the other causal conditions have been met—namely, 
there being no impediment in the efficient cause bringing about its effect—the effect must 
be brought about by its cause. Barring any impediment, the existence of the metaphysical 
efficient cause is sufficient for the existence of its effect. The effect is necessary, but not in 
itself. It is necessary through its cause.237 
                                               
233 Avicenna, Metaphysics of the Healing VI.1. 
234 Avicenna, Metaphysics of the Healing VI.1 p. 197-200. 
235 For an extended discussion, see Avicenna, Metaphysics of the Healing IV.1. Marmura and Richardson also have 
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Avicenna (Ibn Sina),” 184-6. 
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 A metaphysical efficient cause, then, is an efficient cause that brings about the 
existence of an effect. It does not require any patient to underlie the change. The 
metaphysical efficient cause—not the nonexistence of the effect—is what causes the effect 
to exist. A metaphysical efficient cause co-exists with its effect, but the metaphysical efficient 
cause does not need to have the same ontological status as its effect. A metaphysical efficient 
cause necessitates its effect, so the effect cannot fail to exist as long as all of the other causal 
conditions have been met.  
 What is unclear is whether a metaphysical efficient cause brings about its effect as 
the result of its nature or as the result of its will. Avicenna clearly allows that natural efficient 
causes can bring about their effects as the result of either their nature or a result of their will. 
If the metaphysical efficient cause were to bring about its effect as the result of its nature, 
then the cause would bring about its effect given the right circumstances. If the metaphysical 
efficient cause were to bring about the effect as the result of its will, then the cause would 
bring about its effect given that it wills the effect and there is no impediment to it bringing 
about the effect. Whether Avicenna’s metaphysical efficient cause can be either as the result 
of nature or as the result of will (or both) cannot be determined at this point. However, if 
Avicenna’s account of Neoplatonic emanation links to his account of metaphysical efficient 
causation, it seems that some metaphysical efficient causes must be voluntary given that God 
emanates voluntarily.  
 C. Creative Emanation as Efficient Causation 
 Thus far, I have defended the claim that Avicenna presents an account of creation 
via Neoplatonic emanation. Avicenna understands Neoplatonic emanation to be able to 
occur either via one’s nature or via one’s will. Avicenna also discusses God as an efficient 
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cause of the universe, albeit an efficient cause that brings about the existence of something. 
What remains to be examined is how Neoplatonic emanation and efficient causation are 
related as theories of causation in creation. There are three possibilities. First, Neoplatonic 
emanation and efficient causation could be completely distinct types of causation. Second, 
they could be identical causal theories. Third, they could be similar but distinct causal 
theories. Avicenna does not clearly state a relationship between creation by Neoplatonic 
emanation and efficient causation, within the context of creation or any other context. In 
this section, I examine these options and show that the second is the most plausible.  
 1. Option One: Distinct, Separate Causal Theories  
The first way Neoplatonic emanation and efficient causation could be related as 
causal theories is that they are entirely distinct causal theories. Emanation is one type of 
causation; efficient causation is a different type of causation. In “Ibn Sina’s Ontology in his 
Danishnama ‘ala'i,” Thomas Gaskill argues that “God is the cause of causes by being the final 
cause of all causes.”238 According to Gaskill, the origination of the First Intellect by God is 
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“one of final cause to effect,” not one of efficient cause to effect.239 Although Gaskill’s thesis 
is that Avicenna’s emanation is Zoroastrian rather than Neoplatonic, his claim helps one see 
how even Neoplatonic emanation might be interpreted as final causation. In chapter one, I 
noted the conceptual link between the perfection of the One and the procession of the 
universe from the One. The One is the explanans of the universe in this manner: the One’s 
perfection (and thus, its goodness) is the reason the universe exists, and the universe exists in 
order to be as perfect—as much like the One—as possible. By focusing on this conceptual 
link, a person could be persuaded to argue (like Gaskill) that God’s emanation is the final 
cause of the universe. 
 Problematically, understanding emanation only as final causation causes interpretive 
difficulties. Primarily, Avicenna asserts that an efficient cause brings about existence. A final 
cause is the purpose or end for which a thing exists. Final causation is not productive, and 
Avicenna never clearly describes it as such. Efficient causation, though, is clearly described 
as productive. So, one would have to offer a new interpretation of final causation, and it 
would be an interpretation that is not endorsed by Avicenna. Further, Avicenna clearly states 
                                               
239 Gaskill, 317. In Gaskill’s paper, he argues that Avicenna’s emanation schema is heavily influenced by 
Zoroastrian cosmology. Gaskill argues that Avicenna’s conception of emanation is influenced by 
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causation to allow it to be productive. I argue that (1) Avicenna’s cosmology is Neoplatonic despite the 
influence of Zoroastrianism upon Avicenna’s cosmology and (2) Avicenna clearly asserts that God is both the 
efficient cause and final cause of the universe. By denying that emanation is efficient causation, Gaskill creates 
unnecessary interpretive difficulties for a reader of Avicenna—one must now explain (or explain away) 
Avicenna’s descriptions of God as an efficient cause.  
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in Metaphysics of the Healing VIII.6 that God is both the final and efficient cause of the 
universe. Interpreting emanation as final causation is helpful insofar as it accounts for how 
God is a final cause of the universe, but one would still have to explain how God is the 
efficient cause of the universe.  
 Similar problems would arise if one attempted to interpret emanation as either the 
material cause or formal cause of the universe. Because God’s emanation is immaterial, it 
cannot be a material cause. God’s emanation is not a formal cause, either. A formal cause, as 
noted in chapter one, is the form in which a thing is made. If God emanates the form of a 
thing, something intrinsic to that thing—namely, its form—is shared with God. This would 
violate Avicenna’s claim that God is unique and independent. So, none of the other 
Aristotelian causes seem to be able to explain God’s emanation, which means that they are 
not viable alternative explanations of the causal mechanism of emanation. 
 The other two types of causation prevalent in early Neoplatonic discussions of 
causation, paradigmatic causes and instrumental causes, are not helpful for explaining the 
causation that occurs when God emanates, either. Paradigmatic causes are the Separate 
Ideas. Instrumental causes are the agents responsible for bringing about motion in the 
sublunary realm.240 Accordingly, neither could explain what occurs when God emanates. 
Final, formal, material, paradigmatic, and instrumental causation—all types of causation that 
are distinct from efficient causation—can all be rejected as ways to understand the causation 
of emanation. If emanation and efficient causation were to be understood as distinct causal 
theories, then there would have to be some other way to explain the causal mechanism of 
emanation.  
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2. Option Two: Identical Causal Theories 
The second option for understanding the relationship between Neoplatonic 
emanation and efficient causation is that, at least with regards to creation, they are identical 
causal theories. What makes this view of the relation Neoplatonic emanation to efficient 
causation seem plausible is that, in both theories, causation is explained in a similar 
manner—perhaps an identical manner. Primarily, both types of causation involve an agent 
that somehow initiates the action. A metaphysical efficient cause is an agent who acts to 
bring about being, and a Neoplatonic emanator is an agent who, in the case of God, 
consents to bring about its emanation of the First Intellect. Not only does causation in each 
involve an agent, but also neither causal theory involves a patient. Also, it seems that 
causation could be voluntary or natural in each of these causal theories. Avicenna conceives 
of Neoplatonic emanation as either natural or voluntary, but God emanates the universe as 
the result of its volition, not nature. From Avicenna’s description of metaphysical efficient 
causation, it seems that a metaphysical efficient cause could be either voluntary or natural. 
Additionally, Avicenna specifies that when an agent Neoplatonic emanates something or 
metaphysically efficiently causes something, that agent brings about the existence of 
something.  
Support for the view that Neoplatonic emanation is a type of metaphysical efficient 
causation can be garnered from earlier Neoplatonic philosophers. The procession of being 
from the One was seen as efficient causation by Proclus and Asclepius.241 Al-Farabi also 
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identified procession as efficient causation.242 So, it seems that Avicenna’s predecessors 
thought of Neoplatonic emanation as efficient causation, specifically the sort of efficient 
causation Avicenna terms metaphysical efficient causation. It would be unsurprising, then, if 
Avicenna also adopted this view. What is unclear is whether the Neoplatonic interpreters 
who influenced Avicenna understood Neoplatonic emanation to be a type of efficient 
causation or understood it to be identical to efficient causation.  
If Neoplatonic emanation has the causal features that distinguished natural efficient 
causation from metaphysical efficient causation, it would bolster the claim that the two 
causal theories are identical. A metaphysical efficient cause brings about the existence of its 
effect, and the prior non-existence of the effect is not an important causal factor. In 
Avicenna’s description of creation via Neoplatonic emanation, Avicenna clearly states that 
the universe originates from God’s emanation of the First Intellect.243 The non-existence of 
the universe before God’s emanation is not a causal factor in the eventual existence of the 
universe. So, both metaphysical efficient causation and Neoplatonic emanation share this 
feature. 
 A metaphysical efficient cause co-exists with its effect. As long as the effect exists, 
one can be sure that the cause exists, for the cause is what is keeping the effect in existence. 
In Avicenna’s narration of creation via Neoplatonic emanation, he distinguishes between 
possible and necessary beings. The First Intellect is a being that is possible in itself but is 
necessary through another.244 Avicenna uses this same language of necessity through another 
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when explaining that metaphysical efficient causes co-exist with their effects.245 As long as 
the effect exists, it is clear that the cause exists for both a metaphysical efficient cause and a 
Neoplatonic emanator. 
 Finally, a metaphysical efficient cause necessitates its effect. Assuming the 
appropriate conditions have been met, namely that there is no impediment to the 
metaphysical efficient cause bringing about its effect, the effect comes to exist.246 Similarly, 
assuming that God knows, wills, and has no impediment to emanating, God emanates the 
First Intellect.247 Again, the metaphysical efficient cause and the Neoplatonic emanator share 
this feature.  
In order for this interpretation to be correct, there must be no differences between 
Neoplatonic emanation and efficient causation. From Avicenna’s account of Neoplatonic 
emanation, it is clear that God must emanate something similar to itself. Specifically, God 
must emanate one simple being. A longstanding principle of causation, however, is that 
effects must be like their causes in some way. Although Avicenna does not specify this 
causal principle with respect to metaphysical efficient causation, it seems fair to assume he 
believed this principle also applied to metaphysical efficient causation. So, it seems unlikely 
that there is a difference between the two accounts on this point. 
Perhaps a difference between Neoplatonic emanation and metaphysical efficient 
causation is that a metaphysical efficient cause is said to bring about existence, but the exact 
action it takes to bring about existence is not specified. In contrast, causation by Neoplatonic 
emanation involves a specific type of action: diffusion of being. Causation by Neoplatonic 
emanation must occur in this manner; if causation does not occur via diffusion, then that 
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causation cannot be Neoplatonic emanation. Avicenna does not specify whether 
metaphysical efficient causation occurs by diffusion, so it is unclear whether this is a feature 
of causation in both causal theories. 
Further, Neoplatonic emanation involves intermediaries in creation. While it is true 
that God is the ultimate cause of the existence of the universe, God does not directly 
emanate anything except for the First Intellect. The First Intellect continues the chain of 
emanation, a chain which eventually results in the existence of the universe. If metaphysical 
efficient causation is identical to Neoplatonic emanation, then metaphysical efficient 
causation either would have to involve mediators in order to bring about something like the 
universe or else could explain God’s causation of the First Intellect only. The only being that 
is directly caused by God is the First Intellect, but God is described as the efficient cause of 
the universe. So, it seems that in order for these two theories to be identical causal theories, 
both theories must involve mediators. Avicenna does not specify whether the metaphysical 
efficient causation of the universe is direct or mediated, so it is unclear whether this is a 
feature of both causal theories.  
3. Option Three: Similar Causal Theories  
Perhaps Neoplatonic emanation and efficient causation are not identical but are 
merely similar causal theories, at least within the context of creation. They are neither 
entirely distinct nor identical—there is some overlap in their explanatory power. Since 
causation by Neoplatonic emanation seems to occur only via a certain type of action but no 
such type of action is specified in the account of metaphysical efficient causation, a 
difference might be that Neoplatonic emanation occurs only via one type of action but 
metaphysical efficient causation could occur via many types of action. Additionally, it seems 
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that Neoplatonic emanation involves intermediaries in the causation of the universe, but it is 
not clear that metaphysical efficient causation does involve intermediaries. However, both 
theories (as noted above) share many similarities and deal with bringing something into 
existence. So, it seems that these theories are merely similar and not identical. 
If it were the case that Neoplatonic emanation and metaphysical efficient causation 
were similar theories of causation, they might be related as species and sub-species. 
Metaphysical efficient causation does not, according to Avicenna’s descriptions, entail only 
one type of action. Metaphysical efficient causation, then, could be the general manner in 
which being is brought about. Neoplatonic emanation in creation is one specific way to 
bring about being: by diffusion with the involvement of intermediaries. Neoplatonic 
emanation would be a type of metaphysical efficient causation, but there could (presumably) 
be other types of metaphysical efficient causation as well. 
 Even though these theories are nearly identical, it is unclear that they are, in fact, 
identical. The primary difference between these theories is that Avicenna specifies the type 
of action a Neoplatonic emanator performs, but he does not similarly specify the type of 
action a metaphysical efficient cause performs. Unless every effect of metaphysical efficient 
causation is brought about by diffusion, metaphysical efficient causation is not identical to 
Neoplatonic emanation. There is simply insufficient textual evidence to assert that these 
causal theories are identical. It seems most plausible, then, that these two causal theories are 
similar. Neoplatonic emanation is a sub-type of metaphysical efficient causation. 
 Despite the similarities, Neoplatonic emanation and metaphysical efficient causation 
are causal theories that overlap with respect to divine creation but are distinct in other ways. 
One way in which these causal theories are distinguished is the primacy given to Neoplatonic 
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emanation in Avicenna’s account of divine creation. Whereas Avicenna deftly develops the 
implications of Aristotle’s account of efficient causation, which allows him to explain 
creation in terms of metaphysical efficient causation, Avicenna uses Neoplatonic emanation 
to explain how God could be ultimately be responsible for the existence of the universe. 
Metaphysical efficient causation is a causal theory that explains how it is possible that 
something can be created; Neoplatonic emanation provides the details of that creative 
process. Without the specific details provided in the theory of Neoplatonic emanation, 
Avicenna could not explain how a simple, changeless, immaterial being produces the 
universe as a whole. God, in emanating the First Intellect, produces a simple being; thus far, 
as long as metaphysical efficient causation is understood to be productive of being generally 
(and little emphasis is placed on the uniqueness of emanating versus producing more 
generally), metaphysical efficient causation can be used to understand this act. However, 
when Avicenna asserts that a multiplicity develops in the First Intellect because it is possible 
in itself yet necessary through another and that from the First Intellect contemplating this 
multiplicity arises the first celestial sphere, the soul of that sphere, and the Second Intellect, 
his causal analysis depends entirely upon the causal theory of Neoplatonic emanation. 
Additionally, when Avicenna asserts that this series of emanations of Intellects, celestial 
spheres, and the soul of each of those spheres cannot continue ad infinitum and uses this 
assertion to justify his claim that the Giver of Forms must produce a terrestrial sphere, he 
relies upon the causal theory of Neoplatonic emanation. While it is true that if Avicenna did 
not adhere to Neoplatonic emanation as a causal theory, he would not be constrained by the 
presupposition that from one simple being, only one simple being can be produced, 
adherence to Neoplatonic emanation allowed him to cope with the tensions between his 
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philosophical commitments and his faith commitment. Thus, I contend that Neoplatonic 
emanation is not only Avicenna’s primary means of explaining divine creation but is also the 
more fundamental causal theory within the context of creation. Avicenna uses metaphysical 
efficient causation as a means of justifying creating as a type of efficient causation, but he 
uses Neoplatonic emanation to explain precisely what creating is. The philosophical theory 
that Avicenna uses to do the bulk of the work, so to speak, in his explication of creating is 
Neoplatonic emanation. 
 It seems that Avicenna holds on to these two theories of causation because each is 
useful in unique ways. Aristotelian metaphysical efficient causation provides the theoretical 
support for Avicenna’s claim that being can be originated. The universe has a beginning, and 
it is initially brought into existence out of nothing. Metaphysical efficient causation explains 
how that is possible, but the theory itself provides no immediately clear way for Avicenna to 
continue to assert divine simplicity. As noted in chapter 1, God’s simplicity and unity is one 
of the defining characteristics of Islam, and the mere appearance that one’s philosophical 
theory posited multiplicity in God—as positing God as the direct efficient cause of the entire 
universe might have—was something most philosophers considered to be worth avoiding. 
Neoplatonic emanation allows Avicenna to explain how God could be ultimately responsible 
for the universe without impugning God’s simplicity or, it turns out, impugning God’s free, 
voluntary creation of that universe. While there is significant overlap and it seems that 
Neoplatonic emanation could be a subtype of metaphysical efficient cause, each causal 





 In this chapter, I have defended the claim that Avicenna solves the ‘problem of 
creation’ presented in chapter one by assuming the truth of the Neoplatonic model of 
creation. Avicenna explains that Neoplatonic emanation is indeed compatible with the 
Islamic conception of creation because Neoplatonic emanation can be voluntary. Despite 
Avicenna’s clear presentation of creation as emanation, Avicenna also describes God’s 
creative act as efficient causation. I have explained both what type of efficient cause God 
is—a metaphysical efficient cause—and why Avicenna believes such a type of efficient 
causation must exist. Finally, I have attempted to explain the relationship between 
metaphysical efficient causation and Neoplatonic emanation within the context of creation. 
These two theories are clearly either similar theories or identical theories. If they are similar 
theories, it seems the best way to understand their similarity is to consider one theory to be a 
sub-type of the other theory. I suggest that Neoplatonic emanation is best understood as a 
sub-type of metaphysical efficient causation. Avicenna’s theory of causation initially appears 
to be fundamentally Neoplatonic because of his focus on emanation, but in light of his 
extended discussion of metaphysical efficient causation, it is clear that Avicenna does not 
think of creating exclusively in terms of Neoplatonic emanation. Avicenna has found a way 
for causation by Neoplatonic emanation and causation by a metaphysical efficient cause to 
co-exist in his theoretical framework, namely by sublimating Neoplatonic emanation as a 
sub-type of metaphysical efficient causation more generally. Fundamentally, however, 
Avicenna uses the conceptual tools provided within the theory of Neoplatonic emanation to 











 In this chapter, I shall defend the claim that Aquinas takes for granted the truth of  
the Aristotelian model of  causation by reviewing Aquinas’s discussions of  God creating and 
showing that in these discussions, Aquinas calls God an efficient cause of  what comes to 
exist and discusses God’s causation of  what exists in terms of  efficient causation. I also 
defend the claim that, for Aquinas, Aristotelian efficient causation is not incompatible with 
God creating ex nihilo. While Aristotle presents efficient causation in which an agent activates 
some potentiality and focuses on examples of  efficient causation in which a patient underlies 
the change, Aquinas asserts that Aristotle dwells upon one type of  efficient causation—
namely, natural efficient causation—and that there is another type of  efficient causation—
namely, efficient causation of  being, which does not involve any patient underlying the 
change. Aquinas does not take Aristotle’s account of  efficient causation to be exhaustive of  
all cases of  efficient causation. Despite Aquinas’s presentation and discussion of  creation in 
terms of  efficient causation, Aquinas also discusses creation in terms of  emanation. I claim 
that Aquinas’s interpretation of  emanation varies greatly from Avicenna’s interpretation. 
Aquinas seems to mean nothing distinctive from the efficient causation of  being when he 




II. An Aristotelian Approach 
 Contrary to Avicenna, who explains God creating primarily in a manner which 
conforms to the details of  Neoplatonic emanation, Aquinas explains God creating primarily 
in a manner that conforms to Aristotelian efficient causation. In this section, I will defend 
the claim that Aquinas takes God to be an efficient cause of  creation when God creates. To 
do so, I will present what Aquinas understands to be efficient causation in ordinary cases—
that is, in the sorts of  cases involving an agent activating some potentiality in a patient. I will 
then present evidence that Aquinas not only describes God as the efficient cause of  the 
universe but also speaks of  the details of  creation in ways that align with efficient causation. 
Based on Aquinas’s explication of  God creating, it will become clear to the reader that 
Aquinas understands Aristotelian efficient causation to be the fundamental way to think of  
divine creating. 
A. Aristotelian Efficient Causation 
 In the first chapter, it was shown that an Aristotelian efficient cause is an agent that 
actualizes some potentiality in something. So, a sculptor actualizes the potentiality of  bronze 
to be in the shape of  Aphrodite, thus bringing about a statue with the form of  Aphrodite. 
An efficient cause is, in some sense, prior to its effect. An efficient cause could bring about 
its effects as the result of  its will or its nature. If  Aquinas does more than label God the 
efficient cause of  the universe, then one can expect to find him describing God creating in a 
way that emphasizes the fact that God’s action brings about the effect, that God is somehow 
prior to the effect, that God acts either as a result of  God’s will or God’s nature, and that 
God is either the proximate or distal cause of  the effect. Our examination will include 
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Aquinas’s discussion of  divine creating and the six days of  creation found in his Summa 
Theologiae, Summa Contra Gentiles, and Disputed Questions on the Power of  God.  
 B. Aquinas on Creation  
In this study, I will examine Aquinas’s account of  creating insofar as it conforms to 
an account of  efficient causation—but not at the expense of  ignoring or discounting 
Aquinas’s account of  creating insofar as it conforms to the creation narrative in Genesis. 
Some of  the details of  Aquinas’s explication of  the biblical account of  creating are 
interesting but not necessary to show that Aquinas takes God creating to be an instance of  
efficient causation, but neither are such omitted details contrary to the claim that Aquinas’s 
account of  God’s action in creating is an instance of  efficient causation. The account 
presented below is not comprehensive but is representative of  Aquinas’s description of  God 
creating. 
Before delving into a discussion of  Aquinas’s account of  God creating, it is helpful 
to have a basic understanding of  what Aquinas means when he talks about creation. 
According to Aquinas in his commentary on Peter Lombard’s Sentences, creation can be 
thought of  in terms of  the creator or in terms of  the created. In terms of  the creator, the 
act of  creation is an action that occurs without any preceding causes.248 By “without any 
preceding causes,” Aquinas means that the act of  creation occurs by “the action of  the 
primary cause alone.”249 Nothing other than God, then, brings about the effect. In terms of  
the created, the act of  creation is the act that brings about the existence of  created beings 
from nothing preexisting.250 Aquinas asserts here and elsewhere that the act of  creation is an 
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act that neither presupposes some preexisting material nor relies upon any such preexisting 
material. Instead, creation is the production of  being from nothing that preexists said being.251 
Creation is, by definition, an action of  God that brings about the existence of  beings other 
than God’s self, and in such an act being is brought about ex nihilo.  
When Aquinas describes this act of  God, Aquinas consistently speaks in terms of  
efficient causation. Aquinas’s famous ‘five ways’ include the argument that because there 
cannot be an infinite chain of  efficient causes, some first efficient cause must exist in order 
to account for the existence of  the universe.252 This first efficient cause is called God “by 
everyone,” Aquinas asserts.253 Aquinas makes a similar argument in his Summa Contra Gentiles 
book two, where he presents Aristotle’s argument from motion for a first efficient cause.254 
While these examples illustrate that Aquinas seems comfortable applying the language of  
efficient causation to creation, one could ask whether these examples are representative of  
Aquinas’s general conception of  divine creating. In exploring whether Aquinas genuinely 
believes divine creating to be an instance of  divine efficient causation—more specifically, 
Aristotelian efficient causation—it will be necessary to examine Aquinas’s account of  God 
creating for elements of  Aristotelian efficient causation.255  
1. God’s action brings about the effect 
To understand why Aquinas specifies that creating is performed by God in his 
definition of  creation, it is necessary to understand what Aquinas says God is like. In his 
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Summa Contra Gentiles, Aquinas asserts that God is an eternal, changeless, immaterial being.256 
God is personal, which means that God has attributes commonly associated with 
personhood. According to Aquinas, God has an intellect, which means that God is a 
thinking being. Additionally, God is a being who has a will. And, in a manner somewhat 
similar to how human wills operate, God’s will is guided by God’s intellect. God’s intellect 
determines what is God’s good, and God’s will seeks that thing.257 What is good is the 
existence of  God, and thus God wills God’s own existence.258 
Unlike Avicenna, who would embrace Aquinas’s conception of  God thus far, 
Aquinas also asserts that God is triune. Without heading into a excursus on Trinitarian 
theology, suffice it to say that Aquinas believes that God is a being that shares one 
substance—one underlying nature—in three unified persons—God the Father, God the 
Son, and God the Holy Spirit.259 Although Aquinas holds to this distinctive theology, he 
nonetheless maintains that the triune God has the characteristics classically attributed to 
God, characteristics that apply to all three persons of  the Godhead.  
Despite his claim that God is triune, Aquinas upholds the doctrine of  divine 
simplicity. Because God is an immaterial being, God is neither a body nor is composed of  
matter and form.260 Aquinas asserts that God’s essence is identical to God’s nature, and that 
God’s essence is identical to God’s existence.261 Even though God exists in three persons, 
those persons share the same nature; accordingly, Aquinas would not have believed 
Trinitarian theology to inconsistent with divine simplicity. Complex beings have causes, but 
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God is the uncaused cause.262 Thus, God is simple. God’s nature, then, is identical with 
God’s essence, God’s existence, God’s knowledge, and God’s will.  
Aquinas, like Avicenna, asserts that God is an eternal, changeless, simple, immaterial 
being because God is a necessary being that is fully actualized. God cannot fail to exist, and 
God is a being who is entirely self-sufficient. God does not depend on any other being for 
God’s existence. In addition, God is a fully actualized being. That is, God is a being in which 
no potency can be found; instead, God is a being that is pure act.263 Aquinas appeals to the 
claim that God is pure act to justify his earlier assertion that God is simple: every composite 
has potency and actuality, but God is not a composite. Since God exists, God cannot be pure 
potency; instead, God is pure actuality.264 
Among these attributes of  God, Aquinas dwells on the notion of  God as pure act in 
his explanation of  creation. The fact that God is the pure act explains why God—this 
eternal, changeless, immaterial, Trinitarian being—performs the action of  creating instead of  
some other being performing the action of  creating. Aquinas repeatedly asserts that “every 
agent acts according as it is in act.”265 An effect brought about by a being that is both active 
and passive—has some things about itself  which are actualized and some things about itself  
which are merely potentialities—will reflect this division of  act and potency: in such a case, 
the effect will also be both active and passive. Because material objects are both active and 
passive insofar as they are composed of  (passive) matter and (active) form, one might think 
that any being which is active and passive could bring about a material object. Aquinas thinks 
of  things differently. A material object can bring about another material object by actualizing 
                                               
262 Aquinas, ST Ia.4.7. 
263 Aquinas, SCG II.16. Aquinas addresses the notion of God being pure act in On the Power of God 3.1, as well. 
264 Aquinas, ST Ia.4.7. 
265 Aquinas, SCG II.6; see also On the Power of God 3.1. 
102 
some potency in that object. A sculptor actualizes the lump of  bronze into a statue. Take 
away the bronze, however, and the sculptor is unable to make the statue. The sculptor 
cannot snap her fingers and produce more bronze. Aquinas argues that the sculptor lacks the 
ability to bring more bronze into existence because she, as a material being, causes things to 
happen through motion.266 She can cause a dog to bark by clapping her hands loudly and 
suddenly. She can cause a car to slow by pushing on the left pedal. By manipulating the 
material world around her, she can bring about her desired effect. What she cannot do is 
bring about some effect without manipulating the world around her. All of  her effects can be 
produced because she is effecting something that already exists. She is limited in her causal 
abilities by the fact that she is a being in act and in potency. Specifically, she is limited to 
causing by motion, a means of  causation that requires preexisting matter.267 
God, who is fully actualized, does not have this limitation. According to Aquinas, a 
fully actualized being is not limited to actualizing some potentiality in other things (or in 
itself). Instead, a fully actualized being can, in virtue of  its own actuality, bring about the 
existence of  other things out of  nothing. Whereas the sculptor cannot snap her fingers and 
produce more bronze, God can bring about the existence of  the sculptor, the bronze, or the 
statue (or all of  the above), using no pre-existing material to do so. God is not limited in 
action by the non-existence of  the sculptor, the bronze, or the statue. God lacks such 
limitations because “effects correspond proportionally to their causes,” meaning that a fully 
actualized being can produce any effect.268 This is not to say that God’s action has no limits: 
Aquinas argues that God’s actions are determined by God’s will and God’s knowledge (more 
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on this below) and that God cannot do what is logically impossible.269 Because God is the 
only fully actualized being, God is the only being capable of  creating.270 
Further, God is able to create because as a fully actualized and immaterial being, God 
can act by God’s total substance. And, only an agent that can act by the totality of  its 
substance can produce a total substance as its effect. Our sculptor, as a material being 
composed of  matter and form, is doubly limited: there are certain things which she cannot 
do because they are contrary to her nature—she cannot give birth to a non-human, for 
example—and there are certain things that she cannot do because they are contrary to her 
abilities as a hylomorphic compound of  matter and form. As noted above, she cannot be 
fully actualized, since her material existence inherently involves some potency. In addition to 
entailing that our sculptor cannot create because she is not fully actualized, the fact that she 
is a material being entails that she cannot act by the entirety of  her substance. Since only 
some of  her substance is actualized and she acts by those parts of  her which are actualized, 
she acts by part of  her substance. God, however, is an entirely immaterial being, and thus 
God can act by the totality of  God’s substance. Because God can act by the totality of  God’s 
substance, God can bring about the existence of  a total substance in its entirety without any 
preexisting matter.271 
Not only is God the sole being with the capability of  creating, God must be the 
creator because Aquinas understands the notion that “effects correspond proportionally to 
their causes” to have further application not only to the actuality or potentiality of  effects 
but also the particularity or universality of  effects.272 According to Aquinas, there is one 
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action that is universal: the action of  being. Because being is everywhere, being is a universal 
act. Aquinas clarifies that by the action of  being, he does not mean each specific being: he 
does not mean this being, say, a horse named Ed; instead, he means being as such.273 The 
cause of  this universal action, then, must also be universal. This first and universal agent is 
God.274 
God alone is able to create because God alone has the power to create. A more 
powerful agent has a higher capacity for actualizing potency than a less powerful agent.275 A 
human, for example, is a more powerful agent than a poinsettia plant. A human can take 
wood and build a desk; a poinsettia can grow roots that disturb the soil. Humans are able to 
actualize potentialities in a wide range of  things, whereas poinsettias have a limited ability to 
do so. An agent more powerful than a human being could actualize the minutest potentiality 
in a thing.276 An agent yet more powerful would not need any potentiality to actualize; 
instead, such an agent has the power to actualize no potency, that is, to bring something into 
existence from nothing.  
So far, Aquinas’s account of  creation aligns with Aristotelian efficient causation. God 
acts to create, and in so doing, God is the cause of  all things by bringing about existence as 
such. God is able to create because God is fully actualized, God is immaterial and capable of  
acting through God’s entire substance, and God is powerful enough not to need potency to 
actualize. God is the efficient cause of  the universe because God, and God alone, is the 
cause of  what exists. 
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2. God acts by will 
God, then, has the ability to create, but one might ask whether God must create, or 
does God create because God wills to create. Aquinas argues clearly and consistently that 
God does not create due to some natural necessity on God’s part. Nothing in God’s nature 
requires that God creates, Aquinas writes, and he offers several arguments to that end. It is 
interesting to note, though, that Aquinas does not offer any arguments that God creates by 
will in the Summa Theologiae: there, he instead argues more generally that God acts by will, and 
one can presumably apply this fact to all of  God’s acts, including creation. In both his Summa 
Contra Gentiles and On the Power of  God, Aquinas offers what may be grouped as three 
arguments with the conclusion that God acts by will in creating. In the first argument, the 
conclusion is that God’s action is not determined to one effect, and thus God must act by 
will. In the second, the conclusion is that God acts for an end, and an agent can act for an 
end only by will. In the third, the conclusion is that every effect is in its cause in some way, 
and God causing by intellect and will explain how this is possible. 
In the first argument, Aquinas begins with the premise that nature determines an 
agent’s action to one effect.277 In the right circumstances, the agent will produce that one 
effect.278 For example, an animal bred under the right circumstances will produce a more of  
that kind of  animal, but it will not produce a different kind of  animal.279 Voluntary effects, 
though, may or may not occur in a variety of  circumstances.280 A person may will at time t1, 
while he is watching television, to read a book, and he might watch television days later 
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without then willing to read a book. His willing to read a book is related to but not 
contingent upon his circumstances. Another feature of  voluntary effects is that an agent may 
will many things. Instead of  willing to read a book while watching television, a man could 
easily will to go for a walk or call his spouse or water the plants. In exactly similar 
circumstances, he may will to do different things at different times. Notice, again, that each 
of  these examples of  things he might will are things he has the ability to perform. With 
regard to the divine will, Aquinas notes that God has the power to perform anything that is 
not logically impossible, that is, that does not imply a logical contradiction.281 God’s act, then, 
is not ordered to one effect only.282 
Aquinas offers an interesting variation of  this argument. Instead of  focusing on 
God’s power, he focuses on the fact that an agent acting by nature produces an effect that is 
its equal.283 A dolphin produces another dolphin, which is an effect that is equal to itself. 
Unless a natural agent is hindered by a defect, either in itself  or in its patient, it will always 
produce an effect equal to itself.284 The world, however, is not filled entirely with effects that 
are equal to their causes. This is true in two ways. First, if  God created by nature, then the 
universe would have to be equal to God; but given the fact that nothing can be equal to God, 
this is impossible. Second, the creatures populating the universe are not equal to each other: 
humans are more advanced creatures than felines, and felines are more advanced creatures 
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than poinsettias.285 So, either God is hindered by some defect or else God wills these 
inequalities to exist. Aquinas resoundingly rejects the first disjunct: God is not hindered by 
some defect in God’s nature because God is perfect, and God is not hindered by some 
defect in the patient, for no patient underlies creation.286 Accordingly, the only remaining 
explanation for the inequality in the universe is God’s will. 
In the second argument, Aquinas begins with the premise that, according to his 
interpretation of  Aristotle’s Metaphysics Λ, the universe is ordered toward an end.287 In order 
for the universe to be directed toward an end, the universe must be directed by an intellect.288 
While it is true that agents acting by nature do act for an end, an agent acting by nature does 
not have any knowledge of  the end for which it acts. An agent acting by nature just happens 
to act toward an end because it is, by nature, directed toward an end. An agent acting by 
nature does not determine its own end. Instead, something else has determined the end 
toward which that agent would act by its nature.289 So, even natural agents that act toward an 
end must be directed toward that end by some intelligent agent. Since the agents in the 
universe act toward an end, the agent responsible for the universe must be an intelligent 
                                               
285 For Aquinas, this is a crucial point to make. Aquinas subscribes to species essentialism, which means that 
each member of a species (here, specifically species of material beings) belongs to that species essentially. A 
human belongs to the species of humanity because that is simply what it means to be a human. With respect to 
his argument here, this view means that a human cannot come from anything other than a human. So, there is 
no way to explain how these diverse, unequal creatures can coexist. One cannot appeal to a theory akin to 
Darwinian evolution to explain the origins of creatures, for it is, in Aquinas’s reckoning, simply impossible that 
an elephant could come—through thousands (if not millions) of years and thousands of smaller changes in 
response to environmental pressures—from a whale. An animal cannot change species because if that animal 
exists, it is a member of a species. Animals do not change species, so the inequality between animals must have 
some other explanation. The only explanations Aquinas can fathom is that some being is responsible for 
creating these inequalities (and thus this creator acts by will, or else there would not be inequalities) or these 
inequalities are the result of chance. Given the fact that Aquinas later argues that the universe has an end, he 
will reject the latter option. Chance cannot explain these inequalities. For Aquinas’s species essentialism, see 
Joseph Bobik, Aquinas on Being and Essence: A Translation and Interpretation (Notre Dame: University of Notre 
Dame, 1965), 119.  
286 Aquinas, On the Power of God 3.15. 
287 Aquinas refers to Metaphysics XI.10 (1075a 12). 
288 Aquinas, SCG II.223. 
289 Aquinas, On the Power of God 3.15. 
108 
agent that can direct others toward an end. Accordingly, this intelligent agent creates not by 
nature but by will, which is informed by knowledge.290  
The third argument Aquinas presents begins with the premise that effects are like 
their causes in some way. Aquinas explains this purported likeness by asserting that the effect 
must preexist in the causing agent in some way.291 And whatever preexists in the causing 
agent must exist in the mode of  the causing agent. Because God is an immaterial, intellectual 
being, the effects must preexist in God’s intellect.292 Aquinas then asserts that the intellect 
produces an effect only by the exercise of  the agent’s will.293 The will executes what is in the 
intellect, and the intellect moves the will.294 Accordingly, God must act by God’s will when 
God creates.  
It is now clear that Aquinas takes God creating to be an act of  will. God does not act 
to create because God’s nature makes God act. Instead, God acts because God wills to act. 
As noted above, Aquinas draws a close connection between knowledge and will. Knowledge 
moves the will to act, and thus God’s knowledge moves the will to act. As with Avicenna, 
one might object that divine simplicity, which entails that God’s essence is identical to God’s 
knowledge, means that God’s actions are indeed necessitated by God’s nature. However, 
Aquinas could respond (like Avicenna) that an agent acting by its nature performs an action 
that does not involve its will. Because God’s action does involve God’s will—even in its 
identity with God’s essence—this action is a volitional action. 
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3. The effect which God brings about is being  
As noted above, when God creates, God creates being as such. The discussion above 
distinguished the production of  “being as such” with the production of  “this being,” that is, 
with the production of  this specific, individual existing thing. In light of  this discussion, one 
might wonder whether Aquinas asserts that God creates being without differentiating being 
into specific, individual existing things. And, if  God does differentiate being, then it remains 
to be seen how God does this. It might be the case that God differentiates some being—for 
example, God creates angels—but God allows these creatures to be the agents that 
differentiate other beings—for example, perhaps angels produce material beings. This latter 
discussion entails an explanation of  whether Aquinas’s account of  creation diverges from 
Avicenna’s account, for Avicenna says that God creates one simple being, and this being is 
the source of  numerical difference and qualitative difference in the universe. According to 
Aquinas, God does differentiate being directly, and God creates immaterial beings (angels) 
and material beings directly. He argues that God is able to create this multiplicity directly 
because God creates by will and not by nature. 
a. What God Creates 
In the Summa Contra Gentiles, Aquinas asserts that God creating involves the 
production of  being as such. Because God brings about the existence of  being other than 
God’s own being, God has brought about being as such. He does not, however, assert that 
God creating produces entirely undifferentiated being.295 Instead, God brings about this 
being and that being, but because none of  these beings existed before God creates, God is 
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said to bring about being as such. Thus, it is correct that being is the proper object of  
creation, but what God produces are specific, individuated beings.296  
One such class of  individuated beings that God creates are angels. In his discussion 
of  the creation of  immaterial substances—that is, angels—Aquinas asserts that God directly 
brings about the existence of  angels.297 Repeating that everything that exists other than God 
has God as its cause, Aquinas applies this statement to angelic beings. Given that angels are 
immaterial beings and God is an immaterial being, it seems clear that God could create such 
beings. Angels, however, were not produced by God from eternity.298 Instead, God existed 
without the angels also existing.299 
Aquinas’s attention to God’s creation of  angelic beings might give the mistaken 
impression that angels were created before other beings were created. Aquinas denies that 
angels were created before other aspects of  the universe, namely the empyrean heavens and 
the earth.300 Angels were created simultaneously with the rest of  the universe. So, when God 
acts to create, God creates the universe—which includes the sidereal heavens, the empyrean 
heavens, stars, and the earth—and what populates the universe—which includes immaterial 
and material beings—in one act.301 
Material beings, too, are created by God.302 Despite the differences between God and 
material beings, Aquinas asserts that one cause must be common to all existing beings.303 
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Material beings are made on account of  God’s goodness.304 All being reflects God’s 
goodness, and the whole of  the universe has God as its end, including material beings.305 
Despite the variety of  material beings, Aquinas insists that God is the direct cause of  what 
comes into existence at the moment of  creation and ultimate end of  all that exists.306 
b. Whether God creating is a mediated action 
God is said to be the ultimate cause—in Aquinas’s language, the principle—of  what 
exists, including that which is material and that which is immaterial. God creates the angels, 
the empyrean heavens, the sidereal heavens, and the terrestrial realm (and all of  its 
inhabitants). However, one should note that Avicenna could assent to the same statement: he 
could agree that God is the ultimate cause or principle of  all that exists other than God’s 
self. Avicenna would emphasize that God is the ultimate but not proximate cause of  all that 
exists, for God cannot directly produce the multiplicity of  beings which are numerically and 
qualitatively distinct. Further, because Aristotle discusses efficient causes which are direct 
causes of  effects and efficient causes which are indirect causes of  effects—their causation of  
that effect is mediated by some other thing—it seems that Aquinas could assert, like 
Avicenna, that God causes some things directly but other things indirectly. Aquinas 
acknowledges that efficient causes could bring about their effects directly or mediately, but 
he asserts that in creating, God directly brings about the existence of  the universe and what 
populates it.  
After arguing that God is the ultimate source of  material beings, Aquinas considers 
whether angels are the agents who bring about the existence of  material beings, either in 
their entirety or merely by producing their forms. Aquinas determines that angels do not 
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bring about the existence of  material beings.307 Instead of  producing material beings through 
the power of  angels, God produces material beings directly. Aquinas argues that the higher 
or more powerful the cause, the more numerous effects to which it will extend. The most 
general effect, then, will have the highest cause. And being is the most general effect—it is 
shared by every existing thing. Thus, being can come from God alone because God is the 
most powerful and highest cause.308 Additionally, Aquinas notes that agents are only able to 
produce something if  they are designed so as to be predisposed to do that thing.309 For 
example, dogs can mate and produce puppies only because part of  what it means to be a dog 
is to be able to produce more dogs (given the right circumstances and the absence of  any 
significant defects). Above, we saw Aquinas’s definition of  creation as production with 
nothing presupposed. Since this predisposition to produce must be presupposed by any 
created agent, that agent could produce something but could not, by definition, create 
something.310 
Aquinas then addresses whether the angels perhaps create the forms of  material 
bodies but do not create the entirety of  the material being. Here, Aquinas again relies upon 
his previously discussed notion of  creation as production from nothing in order to say that 
angels do not create the forms of  material beings. Angels are immaterial beings, but they are 
not the simple, fully actualized immaterial being that God is. Thus, they are not able to 
create.311  
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c. Whether God produces multiple Quantitatively and  
 Qualitatively Diverse Things 
Following what Aquinas says about the direct production of  beings by God, Aquinas 
asserts that God creates diverse things immediately or directly.312 To borrow language from 
Avicenna’s discussion of  creation, God creates a multiplicity of  numerically and qualitatively 
different beings directly. Avicenna, in his discussion of  creation, offered extensive 
philosophical analysis to show that God does not create this multiplicity directly, for to say 
that God directly creates a multiplicity is to suggest that God is not simple. Aquinas, in 
contrast, clearly asserts that God creates this multiplicity directly. What remains to be seen is 
whether Aquinas’s assertion about God’s immediate creation of  numerically and qualitatively 
different beings implies multiplicity in God. To further this discussion, it is necessary to 
explore whether Aquinas believes that asserting God’s direct creation of  this multiplicity 
implies multiplicity in God. It is also necessary to explore how Aquinas believes that God 
can create this multiplicity in light of  Aquinas’s commitment to the principle that effects 
resemble their cause.  
In his On the Power of  God, Aquinas discusses whether a multitude of  things can 
proceed from God. On this issue, Aquinas’s opinion is in stark contrast Avicenna’s position. 
Aquinas asserts that a multiplicity of  numerically and qualitatively different beings can be 
produced by one being—even one simple being—as long as the cause is not determined to 
its effect.313 If  a cause is determined to its effect, then the effect is necessitated by the cause. 
Aquinas does not attempt to explain an effect necessitated by its cause in terms of  natural 
necessity or volitional necessity. Instead, Aquinas considers which sorts of  causes could be 
determined to their effects. 
                                               
312 Aquinas, SCG II.22. 
313 Aquinas, On the Power of God 3.16 resp. 
114 
When Aquinas speaks of  what it means for an effect to be necessitated by a cause, 
he asserts that of  Aristotle’s four causes, only an efficient or a material cause can be 
determined to an effect.314 With both material causes and efficient causes, the cause precedes 
the effect in being. Aquinas rejects the notion that formal causes could necessitate their 
effects, for the effect has its being by its form; thus, a formal cause and its effect exist 
simultaneously. A final cause precedes its effect in intention but not in being: the final cause 
of  something—say, a house—is determined before the house itself  begins to exist. Since a 
final cause does not precede its effect in being, it is not determined to one effect. A material 
cause, however, does precede its effect in being, for the material cause is the matter out of  
which the effect is composed. An efficient cause precedes its effect in being because an 
efficient cause is the agent that brings about its effect. So, if  a cause is determined to its 
effect, that cause will be either a material or efficient cause.315 
In the context of  whether God creating is a cause determined to its effect, it should 
already be clear that Aquinas will focus on efficient causes and not material causes. One of  
the hallmarks of  divine creating is that the effect is produced ex nihilo, which means that 
there is no material cause of  divine creating. Thus, no material cause could determine God’s 
action of  creating to one effect.316 With that, Aquinas focuses on whether there are any 
reasons to assert that the first efficient cause—God—would be determined to one effect in 
creating. 
If  Aquinas agreed with Avicenna’s analysis regarding the principle that from one 
simple being, only one simple being can be produced, he would state his acceptance of  the 
principle at this point. He does not. Instead, Aquinas considers whether there is anything at 
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all about God that determines God’s action to one effect. Avicenna asserts that God’s 
simplicity determines God to one effect, but Aquinas focuses not on God’s simplicity but on 
God’s power.317 In God, there is “active power to the highest degree,” which means both 
that God is a being that lacks passive powers (that is, God cannot be acted upon) and that 
God has the power to do anything other than what is logically contradictory.318  
If  God’s power is not determined to one effect, then God’s efficient causation is not 
determined to one effect. Aquinas quickly affirms the antecedent, asserting that God’s power 
is infinite.319 In his earlier discussion of  whether God’s power is infinite, Aquinas asserts that 
God’s power is infinite by way of  negation: God’s power has no end.320 God’s power, like 
God’s wisdom and essence and goodness, is without limit. And, given that God is a fully 
actualized being, God is a being of  infinite act. God is infinite act because God’s act is 
limited neither by any agent nor by any recipient. Because God is the actor and God has 
infinite power, God’s act is not limited by any agent. To illustrate how something can be 
limited by a recipient, Aquinas provides the example of  the heat of  a furnace being limited 
by the disposition of  the fuel. God, however, is a being lacking any passive potency.321 
Because God is a self-subsistent being, God cannot be limited by a recipient in a manner 
similar to the heat being limited by its fuel. God’s infinite power and infinite act are 
corollaries of  God being fully actualized, and thus God’s act is not limited to one effect.  
Were God’s infinite power determined to one effect, then that effect would reflect 
God’s infinite power. Yet, the only being which can reflect God’s infinite power is another 
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being with infinite power. So, if  God’s power were determined to one effect, God would be 
creating another god. However, this is impossible: God is eternal and uncreated. The 
absurdity of  what follows from the supposition that God’s power is determined to one 
effect shows the supposition itself  to be absurd as well.322 
Aquinas explicitly considers Avicenna’s principle that from one simple thing, only 
one simple thing can be produced.323 Aquinas seems to believe that what underlies this 
principle is the belief  that an effect must be like its cause. When rebutting this principle, 
Aquinas asserts that there is a likeness between God and the universe, but this likeness is not 
equality. God, in creating, produces something distinct but similar to God. Accordingly, God 
does not produce something nearly identical to God as is produced when someone makes an 
additional copy of  something. Instead, God makes something that is similar to yet different 
from God. Because there is not equality between God and the universe—because they are 
not identical, are not of  the same substance, and do not each exist as fully actualized, simple, 
self-subsisting beings—there is no reason to expect that God must produce one simple 
being.324 
In response to the objection that God creating a multiplicity of  numerically and 
qualitatively distinct beings posits some plurality in God, Aquinas responds that God’s 
production of  the multiplicity of  beings does not reveal any multiplicity in God’s nature. The 
origin of  the multiplicity of  being, he says, is God’s knowledge and will.325 God has 
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knowledge of  a variety of  beings, and thus God is able to produce a variety of  beings.326 
God has knowledge of  many things, but God has this knowledge through one act.327 As 
mentioned above, Aquinas believes that all things which are eventually created by God 
preexist in God’s intellect, and these things are brought into existence by God’s will. Aquinas 
does not believe that admitting that God knows multiple things introduces multiplicity into 
God, for God knows these disparate things not as they are in themselves but as they are in 
God’s essence.328 Avicenna and Aquinas appear to agree that God can have knowledge of  
things outside God simply by knowing God’s essence as cause of  these things. Additionally, 
both men agree that the proper end of  God’s will is God’s goodness; yet in willing God’s 
goodness, God wills God’s own existence and the existence of  the universe and what 
populates it.329 So, because Aquinas finds both a way for God to know one thing—God—yet 
in that act of  knowing, know many things and a way for God to will one thing—God’s 
goodness—yet in that act of  willing, will the existence of  many things, Aquinas believes he 
can account for God’s direct creation of  the universe without imputing multiplicity into 
God’s nature.  
When asserting that the multiplicity of  numerically and qualitatively different beings 
exist because God both knows them and wills them (through knowing and willing God, of   
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course), Aquinas argues that these things exist because God intends330 them to exist.331 The 
distinction found amongst creatures stems from God’s intention to communicate God’s 
goodness to creatures. Since God’s goodness cannot be represented by one creature 
adequately because no creature other than God is self-subsistent, infinitely powerful, simple, 
and eternal, God instead produces many creatures that, when taken together, reflect God’s 
perfection better than one single creature would. In God’s wisdom, God makes giraffes and 
platypuses, emus and jellyfish, super novae and dwarf  stars, Venus fly traps and roses, all of  
which together reflect God’s goodness better than any one of  them could do alone. The 
totality of  what is created is able to substantially reflect God’s goodness.332 Not only does 
God create the universe and its inhabitants directly without implying multiplicity in God’s 
essence, but God also intentionally creates this multiplicity in order to better reflect God’s 
goodness.  
In discussing what God creates, it is evident that Aquinas’s account of  God’s 
creation of  the universe fits well with Aristotelian efficient causation. God precedes God’s 
effect in some way, and God, by an exercise of  God’s infinite power, is able to produce the 
existence of  new beings. Aquinas attributes God’s action to God’s knowledge and will rather 
than God’s nature, although either are appropriate sources of  action for an efficient cause. 
Creating is something that God is capable of  doing, although Aquinas must explain how 
God is able to produce being and how such an act does not tarnish or deviate from the 
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orthodox Christian conception of  God. The remaining issue regarding whether Aquinas’s 
account of  divine creation is an account of  Aristotelian efficient causation is whether the 
production of  being ex nihilo is a type of  Aristotelian efficient causation. To this issue we 
now turn. 
III. Efficient Causation without Patients 
 Although Aquinas did not compose an extended treatise on causation, one can glean 
his views on causation from discussions that occur in his works.333 In his Summa Theologiae, 
Aquinas draws upon Aristotle and distinguishes four types of  causes: final, formal, efficient, 
and material.334 Since the focus of  this chapter is Aquinas’s account of  divine causation in 
creating, I will focus here on efficient causation.335  
A. Efficient Causation involving patients 
In On the Principles of  Nature, Aquinas describes a typical instance of  generation, 
namely, the case of  a sculptor making a bronze statue. Generation involves three things: 
matter, which is being in potentiality; privation, which Aquinas calls “non-being in actuality;” 
and form, which, by informing the matter, makes the thing actual.336 Generation can be 
substantial, in which some new thing is produced from existing materials, such as the 
production of  a new human being from sperm and menstrual blood. Alternately, generation 
can be accidental, in which variance occurs in some substance that already exists, such as 
when a man moves from sitting to standing.337 In these cases of  generation, the material and 
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formal causes are clearly delineated, but what is unclear is how generation is instigated.338 
Aquinas notes that a lump of  bronze does not make itself  into a statue; instead, a sculptor is 
needed.339 Something is needed to act to bring this potentiality into actuality, and this thing is 
“called the efficient or moving cause, or the agent or the principle of  motion.”340 The agent 
produces the change by actualizing some potentiality in the matter.341 The final component 
of  generation is that for the sake of  which the agent acts, which is the end or final cause. 
 The efficient cause, then, is the agent—literally, the one acting. Agents can be 
sentient beings acting voluntary, but non-sentient beings like plants and even fire can be 
agents.342 So, an efficient cause is not always something that contemporary philosophers 
would recognize as an agent, but all of  these agents share the common characteristic of  
acting. What distinguishes the efficient cause from the other causes is that the efficient cause 
acts. Aquinas states: “for an efficient cause is a cause insofar as it acts.”343  
 Given the importance of  Aquinas’s reliance on the notion of  agents while discussing 
efficient causes, further explication of  what Aquinas means by agent—and also substance—
is warranted. Agents, as noted, can be any substance which acts.344 A substance is 
distinguished from an accident in this way: an accident inheres in something else; that is, it is 
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not an independently existing being. A substance is an independently existing thing.345 For 
example, a camel is a substance, but the color of  the camel is not. In a sense, the color of  
the camel does not exist apart from the camel—it exists in the camel. Whereas if  the camel 
were shaved or had its hair dyed, the camel would still be that same camel—though it would 
certainly look different. Each substance belongs to a species. Each member of  a species has 
a nature common to that species, which entails that they each have a distinctive set of  
properties and causal powers. A human has the causal powers that a member of  the species 
‘human’ has, and a camel has the causal powers that a member of  the species ‘camel’ has. 
Fire has the causal powers that a member of  the species ‘fire’ has.346 
 Agents can be sentient or non-sentient beings, which means that some agents act 
purely based on their nature, and others act based on their natures and volitions. Fire, then, 
is a natural agent because fire cannot think or deliberate. In the right circumstances, fire 
burns and cannot help but burn.347 Humans are voluntary agents because a human is capable 
of  willing an end and acting to reach that end. If  a human wills to become an airplane pilot, 
she can chose to do certain things—take a pilot certification course, for example—to 
accomplish that goal. However, voluntary agents are not able to will and achieve any goal, for 
they are always limited by their natures. A human might will to fly, but if  he is a human (and 
not Clark Kent, who is in fact a Kryptonian), he does not have the ability to fly—unaided by 
any additional tools or machines, of  course. 
 The limitations imposed by a thing’s nature are limitations on the powers and 
capabilities that a thing has.348 These limitations apply not only to what an agent can do to a 
                                               
345 Aquinas, DPN 1-4. 
346 Rota, “Causation,” 107. 
347 Aquinas, DPN 1-3. 
348 Aquinas, ST Ia.36.3 ad 1; Rota, “Causation,” 108. 
122 
patient but also to what a patient can possibly become. Powers can be active or passive. 
Active powers are the abilities an agent has to act, and passive powers are the abilities an 
agent has to be acted upon.349 An agent’s powers determine the range of  actions it can 
possibly perform and changes it can possibly undergo.  
 Along with a specific nature entailing that a creature has certain powers, a nature 
entails that a creature has certain inclinations. An inclination is a tendency for an agent to act 
toward certain ends, namely those ends which are the final cause for whatever sort of  being 
the agent is.350 Agents acting based on their natures have intentions, as do agents acting 
based on their volitions.351 The inclinations of  agents acting by nature are called natural 
inclinations, and the inclinations of  agents acting by volition are any acts of  the will.352 Any 
agent intends to do some things more than others, and these things are what Aquinas takes 
to be the agent’s inclinations. Inclinations are important for Aquinas’s theory of  efficient 
causation because appealing to their existence helps him explain the regularity of  the types 
of  acts performed by agents. 
B. Types of  Efficient Causation 
With this framework in place, we can now discuss what general classifications various 
instances of  efficient causation fall under according to Aquinas.353 The case of  the sculptor 
making a statue above is representative of  the first type of  efficient causation—change or 
motion. In involves an agent (the sculptor), matter (bronze, which is the patient that 
underlies the change), a privation (a lack of  Aphrodite-shaped-ness in the bronze), and a 
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form (Aphrodite’s shape, which comes to inform the bronze), and an act of  our agent which 
imparts the new form to the matter. This act cannot be contrary to the agent’s nature. That 
is, the act does not require an act which the agent does not have the power(s) or 
inclination(s) to perform. Change can be substantial—resulting in a new substance—or 
accidental—resulting in a modification of  an existing substance.354 The action performed by 
the agent and the passion undergone by the patient are the same motion in the patient, for 
the passion undergone by the patient simply is the action that the agent performs.  
 Despite Aristotle’s focus on efficient causation as change, Aquinas asserts that 
efficient causation also includes acts of  conservation. Conservation is the preservation of  
the existence of  some existing thing. Without God conserving what God creates, all of  these 
created things would cease to exist.355 God conserves being by performing an action.356 This 
action of  conservation is a continuation of  divine creating.357 In his commentary on the 
Divine Names, Aquinas says that moving (by which he means bringing about substantial or 
accidental changes) and conserving are types of  efficient causation.358 Thus, efficient 
causation in Aquinas is not limited merely to acts of  production, as is implied by the case of  
the sculptor as an efficient cause. So, Kretzmann’s claim that Aquinas thinks of  efficient 
causation “as a thing’s (natural or artificial) production of  another thing, or event, or state,” 
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is not correct.359 Efficient causation is causation by action, though the example the sculptor 
as efficient cause is a type of  efficient causation that is productive.  
 Because Aquinas takes action to be the main characteristic of  efficient causation and 
says that conservation and creation are one act of  God, it may be unsurprising that the third 
type of  efficient causation recognized by Aquinas is creating.360 Yet, there are significant 
differences between creation, conservation, and change. Change and creation involve a 
patient, but creation does not; change and creation involve production, but conservation 
does not.361 Despite these differences, each type of  efficient cause occurs because an agent 
acts, bringing about some effect. 
C. Efficient Causation without Patients 
Creating, as noted above, is an action of  God which produces being out of  no pre-
existing material.362 Because God is an agent who lacks any passive potentiality, God is a fully 
actualized being.363 Hence, God does not require some patient upon which to act. Instead, 
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God is able to bring about the whole existence of  the thing.364 Creating is a type of  efficient 
causation in which God’s action is productive of  the totality of  beings other than God.365  
 Creation, then, is not change. Change must involve a patient that persists through the 
action performed by the agent.366 The patient underlying the change is different as a result of  
the agent’s action, but it persists nonetheless. The assertion that creation is an action of  God 
but is not change raises several important questions. First, what does Aquinas mean by the 
term ‘action’ in the context of  creation? Second, how does the conception of  creating as a 
type of  efficient causation cohere with Aquinas’s acceptance of  Aristotle’s conception of  
changing something as a type—or, as Aristotle presented it, as the type—of  efficient 
causation? 
 In terms of  action in change, the action performed by the agent when the agent 
changes a patient is straightforward: the agent actualizes some potentiality in the patient. 
This sort of  act is characterized as motion by Aquinas.367 The agent’s act changes the patient, 
and the change in the patient is termed the passion.368 Motion—change—links passion to 
action, but passion and action differ in terms of  relations.369 
 In terms of  action in creation, Aquinas cannot appeal to motion to explain action. 
Since the motion produced by the agent is what actualizes potentialities in a patient and there 
is no pre-existing subject in creation, motion is not a helpful concept for explaining God’s  
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action in creating. Aquinas explains:  
in creation, by which the whole substance of  a thing is produced, the same thing can 
be taken as different now and before only according to our way of  understanding, so 
that some thing is understood first entirely not existing, and afterwards as existing. 
But as action and passion coincide in the substance of  motion, and differ only 
according to diverse relations, it must follow that when motion is subtracted, only 
diverse relations remain in the Creator and in the creature.370 
 
So, if  motion is not a possible explanation of  God’s act in creating, then what remains as a 
possible explanation is some relation.371 Creating, then, is a relation.372 Creating is a relation 
between what is brought into existence and what brings it into existence.373 Creating is an act 
of  God that results in the existence of  some new being, which means that a relation of  
dependence exists between the new being and God.374 
 These two ways of  talking about creating—as an action and as a relation—
correspond to the active and passive sense, respectively, of  the term creation.375 Taken 
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Aquinas says, “creation signified actively means the divine action, which is God’s essence, 
with a relation to the creature.”376 
This distinction between active and passive creation helps show the similarity 
between efficient causation without and with a patient. In efficient causation with a patient, 
the effect is dependent on the cause: the change in the patient is brought about by motion, 
which means that the effect depends on the cause’s motion to change. In efficient causation 
without a patient, the effect is dependent on the cause: the production of being is brought 
about without motion, but the new being still depends upon God for its production. In both 
types of efficient causation, dependency on the agent (whether that agent’s action involves 
motion or not) is crucial. 
D. Defense of  Creation as Aristotelian Efficient Causation 
Having addressed what Aquinas means by action in creating, Aquinas’s integration of  
creation into Aristotelian efficient causation can be addressed. Like Avicenna, Aquinas takes 
metaphysics to be the study of  being, a study which suggests that there ought to be a type of  
causation that produces being. Unlike Avicenna, Aquinas does not offer extended analyses 
of  the intricacies of  efficient causation comparable to Avicenna’s. Additionally, Aquinas has 
access to commentaries on Aristotle’s works (including Avicenna’s commentaries), and some 
of  the foci of  those commentaries are on causation. So, like Avicenna, Aquinas presumes 
that Aristotle focuses on one kind of  efficient causation rather than offering a plenary 
                                               
376 ST Ia.45.3. ad 1. Creatio active significata significat actionem divinam, quae est eius essentia cum relatione ad 
creaturam. Aquinas distinguishes between real and conceptual relations. The relationship between created 
beings and God is a real relation, but the relation between God and created things is a conceptual relation. Real 
relations are relations that have a subject, a term, and a relation (a reason the subject is referred to the term) 
that are all real, that is, that all exist. Conceptual relations, or relations of reason, have only either a subject, a 
term, or a relation that is real. The other two components depend on the activity of some mind for existence. 
See Aquinas, On the Power of God 7.8-11, 8.1-4; Aquinas, SCG IV.14.6-13; Acar, Talking about God 202-210; Earl 
Muller, “Real Relations and the Divine: Issues in Thomas’s Understanding of God’s Relation to the World,” 
Theological Studies 56 (1995), 675. 
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explanation of  efficient causation. In delineating conservation and creation as types of  
efficient causation, Aquinas offers a more robust explanation of  efficient causation that 
makes explicit what is implicit in Aristotle’s account of  efficient causation. 
In support of  this claim, consider Aquinas’s discussion in his Commentary on the 
Sentences. Aquinas says, “according to Avicenna, Physics 1.10 and Metaphysics 6.1, there are two 
kinds of  agents. One is a natural agent, which is an agent involving motion, and the other is 
divine, which is the giver of  being, as was said.” 377 Along with these two kinds of  agents, 
there are “two kinds of  act or effect. One is accomplished through the motion of  a natural 
agent.”378 The second kind of  effect is the sort of  effect which “receives being form the 
divine agent without motion.”379 The distinction of  two kinds of  agents and two kinds of  
acts—natural, which involves motion, and divine, which does not involve motion—is 
presented as though this distinction coheres with Aristotle’s theory of  causation. Motion, i.e. 
change, is one type of  efficient causation, but creation is another. Divine efficient causation 
does not involve motion because God brings about the existence of  beings ex nihilo, and 
God is able to do this because God is a being who lacks any passive potency. In asserting 
efficient causation to be causation which occurs either by natural or divine agents, Aquinas 
explicitly follows Avicenna’s broader interpretation of  Aristotelian causes. 
In addition to drawing upon Avicenna’s commentary on Aristotle’s causation to 
justify the inclusion of  divine efficient causation as a type of  efficient causation, Aquinas 
follows Avicenna in pointing out some of  the shortcomings of  Aristotle’s account of  
causation that could be solved by the inclusion of  divine efficient causation. One such 
problem is that the subject matter of  metaphysics—being and causation—seems incomplete 
                                               
377 Aquinas, Commentary on the Sentences 2.1.1.2 ad 1, p. 75. 
378 Aquinas, Commentary on the Sentences 2.1.1.2 ad 1, p. 75. 
379 Aquinas, Commentary on the Sentences 2.1.1.2 ad 1, p. 75. 
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without an exploration of  the causes of  being. Aquinas asserts that being is the primary 
subject of  metaphysics.380 Along with being, causes are another important subject of  
metaphysical study. Aquinas says that metaphysics is a study of  universal and primary 
causes.381 The study of  being as such does not fit into the other sciences, and while 
metaphysical study involves an examination of  separated substances primarily, the study 
involves all substances insofar as they have being.382 Substances originate from something, 
and thus there must be an investigation of  those origins.383 Accordingly, the subject matter 
of  metaphysics is indicative that there are additional causes which Aristotle did not consider, 
particularly the sort of  cause from which being is originated. While Aristotle did seem to 
consider that the Unmoved Mover is, in a way, a cause of  what exists (namely, by final 
causation), Aquinas expands his consideration to the efficient cause of  being as well.384 
Aquinas emphasizes that the Unmoved Mover is a simple, immaterial, unmoved, fully 
actualized being.385 So, Aquinas’s emphasis on efficient causation being a type of  causation in 
which an agent acts flows naturally into Aquinas talking about how this fully actualized being 
causes not only by final causation but also by efficient causation.386 
                                               
380 Aquinas, In Meta VI.1.1148, 1152-1153; XII.1.2416. 
381 Aquinas, In Meta I.2.36; I.3.64. 
382 Aquinas, In Meta XI.1.2153. 
383 Aquinas, In Meta XII.5.2490. 
384 Aquinas, In Meta XII.7.2521. 
385 Aquinas, In Meta XII.6. 
386 Not only could Aquinas point to the subject matter of metaphysics to help justify the study of creation, but 
he also could have emphasized the distinction he draws between self-sufficient and dependent beings. God is a 
purely self-sufficient being who does not depend on anything else for God’s own existence (SCG II.37). 
Aquinas argues in his famous five ways that there must be some self-sufficient being that produces what exists; 
otherwise, nothing would exist. From the transience of living beings, Aquinas concludes that there must be 
something that brings about the existence of such beings. This argument suggests that there is some being who 
brings about the existence of the universe (ST Ia.2.3). Aquinas does says elsewhere that the belief that the 
universe is created is a matter of faith that is neither contrary to reason nor demonstrable to reason (On the 
Power of God 3.17; On the Eternity of the World 3 in St. Thomas Aquinas, Siger of Brabant, St. Bonaventure On the Eternity 
of the World, trans. Cyril Vollert, Lottie Kendzierski, Paul Byrne (Milwaukee: Marquette, 1964).). Accordingly, his 
adherence to Christian theology gives him a reason to find Aristotle’s analysis of causation to be incomplete. 
130 
The second potential problem with Aristotle’s theory of  causation is that in it, 
Aristotle does not make a distinction between causes of  being and causes of  becoming. 
Aquinas follows Avicenna in distinguishing between the causes of  being and the causes of  
becoming.387 Aquinas says that there is a need for God to keep creatures in existence, which 
means that God preserves them.388 Aquinas presents two ways in which some thing can 
preserve another thing. An agent can preserve something accidentally by removing from it 
that which would destroy it. This is an indirect sort of  preservation. An example would be a 
person removing water from an iron handle. The water would cause the iron to oxidize, 
which would destroy the iron. The other way an agent can preserve something per se, which 
means that “what is preserved depends on the preserver in such a way that [the preserved] 
cannot exist without [the preserver].”389 This second way most aptly describes how God 
preserves what is in existence. God preserves all things in this second way, even things that 
are directly produced by something else.  
                                               
387 Aquinas, On the Power of God 5.1; Kara Richardson, “The Metaphysics of Agency: Avicenna and his Legacy” 
(Ph.D. diss., University of Toronto, 2008), 126. See also Gregory T. Doolan, “The Causality of the Divine 
Ideas in Relation to Natural Agents” International Philosophical Quarterly 44 (2004): 399; Francis X. Meehan, 
Efficient Causality in Aristotle and St. Thomas, (Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, 1940), 317f; 
John F. Wippel, “Thomas Aquinas on Creatures as Causes of Esse” International Philosophical Quarterly 40 (2000): 
202. 
388 This claim is unsurprising given the discussion above about conservation. Conservation simply is God 
keeping things in existence. One might be tempted to think that Aquinas makes a circular argument—he says 
that conservation is a type of efficient cause, and then he uses the notion of conservation to suggest that there 
is an inherent weakness in Aristotle’s causal analysis. Unfortunately, that is the order in which the claims appear 
in this paper. However, I note two additional mitigating factors that either make Aquinas’s argument non-
circular or, at least, make the circularity appear less vicious. First, Aquinas follows Avicenna in making this 
distinction. Avicenna distinguished between true causes and apparent causes, and the true causes are the causes 
which bestow being on a thing. Aquinas’s work mirrors that distinction here. Second, Aquinas does not write a 
treatise in which he presents problems with Aristotle’s causal theory. This evidence I have presented that there 
is warrant to find room in Aristotle’s theory of causation for efficient causation without patients stems from a 
number of Aquinas’s writings in a number of places within those writings. So, to be fair, Aquinas does not 
present an argument that efficient causation without patients is a type of Aristotelian efficient cause. He merely 
posits the existence of such a type of causation and incorporates it into the existing causal system, which was 
Aristotle’s. So, it is unfair to suggest that Aquinas argues circularly for the existence of this type of causation, 
for he does not, strictly speaking, argue for it at all.  
389 Aquinas, ST Ia.104.1 (inquantum scilicet illud quod conservatur, dependet a conservante, ut sine eo esse non 
possit); On the Power of God 5.1; See also Richardson’s discussion, p. 126-7. 
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 To further his point, Aquinas distinguishes between agents that cause becoming and 
agents that cause being. An agent that causes becoming might not be the direct cause of  
being: a builder is the cause of  the becoming of  a house but not the being of  a house, for 
the being of  the house is its form and matter. “If  an agent is not the cause of  a form as such, 
neither will it be directly the cause of  being which results form that form, but it will be the 
cause of  the effect in its becoming only.”390 God is the cause of  the being of  a thing, for all 
beings exist insofar as they participate in the divine existence.391 Since there is a distinction 
between causes of  becoming—causes which appear to be efficient causes of  accidental or 
substantial change—and causes of  being—a cause which appears to be an efficient cause of  
existence—there must be some room in a theory of  causation to discuss both causes of  
being and causes of  becoming.392 Aquinas’s account of  efficient causation without a patient 
is an account of  the cause of  being. Given the close connection between creation and 
conservation in Christian theology, this broader conception of  efficient causation will be 
useful for explaining God’s production and preservation of  the universe. If  Aristotle’s theory 
of  efficient causation cannot account for both creation and conservation, it would likely be 
an unhelpful theory for explaining divine creating.  
Aquinas’s conception of  efficient causation is broader than what Aristotle articulates, 
but Aquinas, like Avicenna, would have viewed his own discussions of  conservation and 
creation as efficient causation as development of  the implications of  Aristotle’s causal 
theories. When Aquinas asserts (following Aristotle) that there are four types of  causes, 
Aquinas then attempts to fit creation into that paradigm. Aquinas follows Avicenna’s 
                                               
390 Aquinas, ST Ia.104.1. 
391 Aquinas, ST Ia.104.1; In Div Nom 4. 
392 Again, see Wippel’s “Thomas Aquinas on Creatures and Causes of Esse” for a fuller discussion of the 
implications of this claim. 
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interpretation, echoing Avicenna’s analysis of  efficient causation as natural or metaphysical. 
However, Aquinas distinguishes efficient causation from other types of  causes by focusing 
on action (not production). Aquinas also finds room for discussing creation as efficient 
causation because metaphysics is the study of  being and first causes. Given the distinction 
Aquinas draws between causes of  being and causes of  becoming—a distinction not in 
Aristotelian theories of  causation but not necessarily contrary to such theories—it is 
unsurprising that Aquinas ties the cause of  being to creation and conservation. Aquinas 
adopts and further develops the implications of  Aristotle’s causal theory and Avicenna’s 
articulation of  some of  those implications. For Aquinas, efficient causation is causation by 
action, either as the result of  an agent’s will or nature. Efficient causation could be change 
(involving patients), conservation, or creation. Given what Aquinas says above about God’s 
will and creation, the act which produces created beings s a voluntary rather than natural act.  
IV. Emanation as a type of  Aristotelian Efficient Causation  
In light of  the discussion above, which reveals that Aquinas discusses God creating 
in terms of  efficient causation and that Aquinas seems to understand efficient causation 
without a patient to be a type of  efficient causation that is not inconsistent with Aristotelian 
efficient causation, it is somewhat surprising to discover that Aquinas also speaks of  God 
creating in terms of  emanation. Within this section, I will explore the passages in which 
Aquinas speaks of  divine creating as an emanation. When describing creating as emanating, 
Aquinas uses some but not all of  the features of  Neoplatonic emanation identified in the 
first chapter. So, the next task I undertake in this section is to show what Aquinas means by 
emanating in the context of  his discussion of  creating. Because Aquinas does not adopt 
wholesale the Neoplatonic conception of  emanation, I also discuss why Aquinas might have 
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averred what he did. Aquinas presenting creation as emanation (but not of  a strictly 
Neoplatonic sort) is likely related to a distinction he wished to draw between God’s 
generative acts of  creating the world and of  the procession of  the Son and the Holy Spirit, 
the members of  the Trinitarian God in addition to God the Father. Finally, I offer a brief  
discussion of  how the causal theories of  efficient causation and emanation are related in 
light of  Aquinas’s statements concerning divine creating. I argue that Aquinas thinks of  
emanation as producing an effect via efficient causation without a patient, and that the 
emanator acts voluntarily (rather than acting by its nature) when performing this act.  
A. Explication of  creation as emanation 
In the Summa Theologiae, Aquinas opens his discussion of  God creating by discussing 
“the mode of  the emanation of  things from the First Principle, which is called creation.”393 
Specifically, creation is the “emanation of  all being from the universal cause, which is 
God.”394 According to his analysis in Summa Contra Gentiles, the emanation of  all beings form 
God must be an emanation that does not rely on any patients, for if  there were some pre-
existing thing(s), then God’s procession would not be the source of  all beings.395 Aquinas’s 
discussion of  God’s creation of  beings distinct from God in his Disputed Questions on the Power 
of  God is also peppered with references to emanation and production, and both terms are 
used synonymously with the term ‘creation’.396 Aquinas consistently defines the term 
‘creation’ to mean the emanation by God of  beings other than God.397  
                                               
393 Aquinas, ST Ia.45 preamble: “de modo emanationis rerum a primo principio, qui dicitur creatio.” 
394 Aquinas, ST Ia.45.1 resp: "emanationem totius entis a causa universali, quae est Deus.” 
395 Aquinas, SCG II.30. Earlier, Aquinas has argued that God is and must be the source of all beings. See SCG 
II.15. 
396 See, for example, Aquinas, On the Power of God 3.4, 13, 15, and 16. 
397 As noted above, when Aquinas offers details regarding divine creating, he does so in terms of efficient 
causation, and Aquinas seems to believe that efficient causation without patients is a type of efficient causation 
that coheres to Aristotle’s notion of efficient causation. 
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Aquinas’s commentary on the Book of  Causes is an important source for his 
articulation of  creation as emanation. His commentary on the Book of  Causes, composed in 
1272, was one of  his final philosophical works, so in it, he offers his mature opinions. 
Aquinas asserts that the First Cause, which is the emanative source of  other existing beings, 
is a being which is pure act.398 Aquinas further specifies what he means when he says that the 
First Cause, who is God, emanates. Aquinas endorses Pseudo-Dionysius’s399 distinction 
between God, first beings, and second beings, etc.400 There is a difference, he says, between 
first beings, which are intelligent substances, and second beings, which are corporeal 
things.401 Aquinas also adopts Pseudo-Dionysius’s claim that some things are immediately 
emanated by God, and these substances emanate other things themselves; however, he 
interprets this claim to mean that God produces things “in their essence” and these 
substances receive “superadded perfections” from the Intelligences.402 The distinction drawn 
between first and second beings is not a distinction between what is emanated first and then 
emanated second. Instead, it is a distinction between intelligent beings (like the angels) and 
sensible beings (like material beings).403 Additionally, when Aquinas asserts that creation is 
mediated, he explains that between first and second beings, that is, angels and material 
beings, are celestial bodies. Thus, celestial bodies mediate first and second beings.404 Finally, 
                                               
398 Aquinas, Commentary on the Book of Causes, trans. Vincent Guagliardo, Charles Hess, and Richard Taylor 
(Washington: CUA, 1996), proposition 6, p. 49. 
399 Aquinas’s commentary is replete with comparisons to Proclus’s works. It seems safe to assume that Aquinas 
at least suspected that the author of the commentary was not Dionysius. See the Introduction in Commentary on 
the Book of Causes, trans. Vincent Guagliardo, Charles Hess, and Richard Taylor. 
400 Aquinas, Commentary on the Book of Causes, proposition 7, p. 54-55; proposition 16, p. 107. 
401 Aquinas, Commentary on the Book of Causes, proposition 7, p. 54-55. 
402 Aquinas, Commentary on the Book of Causes, proposition 9, p. 69-70. 
403 Aquinas, Commentary on the Book of Causes, proposition 16, p. 107. 
404 Aquinas, Commentary on the Book of Causes, proposition 16, p. 108. 
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Aquinas asserts that God creates all things “with one infusion,” and this infusion is 
“nevertheless received differently in different things.”405 
From this review of  Aquinas’s comments on what, specifically, is meant by defining 
creation as the emanation by God of  beings other than God, it is clear that Aquinas 
interprets much of  emanation differently than the Neoplatonic approach to understanding 
emanation. By defining creation in terms of  a particular type of  emanation—one in which 
God produces beings other than God—Aquinas may or may not be embracing Neoplatonic 
emanation. What is yet unclear is to what extent Aquinas’s account deviates from 
Neoplatonic emanation. As of  yet, Aquinas has shown a tendency to retain the language of  
Neoplatonic emanation—creation, first beings, second beings, mediation—but interpret that 
language in a radically different manner than a Neoplatonist might. So, I will move to a 
careful exploration and comparison of  Aquinas’s use of  this language to see in what ways 
Aquinas’s account of  creation as emanation deviates from creation as Neoplatonic 
emanation. 
B. Creative Emanation is not Neoplatonic Emanation 
Aquinas and Avicenna have a different understanding of  what it means for God to 
create by emanating. Avicenna presents an account of  divine creation via emanation in which 
God, as a simple being, can emanate one simple being, namely the First Intellect. This first 
created being is the origin of  beings which are numerically and qualitatively diverse: it 
considers itself  insofar as it is unlike God, and it emanates a celestial sphere; it considers 
itself  insofar as it is like God, and it emanates a separate intellect, the Second Intellect. The 
                                               
405 Aquinas, Commentary on the Book of Causes, proposition 20, p. 122 Dicit ergo primo quod omnes bonitates 
quae inveniuntur in rebus, effluunt a causa prima; et huiusmodi bonitates recipit unaquaeque res secundum 
modum et proprietatem suae substantiae et virtutis - sunt autem diversarum rerum diversae naturae et virtutes - 
et inde est quod, quamvis causa prima influat uno influxu super omnia, diversimode tamen influxus eius in 
diversis rebus recipitur.). 
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Second Intellect goes through a similar process, as does the Third Intellect, the Fourth, and 
so on, each producing a heavenly sphere and another intellect. The Tenth Intellect is the final 
intellect, and it produces the terrestrial realm. Most obviously, Avicenna’s account of  divine 
emanation includes the dual assertions that (a) God emanates, and this emanation is the 
production of  being(s) other than God and (b) before God emanates, no beings other than 
God exist. One key aspect of  Avicenna’s account of  creation by emanation is that one 
simple being can produce one simple being. Avicenna’s account includes intermediaries, and 
those intermediaries are essential for explaining how numerically and qualitatively diverse 
beings exist. Additionally, Avicenna argues that God emanates the First Intellect as the result 
of  an act of  will, and thus the emanation is voluntary and not the result of  natural 
necessity.406 If  Aquinas also asserts that God can emanate one simple being, that the 
qualitative and quantitative diversity of  existing things is due to the work of  intermediaries, 
and that God emanates as the result of  an act of  will, then Aquinas has presented an 
account of  divine emanation that aligns with Avicenna’s Neoplatonic account.  
1. Productive Emanation ex nihilo 
In Aquinas’s discussion of  God’s emanation of  the cosmos, Aquinas affirms the first 
two components of  Avicenna’s notion of  emanation. God’s emanation is productive of  
being, and God produces these beings out of  nothing pre-existing.407 Aquinas asserts that, by 
emanating, God produces not only being qua being, but also that God produces all beings. 
This emanation of  all being from God is an act that does not presuppose the existence of  
any being (other than God) before this emanation. That is, God’s emanation proceeds from 
                                               
406 See Avicenna, Metaphysics of the Healing VI; IX for more detail. 
407 See, for example, Aquinas, SCG II.2; Fran O’Rourke, Pseudo-Dionysius and the Metaphysics of Aquinas (New 
York: Brill, 1992), 240. 
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God, but this action does not require anything other than God—no preexisting patient, for 
example—to occur.408 God emanates, producing being(s) that did not previously exist.  
2. From one simple being, multiple beings are produced 
Aquinas expressly rejects the principle that from one being, only one simple being 
can be produced in the context of  creating.409 In response to the claim that conformity 
between effect and cause requires that only one simple being be produced by one simple 
being, Aquinas responds that conformity may simply mean likeness. There is some likeness 
between creatures and God, but this fact does not mean that there is, in Aquinas’s terms, 
equality between creatures and God.410 The fact that God is a simple, unified being does not 
mean that creatures must also have those qualities. Aquinas seems to be denying that God’s 
nature as a simple, unified being limits God’s creative emanation to one creature that, like  
 
 
                                               
408 Aquinas, ST Ia.45.1 resp. Avicenna similarly claims that God does not use any pre-existing matter (or 
beings) to emanate the First Intellect; however, he rejected the notion that God created ex nihilo because he 
took ex nihilo production to imply that there was a time when God existed but the universe did not. Avicenna 
objected to this notion for two reasons. First, before the production of the universe, there would have been no 
time—time cannot exist without motion, and motion cannot exist without material beings. If God were the 
only being in existence, there would be no matter, no motion, and no time. Second, Avicenna asserts that the 
universe is sempiternal. As long as God exists, God’s effect exists. Since God always exists (because God is a 
necessary being and cannot fail to exist), the universe also always exists (as something which is necessary 
through another—that is, it is (theoretically) possible for the universe not to exist, but because God wills the 
universe to exist, it must exist). See Avicenna, Metaphysics of the Healing VI, IX. 
409 Aquinas, On the Power of God 3.15. resp; see also Wayne Hankey’s comments in “Ab Uno Simplici non est Nisi 
Unum: The Place of Natural and Necessary Emanation in Aquinas’s Doctrine of Creation,” in Divine Creation in 
Ancient, Medieval, and Early Modern Thought: Essays Presented to the Reverend Doctor Robert D. Crouse, eds. Michael 
Treschow, Willemien Otten, and Walter Hannam (New York: Brill, 2007), 309-333, especially 317. 
410 Aquinas, On the Power of God 3.16 obj 7; ad 7. 
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God, is simple and unified.411 Aquinas substantially loosens the requirement that an effect be 
like its cause when he asserts that material objects can be similar to their simple, immaterial 
creator. 
An entirely simple agent is bound to emanate one and only one thing, Aquinas says, 
when that agent acts by its nature and produces some effect equal to itself.412 This statement, 
mentioned above, raises an interesting question, namely, whether it ever occurs that a simple 
agent is bound to emanate one and only one thing. In order to answer this question, 
Aquinas’s doctrine of  the Trinity, particularly the doctrine of  the procession of  the members 
of  the Trinity, is required. 
a. Excursus on Emanation in the Trinity 
Aquinas holds the orthodox Christian belief  that God is a simple, immaterial, 
eternal, changeless, unified being who is three persons, all of  whom share the same 
substance. To understand the Trinity in such a way that one thinks that three independent 
gods exist is incorrect; yet, it is equally incorrect to assert that only one of  these stated divine 
                                               
411 Perhaps this denial is unsurprising in light of some of the philosophical difficulties associated with 
Avicenna’s claim that the First Intellect is a simple being. Avicenna asserts that God produces the First 
Intellect, which is simple and unified like God. However, as can easily be deduced from McGinnis’s discussion 
of Avicenna’s creation account, it is puzzling that Avicenna makes the claim that the First Intellect is simple: 
Avicenna himself claims that the First Intellect is a being that has a dual ontological status—it is possible in 
itself but necessary through another. Avicenna claims that this dual ontological status is the source of 
numerically and qualitatively different beings in the universe. McGinnis seems to suggest that Avicenna cannot 
mean that the First Intellect is simple because Avicenna acknowledges that the First Intellect is both necessary 
through another but possible in itself. In response to the suggestion that Avicenna does not, in reality, hold to 
the belief that from one simple being, one simple being can be produced, I would argue that McGinnis does 
not place enough emphasis on Avicenna’s claim that, for God’s part, God creates a being that is simple. The 
duality in the First Intellect arises from the fact that the First Intellect is a created being—and thus, it cannot be 
necessary in itself. In my estimation, Avicenna argues that God produces the First Intellect, which is a simple 
being; yet, at the moment of production, it necessarily takes on this dual ontological status. The dual 
ontological status does not stem from God’s productive effort; instead, it is a byproduct of the fact that the 
First Intellect is created. Whether this defense is satisfying is certainly up for debate. But, given the tensions 
surrounding Avicenna’s claim that from one simple being, only one simple being can be produced (that one 
might find in Ghazali’s critiques or Averroës’s response to those critiques), it might be unsurprising that 
Aquinas would abandon this model purely for the sake of philosophical ease. That this is the only reason he 
might do so is not what I believe.  
412 Aquinas, ST Ia.47.1 ad 1. 
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persons—God the Father, God the Son, or God the Holy Spirit—is god.413 As one might 
expect, much ink has been spilled in an attempt to explain the doctrine of  the Trinity. Of  
particular concern for Christians, historically speaking, has been the difficulty which arises 
from asserting that these three persons share one substance.414 In the context of  this study, 
the important concern is how there come to be three divine persons which are composed of  
the same substance. 
To address the issue of  how three persons share one substance, Aquinas speaks of  
the first person of  the Trinity, God the Father, generating the second person of  the Trinity, 
God the Son. The third person of  the Trinity, God the Holy Spirit, is spirated by God the 
Father and God the Son.415 Aquinas speaks of  the generation of  the Son and the spiration 
of  the Holy Spirit in terms of  emanation.416 Aquinas says that the procession of  the second 
and third persons of  the Trinity can be understood “according to an intelligible emanation, 
namely, of  the intelligible word [emanating] by speaking, which remains in the person.”417 
The emanation of  the Son and the Holy Spirit is not an outward emanation; instead, it is an 
emanation which produces something within God.  
The internal emanation of  God the Son can be called generation of  a certain sort.418 
Aquinas distinguishes two types of  generation. The first type of  generation is common to 
                                               
413 Aquinas, ST Ia.27, 32-43. 
414 This issue has been of concern for Christians since before the doctrine of the Trinity was expressed in 
creedal form in the fourth century. Some notable and highly influential philosophers and theologians who have 
attempted to articulate this doctrine clearly include Augustine and Boethius (and, obviously, Aquinas). 
415 Aquinas ascribes to the Roman Catholic doctrine that the Holy Spirit proceeds from both the Father and 
the Son. This position, called filioque after the term inserted into the Nicene creed in the eleventh century, is not 
universally held among Christians. Aquinas, however, speaks of the procession of the Holy Spirit in terms of a 
procession from both the Father and the Son. See Edward Siecienski, The Filioqe: History of a Doctrinal Controversy 
(New York: Oxford, 2009). 
416 Aquinas, SCG IV.11; Hankey, 329. 
417 Aquinas, ST Ia.27.1 resp: sed secundum emanationem intelligibilem, utpote verbi intelligibilis a dicente, 
quod manet in ipso. 
418 Aquinas, ST Ia.27.1 resp. 
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everything that is subject to generation and corruption, and the term applies to a change 
from non-existence to existence. The second type of  generation is common to all living 
things, and the term applies to the origin of  a living being from another living being. The 
former type of  generation does not apply to the emanation of  the second and third persons 
of  the Trinity, but the second does. Aquinas makes a further distinction, asserting that some 
things to which the second type of  generation applies are also things which are begotten. 
When something is begotten, it is generated “by way of  similitude.”419 A dog begets puppies, 
but a dog does not beget its fur. The thing begotten must be the same sort of  thing as that 
which begets it. That is, something which is begotten has the same nature as the thing which 
begets it. Because the members of  the Trinity share the same nature—which means that 
each member of  the Trinity is a being that lacks passive potency—the second and third 
member of  the Trinity are generated insofar as they are living beings. The second member 
of  the Trinity, the Son, is said to have been begotten because the Son and the Father share 
the same nature. The generation of  the Son occurs via the intelligible emanation discussed 
above.420 The procession of  love between the Father and the Son is the third member of  the 
Trinity, the Holy Spirit.421 This procession is best called spiration, however, and not 
generation.422 There are, then, two emanations within the Godhead: the begetting of  the Son 
and the proceeding of  the Holy Spirit.423  
These intellectual emanations “cannot but be.”424 These emanations are necessary, 
for it is necessary that God has self-knowledge. God’s self-knowledge necessarily results in 
                                               
419 Aquinas, ST Ia.27.2 resp (rationem similitudinis). 
420 Aquinas, ST Ia.27.2 resp. 
421 Aquinas, ST Ia.27.3 resp. 
422 Aquinas, ST Ia.27.4 resp. 
423 Aquinas, ST Ia.27.3. 
424 Aquinas, On the Power of God 2.4 resp.; Aquinas, ST Ia.41.2. ad 5. 
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the emanation of  the Son by the Father, and the self-knowledge of  the Father and the Son 
necessarily results in their emanating the Holy Spirit.425 God, being God, cannot fail to exist 
in three persons.426 
Aquinas asserts that God the Father emanates God the Son because of  the nature of  
God. God the Father does not emanate the Son because the Father wills it; instead, the 
Father emanates the Son because it is the Father’s nature to emanate the Son. According to 
Aquinas, when an agent emanates by nature, the agent’s emanation is determined to one 
effect.427 God’s will, of  course, is not contrary to the emanation of  the Son. As Aquinas states, 
something can be understood to be made by will either because (a) the thing willed is 
concomitant428 with the one who wills or (b) the thing willed is produced by expressed action 
upon the agent willing it. An example of  (a) would be me willing myself  to be human. I am 
not a human as the result of  my will to be human; I am human and that I will to be human. 
                                               
425 Aquinas, In Sent I.6.1.1; ST Ia.41.2; Aquinas, On the Power of God 2.4 and 10.2 ad 5; Hankey, 329. 
426 In Aquinas’s answer to the question, “Can a multitude of things proceed from one first thing,” in On the 
Power of God 3.16, Aquinas says that if the first thing’s effective power “is not determined to one effect save to 
that which were equal to him, and this cannot be sufficient to any effect” (Nam cum eius activa potentia sit 
infinita, non terminatur ad unum nisi ad id quod esset aequale sibi, quod nulli effectui competere potest.). Here, 
Aquinas is discussing what is possible in the context of an emanation outside of the Godhead. When he 
discusses the procession of the divine persons in the tenth question of On the Power of God, Aquinas asserts that 
the emanation of the Son and the Holy Spirit occur because God is an intelligent and living being (10.1). God, 
as an intelligent and living being, cannot but emanate the Son and the Holy Spirit. I would say that Aquinas 
distinguishes between emanations within the Godhead and outside the Godhead, and although the internal 
emanations are natural and necessary, they are not subject to the claim Aquinas makes earlier about the first 
thing’s effective power not be sufficient to any effect. God cannot produce something equal to God outside of 
God for two reasons, which are consistent with Aquinas’s philosophy but neither of which are offered by 
Aquinas in his reply to On the Power of God 3.16. First, this second being would be created, and thus it would not 
be entirely self-sufficient. A being which is entirely self-sufficient is not equal to God (since God is entirely self-
sufficient). Second, (if we set aside the first reason) the existence of this second being would mean that there 
are two Gods. According to Aquinas (who follows Maimonides and Avicenna on this point), there can be only 
one God (ST Ia.11.3). In one sense, the emanations within the Godhead are equal to God: the persons of the 
Trinity share the same nature. However, it is clear that Aquinas’s statement about God’s inability to produce 
something equal to God is directed at an external emanation rather than an internal emanation. 
427 On the Power of God 2.4 resp; 10.2 ad 4; ST Ia.41.2 resp; This statement is somewhat puzzling, for Aquinas 
asserts that there are two emanations within the Godhead. Despite the difficulties this statement might present, 
it is clear that Aquinas believes that the procession of the second and third persons of the Trinity is a necessary 
emanation based on the nature of God. I discuss the difficulties associated with this statement below. 
428 Aquinas does not use the term ‘concomitant’ in a technical sense (like Avicenna’s use of concomitant 
discussed in chapter two) here.  
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An example of  (b) would be a worker willing to produce a home: the home exists as the 
result of  the worker acting upon the volition to produce it.429 According to Aquinas, when 
one wills in the manner of  (a), one can be said to be acting by nature and not will. It is my 
nature to be human, so if  I will my nature, my will is not a causal factor in me having that 
nature. When Aquinas says that God the Father begets Son by will, Aquinas means that God 
the Father “is God by will, because He wills to be God, and wills to beget the Son.”430 God 
the Father does not will to beget the Son in the manner of  (b), and thus (for clarity’s sake) it 
is said that God the Father begets the Son by nature and not by will. The necessary 
emanations within the Godhead, however, are preconditions of  the creative emanation.431 
b. Trinitarian consideration of  whether from one simple being, one 
simple being is produced 
Here, it seems that Aquinas has contradicted himself. Aquinas clearly states that 
there are two processions within the Godhead, and yet by asserting that these processions 
occur by God’s nature, Aquinas is saying that there should be one effect of  God’s 
emanation. Wayne Hankey, in discussing the emanations within the Godhead, suggests that 
the claim that God the Father emanates the Son by nature entails that Aquinas embraces 
Avicenna’s principle that from one simple being, only one simple being can be emanated.432 
Hankey asserts that by specifying that God the Father emanates the Son (and both emanate 
the Holy Spirit) necessarily and by nature, Aquinas is endorsing the notion that one simple 
being produces one effect.433 Hankey’s comments unfortunately overlook the fact that 
                                               
429 Aquinas, ST Ia.41.2 resp.  
430 Aquinas, ST Ia.41.2 resp. 
431 Hankey, 329-330; G. Emery, La Trinité Créatrice: Trinité et creation dans les commentaries aux Sentences de Thomas 
d’Aquin et de ses précurseurs Albert le Grand et Bonaventure (Paris: Librairie Philosophique, 1995), 280. 
432 Hankey, 329. 
433 Hankey, 331. 
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Aquinas asserts that there are two productive emanations within the Godhead, and thus the 
Father is responsible (at least partly) for two effects. The claim that Aquinas endorses 
Avicenna’s principle that one simple being can emanate one simple being must at least 
account for the double emanation within the Godhead, and Hankey offers no such analysis. 
If  one were to take seriously the claim that Aquinas means to endorse the claim that 
from one simple being, one simple being can be produced, one would have to assert that 
when Aquinas says that an agent whose action is determined by nature is determined to one 
effect, Aquinas means that the agent whose action is determined by nature is determined not 
to one single effect but to one type of  effect. This, of  course, is a plausible interpretation of  
that claim. When Aquinas gives examples of  agents acting by their natures, Aquinas 
references agents reproducing. 434 Reproduction is done according to kind: humpback whales 
birth humpback whales, and oak trees produce acorns (which grow into oak trees). A whale 
can produce more than one calf, and an oak can produce more than one acorn; however, 
neither could produce something other than a member of  their own natural kind. Thus, it 
seems possible that Hankey might have been able to argue that because the Son and the 
Holy Spirit share the nature of  the Father, the two emanations which produce them are 
productive of  one type of  effect. 
However, if  one were to take seriously Hankey’s claim that Aquinas means to 
endorse the notion that from one simple being, one simple being can be produced, one 
would have to reinterpret what it means to be ‘one simple being.’ Aquinas (and any orthodox 
Christian) clearly asserts that the Son and the Holy Spirit are distinct persons. That is, while 
the members of  the Trinity share the same substance, they are not the same person. The 
                                               
434 Aquinas, ST Ia.47.2. 
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members of  the Trinity are distinguished by the relations among those members: the Father 
begets the Son, and the Father and Son spirate the Holy Spirit.435 Despite the existence of  
the three persons, Aquinas (and orthodox Christian teaching) asserts that there exists one 
God. So, Hankey’s claim raises interesting and problematic interpretational questions. Is it 
true that in these two emanations, more than ‘one simple being’ is produced? Additionally, is 
it true that because there is one God in three persons, no matter the number of  emanations, 
there cannot be more than ‘one simple being’ produced? Ultimately, these answer to these 
questions hinge on the distinction between what it means to produce a being versus what it 
means to produce a person. In the case of  the production of  the members of  the Trinity, 
this distinction is essential for determining whether Aquinas does adopt Avicenna’s principle 
that from one simple being, one simple being can be produced. This fact, coupled with 
Aquinas’s expressed aversion to the principle in every other context in which he introduces 
it, suggests that Hankey’s assertion that Aquinas adopts the principle is hasty at best. There is 
no clear, concrete evidence that Aquinas intends to assert that from one simple being, one 
simple being can be produced even though he asserts that a thing’s nature is determined to 
                                               
435 As noted above, Aquinas distinguishes between real and conceptual relations. God has a conceptual relation 
to created beings, but created things have a real relation to God. Real relations need not be symmetrical 
between the subject and the term. Real relations could be grounded on quantity or on action and passion 
(Aquinas, De Pot Dei VII.9; Muller, 676). For God, the only possible real relations are action and passion (given 
that God is incorporeal). A real relation is the relationship between God the Father and God the Son (Aquinas, 
ST Ia.28.1, 3). Thus, the emanations within the Godhead produce real relations because the members of the 
Godhead have the same nature (Aquinas, ST Ia.28.1. ad 3). God’s creative emanation, however, does not 
produce a real relation between God and creation (Aquinas, ST Ia.28.1. ad 3). According to Aquinas, God as 
creator is outside the order of creation. Furthermore, God creates not out of the necessity of nature but by 
God’s will. Therefore, there is nothing in God that can be a subject, a term, or a reason the subject is referred 
to the term (Aquinas, ST Ia.28.1. ad 3). God has a merely conceptual relation—not a real relation—to creation. 
Creatures, however, have a real relation to God. If the creative emanation were necessary (like the emanations 
within the Godhead), then there might be a ground for a real relation between God and creation. As it stands, 
creatures are dependent on God, and God is independent of creatures. If God were somehow dependent on 
creatures or else had to bring about the existence of creatures due to some necessity, then there could 
potentially be a real relation between God and creatures. 
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one effect. To conflate those two assertions is incorrect. It is, therefore, my contention that 
Aquinas does not assert the former, though he does assert the later. 
According to Aquinas, then, God does emanate something by nature. The 
emanations internal to the Trinity of  the Son and the Holy Spirit are natural, necessary 
emanations. God, being God, cannot fail to exist in three persons. Even when such an 
emanation is natural and necessary, it is not the case that Aquinas asserts that an entirely 
simple agent is bound to produce one simple being. Instead, Aquinas asserts the weaker 
claim that an agent acting by its nature is bound to produce one effect, and this effect will be 
equal to it. The agent will produce something of  its own natural kind, and being of  the same 
natural kind, the agent and its effect will be equals. Aquinas does not expressly endorse 
Avicenna’s principle that from one simple being, only one simple being can be produced, 
and there are strong theological reasons to suggest that he would not endorse that principle.  
Returning to the discussion of  whether Aquinas asserts that from one simple being, 
one simple being can be produced within the context of  creation, it must be noted that the 
creative emanation, unlike the emanation within the Godhead, occurs because God wills it.436 
As noted above, an agent that emanates by its nature is limited to one type of  effect. An 
agent that emanates by its will and/or intellect, however, is not limited to one type of  
effect.437 According to Aquinas, God’s external emanations occur as a result of  God’s 
intellect and will.438 God’s power is not determined to one effect, Aquinas says, because 
                                               
436 See, for example, Aquinas, In Div Noom 4.1 and In De Caelo I.7.66; te Velde, Participation and Substantiality in 
Thomas Aquinas, 102-103. 
437 Aquinas, ST Ia.47.1 and 2; Aquinas, SCG II.22, 26, 27; Aquinas, On the Power of God 3.16. 
438 Aquinas, SCG II.22. 
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neither God’s intellect nor God’s will are determined to one effect.439 Accordingly, God can 
produce whatever God knows and whatever God wills. 
As noted above, Aquinas asserts that God is a simple being, meaning that God’s 
essence is identical to God’s intellect and will. Because God’s power is infinite, God has the 
power to perform any act that is not logically contradictory for God to perform; however, 
God does not perform any act of  which God does not have knowledge or that God does 
not will to do.440 Aquinas asserts that because God’s power is infinite and God is a simple 
being, God’s intellect is infinite as well.441 Accordingly, God knows infinitely many things.442 
Aquinas believes that he can make the dual (and seemingly contradictory claims) that God is 
simple and that God knows infinite things because the primary object of  God’s intellect is 
God’s essence. Because God is simple, God’s intellect lacks potency; because God is 
changeless, God’s intellect performs one operation.443 With this one operation, God’s 
intellect fully and completely apprehends God’s essence, which, for Aquinas, means that 
God has perfect self-knowledge. God apprehends God’s essence, but knowing God’s 
essence means knowing both perfection and infinite things. 
When Aquinas says that God has self-knowledge and thus knows perfection, 
Aquinas means that God has self-knowledge of  God as an exemplar to other beings. 
Knowing God’s perfection entails knowing other things because no one thing can perfectly 
reflect God. However, an infinite number if  imperfect things can reflect God. Accordingly, 
                                               
439 Aquinas, SCG II.26. 
440 Aquinas, SCG II.22; II.26. 
441 Aquinas, SCG II.26. 
442 Aquinas, SCG I.69. 
443 Aquinas, SCG I.48. I use temporal language here to emphasize the point that God’s knowledge cannot 
change. I do not intend to make any assertions whatsoever about the relation of time to God’s existence. 
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God has knowledge of  these things which could reflect God’s own perfection.444 So, God 
knows other beings insofar as there is a relationship of  likeness between those other beings 
and God. The “divine essence is the likeness of  all things.”445 By having this self-knowledge, 
God has knowledge of  the one essence that all other beings are like; thus, God knows all 
other beings as well.446 
The likeness between other beings and God can, of  course, be explained by God 
having created those beings. God is the cause of  all other things, as was discussed above. 
God’s self-knowledge, then, involves God’s knowledge of  the things God causes. Because 
God is the cause of  everything that exists, these things preexist in God’s intellect.447 God 
knows not only existing beings—that is, beings which exist in actuality—but God also 
knows things which exist in potency.448 So, in apprehending the divine essence, God 
necessarily apprehends all of  the things which God will or might create. God’s knowledge, 
then, does not limit God to producing one simple being. 
Knowledge of  the things God will or might create must be coupled with the will to 
create those things in order for God to create them. If  God’s will does not limit God to 
producing one simple being, then there is no reason to think that God cannot produce a 
multiplicity. The will is moved by what the intellect apprehends as a good; in the case of  
God’s will, God’s will is moved by the intellectual apprehension of  God’s essence.449 God’s 
goodness—and, by divine simplicity, God—is the end of  God’s will. However, this entails 
that God wills things other than God as well. Since every acting agent produces something 
                                               
444 Aquinas, SCG I.69. 
445 Aquinas, SCG I.53. 
446 Aquinas, SCG I.53. 
447 Aquinas, SCG I.49; te Velde, Participation and Substantiality, 104. 
448 Aquinas, SCG I.69; Aristotle, Physics III.6 206b 12. 
449 Aquinas, SCG II.24. 
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similar to it, the will of  the agent “communicate[s] as far as possible to others the good 
possessed” by the will.450 God, who is perfect, communicates God’s perfection to other 
things to varying degrees.451 By willing God, God wills God’s own existence and the 
existence of  other things insofar as they are ordered toward God as an end.452 
An appeal to neither God’s essence, power, knowledge, nor will can be used to justify 
the claim that God can produce one simple being. It is possible for God to will and produce 
a plurality of  effects.453 The distinction Aquinas draws between production by nature and 
production by art further illustrates how God can produce multiple beings. An agent acting 
through its nature produces another thing of  the same kind as itself. A dog producing 
puppies is an agent acting through its nature. An agent acting by art produces another thing 
somewhat similar to itself, but it produces something that is not the same kind of  being as 
itself. A sculptor producing a sculpture acts by art and not nature. God acts by art in creating 
insofar as God makes what is in God’s mind; however, God creates by God’s nature insofar 
as God exercises God’s creative action in virtue of  God’s nature rather than some other 
tool.454 
3. Direct Creation 
Despite the assertion that God is able to produce more than one being because God 
creates due to God’s will rather than God’s nature, it is still conceivable that Aquinas might 
intend to say that God directly creates some things but mediates the creation of  others. 
Aquinas does specify that God creates all things in one emanation, and this emanation is 
                                               
450 Aquinas, ST Ia.19.2. 
451 Aquinas, ST Ia.19.2; te Velde, Participation and Substantiality, 105-6. 
452 Aquinas, ST Ia.19.2; te Velde, Participation and Substantiality, 107. 
453 te Velde, Participation and Substantiality, 103. 
454 te Velde, Participation and Substantiality, 103. 
149 
received differently by different things.455 God creating is one action, although this one 
action produces multiple effects.456 God produces things in a manner similar to the sun 
sustaining life: through one act, the emanation of  heat, the sun sustains the lives of  plants 
and animals on Earth. The effects of  this one action are multiplied.457 
In addition to asserting that God creates many things in one action, Aquinas denies 
that God creates with the use of  intermediaries. As noted above, Aquinas denies that angels 
create anything. Because they are not fully actualized beings, they cannot possibly create.458 
In his commentary on the Book of  Causes, Aquinas consistently re-interprets Pseudo-
Dionysius’s comments about mediated creation. When Pseudo-Dionysius writes that the first 
cause produces some effects and second causes produce others, Aquinas interprets this as 
God creating things “in their essence” and the angels giving “superadded perfections” to 
these other beings.459 Aquinas’s interpretation of  the mediated creation between first and 
second beings mentioned in Proposition 16 of  the Book of  Causes strongly suggests that 
Aquinas does not endorse Avicenna’s concept of  mediated creation. There, Aquinas says 
that creation is mediated; however, he means that the intellects, the first beings, are separated 
from the sensible beings, which are the second beings, by the celestial bodies. He utterly 
rejects Neoplatonic mediated emanation, instead saying that there is something in between 
angels and sensible beings.460 God emanates creatures directly in one act. 
 
 
                                               
455 Aquinas, Commentary on the Book of Causes, proposition 20, p. 122. 
456 Aquinas, Commentary on the Book of Causes, proposition 20, p. 122; Booth, Edward. Aristotelian Aporetic Ontology 
in Islamic and Christian Thinkers (New York: Cambridge, 1983), 239. 
457 Aquinas, In Div Nom 4; O’Rourke, 257; Booth, 239. 
458 Aquinas, ST Ia.63.3. 
459 Aquinas, Commentary on the Book of Causes, proposition 9, p. 69-70. 
460 Aquinas, Commentary on the Book of Causes, proposition 16, p. 108. 
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4. Voluntary, Free Creation 
The Neoplatonic account of  emanation is typically understood to entail that 
emanation is necessary rather than voluntary. Avicenna asserts that emanation can be 
voluntary, yet God cannot fail to will to emanate. Aquinas, as should be clear from the 
discussion above, agrees that God’s creative emanation is a voluntary act. This agreement is 
interesting in light of  the Neoplatonic sources with which Aquinas was familiar. As Taylor 
emphasizes, the Liber de Causis is a Neoplatonic text that does not include references to 
God’s will at all in the context of creating.461 In Aquinas’s commentary, he largely follows the 
Liber de Causis in refraining from discussing God’s will in creating, but he does make two 
interesting (repeated) appeals: first, he appeals to God’s knowledge, which, as was discussed, 
Aquinas takes to be identical to God’s will;462 second, he appeals to God as a causa agente—an 
efficient cause—when God emanates.463 When discussing the possibility of the sempiternity 
of the universe, Aquinas likens God’s ability to produce an effect in time to a human’s ability 
to will to defer an action, which suggests that Aquinas would not deny a role for God’s will 
in emanating.464 Aquinas then asserts that when such an effect occurs (and precisely what 
such an effect is) depends upon the will of the one producing it.465 These appeals suggest 
that Aquinas would not deny that God wills to emanate. God does not emanate the universe 
and its inhabitants based on God’s nature; instead, God wills to emanate these things (and 
emanates them directly). While it seems clear that Aquinas believes that God wills God’s 
emanation, it is unclear whether this emanation is willed freely.  
                                               
461 Taylor, “Primary Causation,” 128. 
462 Aquinas, ST Ia.4.3-4, 7. 
463 Aquinas, Commentary on the Liber de Causis, proposition 26 commentary, p. 144. 
464 Aquinas, Commentary on the Liber de Causis, proposition 11 commentary, p. 85. 
465 Aquinas, Commentary on the Liber de Causis, proposition 11 commentary, p. 85-86. 
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If God’s creative emanation is the result of God’s free will, then there is nothing 
external or internal to God that would necessitate this act of will. As Acar notes, Aquinas 
does not spend much time discussing whether any external constraints upon God’s will 
would necessitate God’s will; instead, he seems to (a) assume that an external constraint 
would necessitate God’s will and (b) reject that any such external constraint is possible.466 
Instead, Aquinas discusses potential internal constraints, namely whether God’s justice 
requires the production of beings, and whether God’s goodness requires the production of 
beings.  
 Aquinas argues that God does not produce the world as a result of a debt of justice. 
He offers several arguments for this conclusion. Primarily, Aquinas uses Aristotle’s 
definition of justice as something rendering what is due to something else. Since God creates 
out of nothing, there exists nothing presupposed to which something could be due.467  
Additionally, he argues that when something owes another thing, that first thing 
depends on the second thing. God, however, does not depend on anything.468 Aquinas also 
notes that God does not “stand in need of anything” that God might receive from 
something else. Presumably, what Aquinas considers when he denies that God could stand 
in need of something is a scenario in which preexisting matter or beings are posited. Even if 
there were things that existed before creation (something which is, admittedly, impossible by 
the definition of creation), God could never be in debt to those things. God is a self-
                                               
466 See, for example, his discussion of necessity and contingency in On the Power of God 3.15 obj 11 and ad 11. 
God, as an absolutely necessary being, is not dependent (and thus not constrained) by anything outside of God. 
Acar, Talking about God, 156. 
467 In a similar argument, Aquinas notes that justice can also be understood as rendering to something that 
which is its own. Using similar logic, he notes that because creation is ex nihilo, there is nothing preexisting to 
which something can be rendered. (Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles II.28 & 29). 
468 Aquinas notes that he has defended this claim in Summa Contra Gentiles I.13, 28, 40, and 102. In Summa 
Contra Gentiles I.28, for example, Aquinas argues that God is a perfect (that is, complete) being. As a perfect 
being, there is nothing that could be added to God to complete God more fully.  
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sufficient being that does not depend upon the existence of anything else.469 Neither does 
God benefit from the existence of anything else.470 Accordingly, God does not have a debt 
of justice, which means that God does not create because of a debt of justice.471 Therefore, 
God being just does not entail that God must create.472 
Aquinas immediately transitions from discussing God’s justice to God’s goodness. 
Although Aquinas argues that God’s justice does not require that God create, perhaps God’s 
goodness does require that God create. Aquinas considers whether God being good means 
that something is due to God by creation. When considering God’s goodness absolutely, 
God being good does not require God to create. Aquinas explores two ways in which 
goodness might necessitate action on God’s part. If God were to somehow be indebted to 
something as a beneficent is indebted to a benefactor, then God would need to repay this 
debt. But, as noted above, God is self-sufficient and cannot be indebted to anything. 
Alternately, a thing could be owed something according to itself, which occurs when a thing 
                                               
469 See, for example, Aquinas’s comments in Summa Contra Gentiles I.81 that creatures do not contribute to God.  
470 Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles I.81. As Wippel notes, God does not gain any perfection by creating: God 
may create other beings which manifest God’s goodness, but God’s goodness is complete regardless of God’s 
action of creation. See John F. Wippel, “Norman Kretzmann on Aquinas’s Attribution of Will and Freedom to 
Create to God,” Religious Studies 39.3 (2003), 297-298. 
471 Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles II.28 & 29. 
472 There are three circumstances in which it can be conceived that God would owe a debt of justice in creating. 
First, if God conceives of the universe in such a way that parts of the universe depend on other parts, God 
ought to produce all of those parts. For example, if God conceives of the universe having the sun, and if life 
depends upon the sun, then God ought to produce the sun with the universe. Second, if God conceives of 
creatures that are dependent upon something to exist, God ought to create that upon which they depend. So, if 
animals and plants require an earth upon which to live, God ought to create the earth. Third, if God conceives 
of creatures that have certain properties, accidents, or component parts, God ought to create those elements. If 
humans are hylomorphic compounds of a soul and a body, God ought to create souls and bodies such that 
they can compose a whole human. None of these instances of indebtedness, though, are absolute—all are 
conditional upon what exactly God wills to create. God, being just, would not produce a universe, world, or 
creatures that are unable to meet their ends (Summa Contra Gentiles II.28 & 29). See also Aquinas, On the Power of 
God III.16. 
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requires something additional to be complete. God, however, is already complete, and thus 
God’s goodness does not require anything outside of God.473 
Next, Aquinas considers whether God’s goodness necessitates that God will other 
creatures. Aquinas states, “if God wills His own goodness to be, He is under no necessity of 
willing the production of anything else; the antecedent of this conditional proposition is 
necessary, but not the consequent; for, as we proved in Book I, God necessarily wills His 
goodness to be, but He does not necessarily will anything else.”474 In book I, Aquinas argued 
that God wills God’s goodness necessarily—God, a perfect being, cannot fail to will God’s 
own (perfect) goodness.475 God wills other things, too, insofar as those things are ordered to 
God’s goodness.476 Aquinas then argues that although God wills God’s own goodness of 
absolute necessity, God wills the existence of other things by the necessity of supposition. 
God’s will is immutable, and thus once God wills x God cannot stop willing x. Since God 
wills the existence of other things, God must continue to will the existence of other things. 
What Aquinas denies is that God wills the existence of things other than God with absolute 
necessity.477 
Aquinas’s insistence that God wills things other than God voluntarily and has neither 
internal nor external constraints upon that will suggests that Aquinas believes God’s creative 
emanation is voluntary, free, and non-necessary. Aquinas says as much: “if we consider the 
matter correctly, it appears that [God] does not will other things necessarily.”478 Things other 
than God are ordered to God’s goodness as an end, and because God is perfect already—
                                               
473 Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, II.28 & 29. 
474 Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, II.28 & 29. 
475 Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles I.74, 81. 
476 Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles I.81. Aquinas consistently speaks of God’s goodness as a final cause of 
beings other than God. In so doing, Aquinas deviates from the Neoplatonic tradition of interpreting a divine 
emanation as an efficient cause and a final cause. See Wisnovsky, 64-65, 67. 
477 Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles I.83. 
478 Summa Contra Gentiles I.81. 
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God’s perfection cannot be enhanced by creating—God need not create in order to fulfill 
that end.479 
Despite Aquinas’s assertion that God emanates things other than God voluntarily 
and freely, the fact that God is goodness might entail that God does indeed emanate 
creatures necessarily. Aquinas repeatedly employs the Pseudo-Dionysian principle that the 
good is self-diffusive. In the Summa Contra Gentiles, in a discussion of  God’s goodness, 
Aquinas notes that “the communication of  being and goodness arises from goodness.”480 
Aquinas asserts this based on (a) the nature and (b) the definition of  the good. By nature, 
Aquinas says, “the good of  each thing is its act and perfection.” An agent acts insofar as it is 
able, and by acting, the agent “diffuses being and goodness to other things.” Here, Aquinas 
appeals to Aristotle’s comment in Meterologica IV that the sign of  a perfect being is that the 
being can “produce its like.” Additionally, the nature of  the good, Aquinas says, “comes 
from it being appetible,” which is why the good can move an agent to act as a final cause of  
that agent. The good being appetible is “why it is said that the good is diffusive of  itself  and 
of  being.” God can be described as the good because God is the cause of  all other existing 
beings.481  
 Norman Kretzmann highlights this tension, noting that Aquinas refers to the 
principle that the good is self-diffusive repeatedly throughout many writings over the course 
of  his career.482 The comments, then, in the Summa Contra Gentiles explored above are not 
unique or uncharacteristic of  Aquinas’s general approach to the question of  the good being 
                                               
479 Summa Contra Gentiles I.81; Kretzmann, 220. 
480 Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles I.37. Aquinas first argues that must be good because God is perfect, that 
God is good because God, as the first mover, is what is desired by created things, and that God is the final 
cause of the universe. 
481 Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles I.37. 
482 For a more comprehensive list of Aquinas’s repetition of and reliance upon the principle that the good is 
self-diffusive, see Julien Peghaire, “L’Axiome ‘Bonum est diffusivum sui’ dans le néo-platonisme et le 
thomisme,” Revue de l’Université d’Ottowa (1932), 5-30, especially page 19. 
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self-diffusive. If  the good is self-diffusive, then Aquinas seems to be dissembling when he 
says that God emanates because God wills to emanate: God, being the good, cannot fail to 
emanate. Kretzmann contends that Aquinas endorses the principle that the good is self-
diffusive except in cases where Aquinas is specifically arguing that God does not create due 
to natural necessity.483 For example, Kretzmann mentions that in On the Power of  God, in 
response to an objection that God would be denying God’s own goodness by not creating, 
Aquinas asserts that God’s goodness would not be harmed or denied by God not creating.484 
While an interesting objection to Aquinas’s doctrine of free and voluntary 
emanation, Kretzmann’s challenge can be overcome. Primarily, Aquinas speaks of necessary 
emanation in the context of the procession of the Son from the Father. As noted above, 
Aquinas describes the emanation of the Son from the Father and of the Holy Spirit from the 
Father and Son as necessary emanations. Aquinas does relate the Pseudo-Dionysian principle 
                                               
483 Kretzmann, The Metaphysics of Theism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 224. According to 
Kretzmann, Aquinas has two problems to solve with respect to creation: first, if God wills God’s own existence 
necessarily and this act of will includes God willing the existence of beings other than God, it seems that God 
must will the existence of other beings necessarily as well; second, God willing the existence of beings other 
than God implies multiplicity in God (219). Aquinas wards off the claim that God is not simple because God 
wills beings other than God by asserting that God wills these things in a single act of will in which God wills 
God’s existence perfectly and wills other things insofar as God wills God’s own existence (219-220). As Rahim 
Acar clarifies, God’s will toward God’s self and toward others have different modalities. God cannot fail to will 
God’s own existence and goodness. God wills things other than God insofar as those other things are ordered 
to God’s goodness. This distinction means that things other than God are not, properly speaking, the end of 
God’s will. These things other than God are not required to meet that end; thus, they are one (optional) means 
to the end (which is God’s goodness) (157; Aquinas, ST Ia.19.3; Summa Contra Gentiles I.75). Kretzmann argues 
that Aquinas’s attempt to distinguish different modalities to aspects of God’s willing is unsatisfactory in light of 
the fact that God is the good. If God is the good, then it seems wrong to say that God’s goodness does not 
require the existence of beings other than God in light of the principle that the good is self-diffusive (221-224; 
Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles I.81). As Acar notes, Aquinas could possibly have resolved this tension by 
modifying his assertions either about the good or about God’s will. Kretzmann finds Aquinas’s account of the 
good being self-diffusive persuasive, so any attempt (on Aquinas’s part) to modify what it means for the good 
to be self-diffusive is unlikely to persuade him that the potential incompatibility has been resolved. I contend 
that Aquinas could attenuate what he means by either the claim that (a) the good is self-diffusive by nature or 
the claim that (b) God emanates by will. As will become obvious in the following discussion, I suggest that 
Aquinas reinterprets the notion that the good is self-diffusive. The good is self-diffusive, but its diffusion 
occurs by will and not by nature. 
484 Kretzmann, The Metaphysics of Theism, 224; Aquinas, On the Power of God 3.15 ad 12. See also Kretzmann’s 
discussion in “A General Problem of Creation,” Being and Goodness, ed. Scott MacDonald (Ithaca: Cornell, 
1991), 215-223 and “Goodness, Knowledge, and Indeterminacy in the Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas,” in 
Journal of Philosophy 80.10 (1983) 631-638.  
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of the self-diffusiveness of the good to the emanations within the Trinity at least once in his 
writings. In his commentary on Lombard’s Sentences, Aquinas applies the Pseudo-Dionysian 
principle of the self-diffusiveness of the good to the procession the Son. This application 
occurs in the sed contra to the question, “Whether in the divine there are many persons.”485 
According to what Aquinas writes in the sed contra, the Pseudo-Dionysian principle can be 
applied to Trinitarian procession. Creatures are unable to perfectly receive God’s goodness, 
so Aquinas concludes that God’s goodness must be shared with something other than 
creatures. Aquinas concludes that in order for God’s goodness to be shared, God must share 
God’s goodness with something that shares God’s essence. Accordingly, there is a sharing of 
God’s goodness among the members of the Godhead.486 In this instance, God sharing God’s 
goodness is necessary, but it is goodness shared within the Godhead. 
Furthermore, Aquinas speaks of the Pseudo-Dionysian principle in terms of final, 
not efficient, causation. As Wippel notes, the results of Julien Peghaire’s study of Aquinas’s 
use of the Pseudo-Dionysian principle were that Aquinas uses it to speak of God’s final, not 
efficient, causation. 487 In the passage of Summa Contra Gentiles above in which Aquinas 
appeals to the Pseudo-Dionysian principle, it is clear that Aquinas believes the good to be 
appetible, or, as Wippel says, “the good is that which is the object of appetite.”488 The good, 
then, is the end of God’s will, and as the end of God’s will, it is “diffusive of itself and of 
being.”489  
                                               
485 I highlight this fact to emphasize that this may not be representative of Aquinas’s position. While he does 
not dispute the sed contra in this question, it is not always his practice to do so. 
486 In Sent I.2.1.4; Kretzmann, “Goodness, Knowledge, and Indeterminacy in the Philosophy of Thomas 
Aquinas,” 634. 
487 Wippel, “Norman Kretzmann on Aquinas’s Attribution of Will and of Freedom to Create to God,” 295, 
297; Peghaire, passim. 
488 Wippel, “Norman Kretzmann on Aquinas’s Attribution of Will and of Freedom to Create to God,” 296. 
489 Wippel, “Norman Kretzmann on Aquinas’s Attribution of Will and of Freedom to Create to God,” 296. 
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The fact that the Pseudo-Dionysian principle is interpreted by Aquinas to apply to 
final causation is important for two reasons. First, as was noted above, according to 
Aquinas’s analysis of necessary causes, final and formal causes do not necessitate their 
effects.490 So, the self-diffusiveness of the good is a feature of the good being a final cause, 
and final causes do not necessitate effects.491 Second, Aquinas deviates from the standard 
Neoplatonic interpretation of the Pseudo-Dionysian principle, which was to apply the 
principle to both final and efficient causation. The only scenario in which Aquinas applies 
the principle to efficient causation is within the context of Trinitarian procession, not within 
the context of creation. God, then, is not forced by God’s goodness to create. 
Finally, Aquinas frequently speaks about the creative emanation as an act of will even 
when he discusses the diffusiveness of the good. For example, in the Summa Theologiae 
question nineteen, Aquinas is discussing God willing God’s existence and the existence of 
other things. He says,  
Natural things have a natural inclination not only with respect to their own proper 
good, to acquire it if [it is] not possessed, or if [it is] possessed, to rest in it; but also 
to spread abroad their proper good amongst others, in so far as possible. Hence, we 
see that every agent, in so far as it is perfect and in act, produces its like. It pertains, 
therefore, to the nature of the will to communicate as far as possible to others the 
good possessed; and especially does this pertain to the divine will, from which all 
perfection is derived in some kind of likeness. Hence, if natural things, in so far as 
they are perfect, communicate their good to others, it appertain how much more to 
                                               
490 Aquinas, On the Power of God 3.16. Kretzmann nonetheless argues that God’s goodness necessitates the 
production of beings other than God whether it is a final or efficient cause. While Kretzmann is willing to 
admit that interpreting the Pseudo-Dionysian principle as a principle of final (not efficient) causation enables 
one to argue that Aquinas’s philosophy leaves room for God to emanate by will, Kretzmann does not believe it 
allows for free choice on God’s part. See “Goodness, Knowledge, and the Indeterminacy in the Philosophy of 
Thomas Aquinas,” 635. 
491 Wippel notes that Kretzmann overlooks an additional argument for the conclusion that God does not will 
things other than God necessarily. Aquinas argues (in Summa Contra Gentiles I.81) that God wills other things 
insofar as they participate in God’s goodness. But, since God’s goodness is infinite, there are an infinite 
number of ways in which it could be participated. If God necessarily willed things other than God, God would 
bring that willing to fruition—there would exist an infinite number of things participating in the divine 
goodness in an infinite number of ways. However, there aren’t an infinite number of things; thus, God does 
not will things other than God necessarily (Wippel, 294). 
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the divine will to communicate by likeness its own good to others as much as 
possible. Thus, then, [God] wills both Himself to be and other things to be; but 
Himself as the end, and other things as ordained to that end; inasmuch as it befits 
the divine goodness that other things should be partakers in it.492 
 
In this passage, Aquinas explicitly connects the diffusion of good to the will of God. God 
makes beings like God because God wills to do so; this action is fitting of God and God’s 
goodness. By connecting God’s emanative act to an act of will, Aquinas is not (contra 
Kretzmann) endorsing the Pseudo-Dionysian principle that the good is self-diffusive by 
nature. Instead, Aquinas seems to be saying that the good is self-diffusive by will. There is 
no necessity of self-diffusion; instead, the self-diffusion is voluntary. 
 Aquinas denies that anything external or internal to God necessitates that God 
create. God, being self-sufficient, is not beholden to anything outside of God. Even God’s 
nature—specifically, God’s justice and God’s goodness—does not entail that God must 
create. It seems, then, that one must take Aquinas at his word when he says that God creates 
freely as a result of a divine volition. 
It is now evident that Aquinas does not subscribe to Avicenna’s Neoplatonic model 
of  emanation when he describes creating as emanating. Aquinas’s account of  God’s 
emanation does not align with the central aspects of  Neoplatonic emanation. He rejects the 
principle that from one simple being, only one simple being can be produced, even within 
the context of  the necessary emanations within the Godhead. He rejects the notion that 
God can only create a multiplicity of  diverse things through mediation; in fact, he rejects the 
                                               
492 ST Ia.19.2 resp: Res enim naturalis non solum habet naturalem inclinationem respectu proprii boni, ut 
acquirat ipsum cum non habet, vel ut quiescat in illo cum habet; sed etiam ut proprium bonum in alia diffundat, 
secundum quod possibile est. Unde videmus quod omne agens, inquantum est actu et perfectum, facit sibi 
simile. Unde et hoc pertinet ad rationem voluntatis, ut bonum quod quis habet, aliis communicet, secundum 
quod possibile est. Et hoc praecipue pertinet ad voluntatem divinam, a qua, per quandam similitudinem, 
derivatur omnis perfectio. Unde, si res naturales, inquantum perfectae sunt, suum bonum aliis communicant, 
multo magis pertinet ad voluntatem divinam, ut bonum suum aliis per similitudinem communicet, secundum 
quod possibile est. Sic igitur vult et se esse, et alia. Sed se ut finem, alia vero ut ad finem, inquantum condecet 
divinam bonitatem etiam alia ipsam participare. 
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notion that created beings have the capability to produces something from nothing. He 
rejects the notion that God creates necessarily. Though the emanations within the Godhead 
are necessary, creation, which is the emanation outside of  the Godhead, is voluntary. The 
one similarity between Aquinas’s account of  creation by emanation and the Neoplatonic 
account of  emanation is that God produces being.  
C. Creative Emanation and Creation by Efficient Causation 
What remains to be seen is how Aquinas relates talk of  creation by efficient 
causation to talk of  creation by emanation. What must be seen is whether Aquinas intends 
to express something distinctive by these two ways of  talking about creation. If  he does not 
intend to express something distinctive, then it remains to be seen why Aquinas would 
continue to use both ways of  talking about creation. Possible explanations for the retention 
of  the language of  emanation and efficient causation in discussions of  creation will be 
explored. 
Aquinas’s discussion of  creating by efficient causation and creating by emanation 
reveal that Aquinas intends to express a similar concept by each way of  talking. In laying out 
these two models of  creation, Aquinas appeals to action as the primary characterization of  
each type of  causation. An efficient cause acts, and this action results in some effect. A being 
emanates, and it seems that emanation should be classified as an action. Emanating is 
something that a being does, and this doing is simply acting.  
Similarly, creating both by efficient causation and by emanation involve the 
production of  something from no underlying material. Creation, whether discussed in terms 
of  efficient causation or emanation, is ex nihilo. Aquinas does not deviate from the notion of  
creation being ex nihilo whether or not he describes it as efficient causation or emanation.  
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Without the additional aspects of  emanation—the emanation of  only one thing by a 
simple being, production via intermediaries, and necessary emanation—that are associated 
with Neoplatonic conceptions of  emanation, it seems that Aquinas does not intend to 
convey something distinctive by speaking of  creation in terms of  efficient causation versus 
in terms of  emanation. Creation is the production of  being from nothing, and the act of  
producing being can be understood either in terms of  God as the efficient cause or of  God 
as the emanator. That these two ways of  talking fit well together should perhaps not be 
surprising.493 If  emanating is an act, then by definition emanating is a way to express some 
sort of  efficient causation. Creation by emanation refers to a specific type of  efficient 
causation—the production of  being from no pre-existing, underlying substrate.  
If  Aquinas does not intend to convey anything distinctive by discussing God as 
efficient cause in addition to discussing God as emanator, then one might wonder why he 
would continue to speak of  God in both of  these ways. When two ways of  speaking are 
each used to express an incredibly similar concept but one of  those ways of  speaking is 
associated with a philosophical approach that has been soundly rejected, it seems puzzling 
why one would continue using both of  those ways of  speaking. In Aquinas’s case, there are a 
number of  plausible reasons for his retention of  the language of  efficient causation and 
emanation in the context of  creation.  
                                               
493 Support for the notion that emanation is another way to talk about efficient causation more generally comes 
from Aquinas’s discussion of the divine procession in On the Power of God. As an objection to the notion that 
there is procession in God, Aquinas offers this critique: “inasmuch as the more excellent creatures are more 
like to God, that which is found in the lower creatures and not in the higher is not found in God: for instance, 
dimensive quantity, matter, and so forth. Now procession is to be found in the lower creatures, where one 
individual engenders another of the same species: whereas this does not obtain in the higher creatures. Neither 
therefore in God is procession to be found” (10.5). Aquinas replies that intellectual substances have 
processions of their wills, and this sort of procession is similar to the procession in the divine trinity. Aquinas 
does not deny that lower creatures have processions—not intellectual processions like angels and like God, but 
the procession of another being of their kind. So, it seems that Aquinas was comfortable using the language of 
procession even in the context of ordinary efficient causation, namely, substantial change. 
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The first plausible explanation for Aquinas retaining language of  efficient causation 
and emanation in the context of  creation is that Aquinas was trying to hold onto as much of  
philosophical and theological history as possible. Philosophers have discussed the origins of  
the universe in terms of  emanation for hundreds of  years, and influential Christian 
theologians adopted this way of  speaking of  creation in the early period of  the church. By 
continuing this usage, Aquinas linked his analysis of  creation to the analyses of  those who 
had come before. Standing in a long line of  tradition, Aquinas continued to use common 
words even when offering a new interpretation of  those words. The language of  emanation 
is not helpful or important for making any specific philosophical point(s); instead, the 
language of  emanation is used to maintain conformity with the works of  previous scholars, 
presumably because Aquinas recognized something correct about their language but thought 
their point could be better illuminated in different contexts. 
The second plausible explanation is that although these terms mean nothing 
distinctive in the context of  creation, the terms are useful for maintaining some 
philosophical distinctions. Instead of  retaining this language as an act of  fealty to those who 
came before, Aquinas uses the language of  efficient causation and emanation within the 
context of  creation because this language is helpful for making some important distinctions. 
Aquinas uses emanation language within the context of  creation, but he also uses it in his 
discussion of  the procession within the Godhead. Emanation is a way of  talking about any 
divine procession, whether it is internal or external to the Godhead.494 In Aquinas’s 
definition of  creation, he specifies that creation is an “emanation of  things from the First 
Principle.”495 Retaining the language of  emanation, even while rejecting wholesale a 
                                               
494 Aquinas, On the Power of God 10.1.5. 
495 ST Ia.45. 
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Neoplatonic conception of  emanation, allows Aquinas to easily speak of  God’s action in 
one word. What God does is God emanates. God emanates within the Trinity and outside 
the Trinity, but the entirety of  God’s action can be understood as emanation.496 So, Aquinas 
retains the language of  emanation because it is useful—it is not useful because it expresses 
something distinctive about God creating but because it allows Aquinas to describe God’s 
action simply and easily. This non-Neoplatonic, sanitized conception of  divine emanation is 
important for framing Aquinas’s larger theological task, which is expressing the exitus and 
reditus to God. 
V. Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I have argued that Aquinas speaks of  creation primarily in terms of  
efficient causation. God is the first efficient cause, but when God creates, God creates ex 
nihilo. I have also argued that Aquinas views divine efficient causation as a type of  
Aristotelian efficient causation. Due to the work of  other Aristotelian commentators and 
some tensions in Aristotelian philosophy, Aquinas is able to find room within the 
Aristotelian causal framework for efficient causation without patients. Finally, I have argued 
that Aquinas’s retention of  the language of  emanation within the context of  creation does 
not entail a retention of  Neoplatonic emanation. Instead, Aquinas talks of  efficient 
causation without patients in a nearly identical manner to emanative creation. I maintain that 
Aquinas retains the language of  emanation, even though he strips it of  its Neoplatonic 
components, because emanation allows Aquinas to easily discuss all of  God’s productive 
acts—those within the Trinity and those without.  
  
                                               









I. Introduction  
In this chapter, I will explore the implications of Avicenna’s and Aquinas’s 
discussion of divine creation. I will begin by exploring some of the similarities and 
differences in their approaches to describing divine creation. In so doing, I will highlight the 
importance of this study for interpreting both Avicenna’s and Aquinas’s discussions of 
creation and their larger philosophical discussions. I will then explore what these similarities 
reveal about the metaphysics of causation in both Aquinas’s and Avicenna’s theories of 
causation. I will close by examining some of the importance of Avicenna’s and Aquinas’s 
theories of divine causation in discussions of creation and causation. This study proves 
helpful for adjudicating disputes about creation, Neoplatonic emanation, and Aristotelian 
efficient causation in the work of historical and modern philosophers. 
II. Comparison 
 In this section, I offer a comparison of the approaches used by Avicenna and 
Aquinas toward solving the problem of creation introduced in chapter one. The manner in 
which Avicenna and Aquinas address the discrepancies between the philosophical accounts 
of causation in the theological account of creation are distinct but follow a similar pattern: 
Avicenna and Aquinas both deny the apparent incompatibility between these philosophical 
accounts of causation and the theological account of creation. For Avicenna, Neoplatonic 
emanation does not require emanation to be a necessary act; neither does Aristotelian 
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efficient causation require there to be a patient underlying the change. Thus, both 
Neoplatonic emanation and Aristotelian efficient causation, when the theories themselves 
and their implications have been properly understood, are compatible with theological 
account of creation as both voluntary and ex nihilo. For Aquinas, Neoplatonic emanation can 
be either necessary or voluntary, and in the case of divine creation that emanation is 
voluntary; Aristotelian efficient causation is best understood to be characterized by the 
action of an agent, which means that an agent acting with or without a patient is an efficient 
cause. Thus, both Neoplatonic emanation and Aristotelian efficient causation are truly 
compatible with theological account of creation.  
However, the specific explanations offered for how these theories do not conflict are 
not identical. Instead, Avicenna’s account of creation includes the details of Neoplatonic 
emanation, and elsewhere when discussing the metaphysics of being Avicenna explains that 
there must be an Aristotelian efficient cause that does not involve a patient underlying the 
cause.497 Aquinas, in contrast, discusses divine creation predominantly—at least in his 
philosophical discussions—in terms of Aristotelian efficient causation, yet he defines 
creation as emanation, albeit emanation stripped of most of the specifically Neoplatonic 
interpretations of emanation.498 To further study the similarities and differences between 
these approaches, I will examine the salient features of their explications of Neoplatonic 
emanation and Aristotelian efficient causation.  
A. Neoplatonic Emanation 
The pertinent features of Avicenna’s and Aquinas’s interpretation and appropriation 
of Neoplatonic emanation both as a theory of causation and an explanation of God’s 
                                               
497 See Avicenna, Metaphysics of the Healing book nine and book six, respectively. 
498 See Aquinas, Summa Theologica questions forty-five through forty-nine and sixty-five through seventy-four. 
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creative act will be examined. Starting from the general traits of Neoplatonic thought 
(discussed in chapter one), Avicenna and Aquinas apply the language of emanation to 
creation. What causal aspects are involved in Neoplatonic emanation deserves special 
attention, for it is a major source of difference between Avicenna’s and Aquinas’s accounts.  
1.  Avicenna on Neoplatonic Emanation  
 Avicenna’s discussion of the origination of the universe depends heavily on 
Neoplatonic emanation as an explanation of that origination. Avicenna’s account of the 
origination of the universe draws upon the major themes of Neoplatonic emanation: what is 
maximally good overflows with goodness; this maximally good being is perfect, simple, 
necessary, and self-sufficient; the good is self-diffusive, which (at least partially) explains why 
the maximally good being emanates; the maximally good being produces additional beings, 
and it uses no pre-existing material to do so; and the maximally good being may produce 
some of these additional beings via mediators. Avicenna adopts the claim that God is the 
maximally good being, and he also adopts the claim that God is self-diffusive. However, 
Avicenna denies that God is self-diffusive by nature; instead, Avicenna claims that God is 
self-diffusive because God wills to be self-diffusive. When emanating, God emanates one 
simple being—and it must be so, Avicenna argues, because what God emanates must be like 
God. Thus, this emanated being must be singular and simple. Avicenna asserts that God 
emanates one simple being, an appeal grounded in the Plotinian Neoplatonic tradition, and 
Avicenna also relies upon the Neoplatonic notion of the presence of the primary cause’s 
causal power in the effects of anything produced by it. God is indirectly responsible for the 
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existence of a multiplicity of numerically and qualitatively different beings. God creates one 
thing immediately and other things mediately.499  
 To make his account of emanation to cohere with his general understanding of 
God—namely that God is simple and perfect—Avicenna relies heavily on the principle 
found in the Neoplatonic tradition that states that emanation by the maximally good being 
will produce one and only one being and that this newly produced being must be simple.500 
In order to account for the existence of a variety of numerically and qualitatively distinct 
beings, there must be intermediaries involved in the process of creation. In asserting that 
intermediaries are (and must be) involved in the process of emanating the known universe, 
Avicenna follows the understanding of Neoplatonic emanation promulgated by his 
forbearers. The need for emanators depends upon Avicenna’s understanding of what it must 
mean for a simple being to produce new being.  
Avicenna deviates from the traditional understanding of Neoplatonic emanation by 
denying that God emanates because of some necessity of God’s nature. Instead, Avicenna 
asserts that God emanates because God wills to emanate. Although God’s will cannot be 
other than it is—to say so implies some imperfection in God’s will—it is the case that God’s 
will is involved in the process of determining to emanate. That God’s will is involved in the 
process of emanation entails that Avicenna denies the traditionally understood Neoplatonic 
                                               
499 Avicenna, Metaphysics of the Healing, IX.4.4; Avicenna, Liber de Philosophia Prima sive Scientia Divina V-X IX.4, p. 
481. 
500 This is in contrast to the Proclean tradition, which understands the maximally good being to be able to 
produce numerically and qualitatively different beings directly because each of these beings reflect the perfection of the 
maximally good being to varying degrees. See Hankey, “Ab Uno Simplici non est nisi Unum: The Place of Natural and 
Necessary Emanation in Aquinas’s Doctrine of Creation.” 
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claim that God creates by nature and not by will. It further complicates the claim that God 
emanates necessarily, for necessary emanation is typically contrasted with an act of the will.501  
The deviation from traditional Neoplatonic emanation can be explained in two ways. 
First, Avicenna conceived of God differently than many of the Neoplatonists insofar as he 
believed that God had a will that could be known. Unlike Plotinus, who at least at times speaks 
as if the One lacked will, Avicenna is convinced that God has and exercises a will.502 Thus, 
there must be a role for the will in whatever God does. Avicenna is able to explain how 
God’s will functions within the process of emanation in a way that is largely faithful to the 
traditional Neoplatonic approach to emanation.503 
Second, Avicenna could be specifically amending his Neoplatonic account of 
emanation to cohere with the Islamic notion of creation. Creation in the Abrahamic tradition 
is always voluntary, and thus one must be able to say that emanation is voluntary if creating is 
to be understood in terms of emanating. By finding room within Neoplatonic emanation to 
account for God’s will, Avicenna is able to bring these two traditions into agreement that, at 
least on some level, God’s will is involved in the production of being.  
2. Aquinas on Neoplatonic Emanation 
Whereas Avicenna follows the traditional Neoplatonic conception of emanation 
quite closely—aside from carving out room for divine will in the process of emanation—
Aquinas deviates in significant ways from the standard understanding of Neoplatonic 
                                               
501 For example, see Zedler’s influential article, “St. Thomas Aquinas and Avicenna in the ‘De Potentia Dei.’” 
502 Plotinus, Enneads V 1, 6, 15-27 and VI 9, 6, 40. As Michael Chase notes, the second passage denying a role 
for will in the One is disputed by Georges Leorux. See Michael Chase, “Abrahamic Creation and Neoplatonic 
Emanation in Greek, Arabic, and Latin: Reflections on a recent paper by Richard Taylor” (Paper presented at 
Aquinas and the Arabs conference, Paris, France, May 31, 2012) http: 
//academic.mu.edu/taylorr/AAP_Papers/Chase_Paris_31_May_2012.html (accessed April 1, 2013), 6; for 
Avicenna’s discussion of the divine will, which is also discussed in chapter two, see Metaphysics of the Healing 
VIII.7.  
503 For a discussion of how, specifically, Avicenna does this, please see chapter two.  
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emanation. Like Avicenna, Aquinas adopts the principle that says that what is maximally 
good overflows with goodness and that this maximally good being is simple, necessary, and 
self-sufficient.504 Aquinas also adopts the principle that says that when producing something 
via emanation, an emanator produces additional beings without using pre-existing material to 
do so. Aquinas’s significant deviations from the interpretation of Neoplatonic emanation 
adopted by Avicenna deal with questions regarding the self-diffusiveness of the good, the 
role of the divine will in emanation, and the role for intermediaries in emanation. 
Aquinas, like Avicenna, asserts that God produces being because God wills to do so. 
This influences Aquinas’s discussion of the principles of Neoplatonic emanation (a) that the 
good is self-diffusive and (b) whether there is a role for the divine will in emanation. Unlike 
Avicenna, Aquinas does not directly address the role of the divine will in emanation; instead, 
he addresses a general question about the role of God’s will in God’s actions: God, as a 
creature with a will, does what God does because God wills to do so.505 There is no reason 
to suggest that such an analysis of the role of God’s will would not apply to divine 
emanation, and as I discuss in chapter three, it seems best to conclude that, like Avicenna, 
Aquinas believes that God’s emanation involves God’s will. 
The principle regarding the self-diffusiveness of the good relates closely to whether 
God must will the existence of other beings. While it is the case that for both Avicenna and 
for Aquinas, the divine will is not subject to change, neither philosopher asserts that the 
immutability of the divine will entails that God wills the existence of other beings with 
absolute necessity. Instead, God willing the existence of other beings depends upon what 
                                               
504 See Aquinas’s discussions in Summa Theologica Ia questions 2 through 6 and 44 through 46. 
505 Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles II.23; On the Power of God 3.15. 
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other things God wills—namely, God’s goodness.506 Not only is there a role for the divine 
will in emanation, but it is also the case that the divine will to produce other beings is not, 
strictly speaking, necessitated. 
Unlike Avicenna’s account of divine emanation, Aquinas’s account of divine 
emanation includes clear examples of natural emanation and voluntary emanation. The 
production of beings other than God is an example of voluntary emanation in both 
Avicenna’s and Aquinas’s accounts. Aquinas, however, articulates at least one instance of 
necessary emanation—the production of the members of the Trinity.507 God simply is the 
sort of being that exists in three persons. With Avicenna’s account of divine emanation, it is 
unclear whether there are emanations that are non-voluntary.508 Up to this point, Aquinas 
and Avicenna have remarkably similar understandings of emanation. 
Aquinas deviates most significantly from Avicenna regarding the issue of whether 
intermediaries are important to (or are required by) an account of divine emanation. On 
Aquinas’s analysis, there must not be intermediaries who are involved in the process of 
creating and produce entirely new beings out of nothing: the maximally good and maximally 
existing being alone has the ability to produce something ex nihilo because only a fully 
actualized being can produce something ex nihilo.509 Wherever Aquinas encounters the notion 
of intermediaries in creation, such as in Pseudo-Dionysius’s Liber de Causis, Aquinas, at every 
turn, reinterprets these references to intermediaries as divisions in types of created beings.510 
                                               
506 For a discussion in Aquinas, see Summa Contra Gentiles I.81 & 83. 
507 See Aquinas, On the Power of God 2.4 resp; ST Ia.41.2 ad 5.  
508 A case can be made that because the Intellects emanate due to desiring to be like God, the emanations are 
willed (or are, at least, the result of an act of will). It is possible, though, to argue that the will is not immediately 
causally relevant to the emanation—the will does not directly produce the emanation; instead, it merely 
produces the desire to be like God, and the desire to be like God results in the emanation. 
509 See Aquinas, ST Ia.63.3. 
510 Aquinas, Commentary on the Liber de Causis, proposition 16, p. 108. 
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Aquinas, then, interprets emanation significantly differently from the Plotinian tradition of 
Neoplatonism.  
Furthermore, Aquinas follows a different tradition of Neoplatonic emanation than 
Avicenna. Aquinas follows the Proclean tradition that included intermediaries but also 
included the assertion that what the One produces is being, which Aquinas uses to argue that 
God can produce a multiplicity of beings directly.511 In so doing, Aquinas applies resources 
within the Proclean tradition in a distinctive manner. There is likeness but not equality between 
God and what God creates, and it is this likeness that allows beings other than God to 
reflect God’s goodness.512 It is important for Aquinas that other beings do not equally or 
perfectly reflect God’s goodness, for it is only when something represents its exemplar 
perfectly that the exemplar can produce only one thing.513 That the universe is produced 
directly does not, as Avicenna alleges, threaten the simplicity of God: it would only threaten 
divine simplicity if God did not emanate by will, for the will explains how there can be 
multiple objects directly created without there being (a) multiple things known (for God 
knows only Godself) (b) multiple things willed (for God can have a compound yet singular 
will).514 In asserting that it is possible for multiple things to be directly created by God and  
 
 
                                               
511 Aquinas, Commentary on the Liber de Causis, proposition 20, p. 122. For an interesting discussion of the 
differences in these traditions with regard to emanation in Aquinas’s views on creation, see Hankey’s “Ab Uno 
Simplici non est nisi Unum: The Place of Natural and Necessary Emanation in Aquinas’s Doctrine of Creation.” 
512 Aquinas, On the Power of God 3.16. resp 11.  
513 Aquinas, ST Ia.47.1 ad 2. 
514 Aquinas, ST Ia.47.1 ad 1. See also te Velde’s discussion on pp. 101-107 in Participation and Substantiality in 
Thomas Aquinas.  
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reflect God’s goodness, Aquinas adopts a different conception of emanation than 
Avicenna.515  
B. Aristotelian Efficient Causation 
Using Aristotle’s discussion of efficient causation as the cause which brings about a 
change in an underlying patient as a starting point, the salient features of Avicenna’s and 
Aquinas’s interpretation and appropriation of Aristotelian efficient causation both as a 
theory of causation and an explanation of God creating will be examined. Avicenna and 
Aquinas explore the implications of this discussion. Both question whether Aristotle’s 
explanation of efficient causation leaves anything unexpressed, and both determine (yet for 
distinct reasons) that Aristotle must have left some of his conception of efficient causation 
unarticulated.  
1. Avicenna on Aristotelian Efficient Causation 
Avicenna’s explication of Aristotelian efficient causation includes a primary division 
in types of efficient causes: there are natural efficient causes, which produce change by 
activating a potentiality in a patient, and there are metaphysical efficient causes, which 
produce change by bringing about the existence of something new. This natural efficient 
causation is the typical form of efficient causation, and it explains most cases of efficient 
causation. On Avicenna’s analysis, natural efficient causation is a correct and useful way for 
understanding the types of causation we regularly encounter in this world. However, there 
                                               
515 In denying the principle that from one simple being, one being must be produced, Aquinas deviates from 
the interpretation of the Liber de Causis offered by Albert in his De Causis et Processu Universitatis, Albert’s 
commentary on the Liber de Causis. There, Albert endorses the principle that from one simple being, one being 
can be produced. However, he asserts that the one being produced by God is being itself. As Bonin notes, “God 
produces all things by producing one thing” (Therese Bonin, Creation as Emanation (Notre Dame: Notre Dame, 
2001), 73). See Albert, De Causis et Processu Universitatis, 1.4.4, 2.1.2, and 2.1.19 and Bonin, Creation as Emanation 
39-40 and 73. 
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simply must exist another kind of efficient cause, a cause that can bring about the existence 
of a new thing, even when that new thing is produced of pre-existing material.  
Avicenna’s account of metaphysical efficient causation includes three important 
facets: first, a metaphysical efficient cause does not need some underlying patient in order to 
bring about an effect, for a metaphysical efficient cause can, under certain circumstances, 
produce something ex nihilo. Second, a metaphysical efficient cause is the sort of efficient 
cause that is able to bestow a new form upon what it produces, whether that production is 
from pre-existing material or not. Third, it is the metaphysical efficient cause that plays the 
role of the sustainer of what is produced. It may be the case that our builder, Bob, is a 
natural efficient cause of the house—he does reconfigure the timbers to produce a livable 
space—but the involvement of a metaphysical efficient cause is still entailed in order to 
explain how the house continues to exist after Bob leaves (or worse, dies). Agents who are 
metaphysical causes include God, the Intellects, and the Giver of Forms. Positing a 
metaphysical efficient cause allows Avicenna to address these issues not explicitly addressed 
by Aristotle. Avicenna discusses these issues as though they elucidate something left implicit 
in Aristotle’s thought; he does not present himself as though he is significantly amending 
Aristotle’s thought.516 
There are several influential underlying philosophical beliefs that are related to the 
difficulties associated with Aristotle’s account of natural efficient causation. One is revealed 
by Avicenna’s opening comments on the study of metaphysics: Avicenna asserts that 
metaphysics is the study of existence as such.517 To study existence as such, one must be able 
                                               
516 Given the medieval inclination to hold on to their philosophical and religious heritage, it is unsurprising that 
Avicenna would refrain from announcing these enhancements of Aristotle’s theory as enhancements to 
Aristotle’s theory.  
517 Avicenna, Metaphysics of the Healing I.2 p. 31-34; Richardson, 21. 
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to discuss how things come into existence from nothing. Thus, one can expect to discuss a 
type of causation in which being is brought about in the study of metaphysics. 
Additionally, a cluster of beliefs related to the necessity and contingency of certain 
beings—for which Avicenna argues extensively in the earlier books of the Metaphysics of the 
Healing—cast light on the limitations of Aristotle’s original explanation of efficient causation. 
Some being exists necessarily.518 Given the fact that some beings are dependent and others 
are necessary, it is clear that the contingent beings must have some originator. A corollary 
belief to the belief that some being is necessary, then, is that there is some production or 
origination of being. What this origination (and, if applicable, this originator) is like and how 
such beings come about depends upon another (well argued) philosophical belief of 
Avicenna’s—that being is distinct from essence.519 This additional underlying philosophical 
belief, then, is that being is not identical to essence. Avicenna, then, introduces a distinction 
between metaphysical and natural efficient causes based largely upon his adherence to the 
belief that some beings exist necessarily and others exist contingently and that there is a 
difference between being and essence.  
 2. Aquinas on Aristotelian Efficient Causation 
Aquinas follows Avicenna in distinguishing between two types of Aristotelian 
efficient causes. Aquinas adopts Aristotle’s way of discussing efficient causes, asserting that 
there is a natural efficient cause that brings about change by activating a potentiality in a 
patient. The patient goes from being one way to being another way as the result of this act. 
Following Aristotle, Aquinas distinguishes between substantial generation—the production 
of a different substance—or accidental generation—alteration in some substance that already 
                                               
518 Avicenna, Metaphysics of the Healing I.6 p. 30 1-7. 
519 Avicenna, Metaphysics of the Healing I.5 p. 24-29.  
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exists. Like Avicenna, Aquinas does not think that this type of efficient causation is sufficient 
to explain all cases of efficient causation, and thus Aquinas addresses a metaphysical efficient 
cause.  
Like Avicenna, Aquinas asserts that a metaphysical efficient cause produces 
something that did not previously exist, neither in totality nor in its component parts. The 
metaphysical efficient does not use any pre-existing material to produce its effect; instead, it 
produces its effect entirely ex nihilo. Only a certain sort of agent can produce something ex 
nihilo, which means that unlike Avicenna, there is and can be only one metaphysical efficient 
cause: God. Aquinas limits metaphysical efficient causation to God and God only because 
one must be fully actualized in order to produce something ex nihilo. Avicenna does not tie 
production ex nihilo to an agent’s state of actualization, but Aquinas does directly and 
forcefully.  
Avicenna relies explicitly on several philosophical beliefs in his articulation of 
metaphysical efficient causation, but Aquinas is less direct and transparent regarding 
influential philosophical beliefs on this topic. Aquinas does appeal to a distinction between 
being and becoming to explain why the standard explanation of an efficient cause needs 
additional explanation.520 Aquinas also appeals to the notion that there must be some 
originator for what currently exists because what exists now may exist or may fail to exist.521 
Aquinas shares these philosophical beliefs with Avicenna. 
Aquinas deviates from Avicenna’s set of underlying philosophical beliefs regarding 
the importance of the distinction between necessary and non-necessary beings. Whereas 
Aquinas does make reference to the notion that some beings are contingent (and thus their 
                                               
520 Aquinas, ST Ia.104.1 resp. 
521 Aquinas, ST Ia.2.3 resp. 
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existence must be explained), he does not argue extensively regarding the necessity of the 
First Being. Instead, Aquinas devotes his energy to defending the claim that God is fully 
actualized, perfect, and simple.522 Of course, such a being would exist necessarily, but it may 
be telling that Aquinas focuses his argumentative efforts elsewhere.  
Aquinas’s elucidation of Aristotelian efficient causation involves a distinctive 
understanding of what separates efficient causation from other types of causation. Aquinas 
broadens the definition of efficient causation to include both natural and metaphysical 
efficient causation types by defining efficient causation as an effect that comes about as a 
result of an agent’s act. This broader conception of efficient causation includes the natural 
efficient cause and it includes the metaphysical efficient cause that produces its effect ex 
nihilo. By arguing that the true mark of efficient causation is that an agent acts to bring about 
the change, Aquinas is able to argue that there need not be any patient underlying the 
change. Thus, patients are not a necessary component of efficient causation. 
III. Metaphysics of Causation 
 In this section, I address the importance of the above discussion for the metaphysics 
of causation. Examining Avicenna’s and Aquinas’s accounts of God’s action in creating 
makes it possible to delineate what sorts of causes there are, even though these sorts of 
causes may be limited strictly to instances of creating. I then discuss to what extent 
Avicenna’s and Aquinas’s causal theories are Aristotelian or Neoplatonic, additionally 
addressing how these theories of causation are related to each other. It is helpful to know 
whether these theories discuss identical, similar, or dissimilar instances of causation. The longer-
term impact of Avicenna’s and Aquinas’s causal theories is briefly explored as well. The 
                                               
522 Aquinas, ST Ia. questions 3-11; Summa Contra Gentiles I questions 14-28 and 37-48. 
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section closes with a discussion of the usefulness of this theory for answering a lingering 
question regarding the appellation of ‘creation’ as applied to Neoplatonic emanation and 
metaphysical efficient causation. 
A. What Types of Causes There Are 
1. Avicenna 
On Avicenna’s analysis, there are efficient causes that act on a patient. Here, he 
closely follows Aristotle’s own analysis: an efficient cause activates some potentiality in a 
patient, thus changing said patient. The agent is prior to the effect in some way. The patient 
goes from being one way to being another way. The change—the activation of the 
potentiality—is wrought by the efficient cause’s action. Such efficient causes can be 
natural—that is, agents that act by nature—or they can be volitional—that is, agents that act 
by will. So, efficient cause C is the cause of some change in patient P if C is in some way 
prior to P and some action of C brings about change in to P.  
There exists another type of efficient cause that does not act upon a preexisting 
patient but still produces something new: in this circumstance, the change is the existence of 
something new, something that comes to be as a result of the agent’s action. The agent still 
must be prior to its effect in some way, but there is no patient that underlies this change: the 
agent does not necessarily act upon something to bring about said change. This metaphysical 
efficient cause M is the cause of some thing O if M produces O ex nihilo.  
Avicenna adds another layer, so to speak, to his robust explanation of efficient 
causation by arguing that metaphysical efficient causation includes both the production of 
something new and the sustenance of something. A builder is an efficient cause of a building 
but is not, strictly speaking, the metaphysical efficient cause because he is not responsible for 
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the preservation of that building’s existence. A metaphysical efficient cause M is the cause of 
some thing O if M produces O and M sustains the existence of O in some way. Avicenna 
believes that any production ex nihilo involves the agent sustaining the new substance. 
 Coupled with Avicenna’s lengthy treatment of Aristotelian efficient causation is his 
general endorsement of Neoplatonic emanation as a manner of causation. God emanates, 
producing the First Intellect by an act in accordance with its will. God is bound it emanate 
only one simple thing, and each intellect emanates as well, and, it seems likely that those 
intellects emanate in accordance with their wills.523 So far, then, it seems that agent A 
emanates B when A wills to emanate. It seems incorrect to argue that agent A emanates B 
when A wills to emanate B because Avicenna does not specify that the later Intellects intend 
to emanate precisely the thing they produce. In God’s case, it seems likely that God 
emanated the First Intellect because God intended to emanate the First Intellect specifically, 
but for the other Intellects, it seems that they intended to emanate something as a 
component of their larger intention to be as like God as possible. What remains unclear is 
whether there are emanations that are produced by nature instead of by will. As noted, 
Avicenna asserts that the Intellects will their celestial spheres to move in a circular manner, 
but it is not clear that everything they do is volitional.524 In the case of voluntary emanation, 
an agent E emanates effect I if E wills to bring about the existence of I and initiates an 
emanation that, directly or indirectly results in the existence of I. E’s volition must be 
congruent with E’s nature or essence. In the case of natural emanation, which may be a 
theoretical type of causation, agent E emanates effect I if E has a nature that invariably leads 
                                               
523 Avicenna, Metaphysica, p. 88-9. 
524 Avicenna, Metaphysica p.88-9 
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(at least in certain circumstances) to the existence of I and initiates an emanation that, 
directly or indirectly, results in the existence of I.525  
2. Aquinas  
On Aquinas’s analysis, efficient causation is the type of causation wherein some 
agent acts. The focus of Aquinas’s analysis of efficient causation is the action performed by 
the agent. Accordingly, there are at least two general classes of efficient causation: instances 
in which the agent acts upon some patient and instances in which the agent does not act 
upon some agent. An efficient cause, in actualizing some potentiality in the patient, affects a 
change in either the accidental or substantial form of its patient.526 An efficient cause E is the 
cause of some change in patient P if E is in some way prior to P and some action of E 
brings about some change in P.  
 Aquinas discusses efficient causes as causes that conserve or sustain their effects. 
Like Avicenna, he asserts that some efficient causes both produce or alter some effect and 
are responsible for the continued existence of that effect. An efficient cause E is the cause of 
the continued existence in patient P if E is in some way prior to P and some action of E 
sustains the existence of P. In this type of efficient causation, the central focus for Aquinas is 
still the action of the agent—which, Aquinas argues, is some continuation of the action by 
which God produces things ex nihilo.527 
 Since action is the primary indicator of an efficient cause—an efficient cause must 
act in order to bring about some change—Aquinas is able to explain how an efficient cause 
could act without a patient. The analysis of this type of efficient causation depends entirely 
                                               
525 I do not include Taylor’s transcendently necessary type of emanation as a potential type of emanation 
because it does not occur in Avicenna’s writings.  
526 Aquinas, De Principiis Naturae 1-3. 
527 Aquinas, ST Ia.104.1 resp 1. 
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upon the agent’s action. An efficient cause E is the cause of P if E is in some way prior to P 
and some action of E brings about P. A further complication is that for Aquinas, there can 
be only one efficient cause who acts without a patient: God. As a fully actualized being, God 
has the ability to produce new being without any patient to underlie that production. So, 
more strictly, the efficient cause G is the cause of P if G is in some way prior to P and some 
action of G brings about P. If creation is understood passively, the formulation would be 
that the efficient cause G is the cause of P if G is in some way prior to P and P depends on 
G for its existence.  
 When specifying precisely what emanation is like in terms of creating, it is important 
to note that Aquinas differs from Avicenna by denying that any intermediaries are 
productive of new being from nothing. Aquinas must offer a different analysis of voluntary 
emanation. Aquinas’s analysis would instead be that agent E produces effect I if E wills to 
bring about the existence of I (a volition that must be congruent with E’s nature or essence) 
and initiates an emanation that directly results in the existence of I. Because only God can 
emanate entirely new being, Aquinas’s understanding of emanation in creating could be 
articulated as an G producing effect I if G wills to bring about the existence of I (a volition 
that must be congruent with G’s nature or essence) and initiates an emanation that directly 
results in the existence of I.  
While Avicenna’s approach to natural emanation may be merely theoretical, Aquinas 
outlines cases of natural emanation, both cases in which God produces a natural emanation 
and in which other agents do so. It is difficult to lay out divine natural emanation in similar 
terms to voluntary emanation, however, because what is emanated by God are the persons in 
the Trinity. What God emanates is, strictly speaking, also God. So, it is tempting to initially 
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posit that in natural emanation, agent E produces effect I if E has a nature that invariably 
leads to the existence of I and initiates an emanation that directly results in the existence of I. 
But this proposal must be modified to apply to the Trinity, given the relation between God 
the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Spirit. One such attempt might be to say that 
agent GF generates GS if GF has a nature that invariably leads to the generation of GS and 
GF exists. This attempt accurately emphasizes the close connection between God’s essence 
and God’s existence as a Trinitarian being.  
Let us apply this analysis to at least one other case of natural emanation, namely the 
sun emanating light. The sun emanates light if the sun has a nature that invariably leads to 
the generation of light and if the sun exists. However, this analysis glosses over the need for 
the sun to exist in the sort of environment in which it is able to produce light; this may be 
oversimplifying the physical processes needed in order for the sun to actually produce light. 
The difference between God and the sun is that the sun depends upon certain circumstances 
other than its existence to produce light. So, a better analysis for the sun would be that the 
sun produces light if the sun has a nature that invariably leads to the existence of light in 
certain circumstances, the sun exists, and those circumstances are met. The sun fulfilling its 
nature, as it were, requires more than the brute existence of the sun. So, for natural 
emanations produced by beings other than God, agent E produces effect I if E has a nature 
that invariably leads to the existence of I in certain circumstances, has those circumstances 
met, and initiates an emanation that directly results in the existence of I.  
B. Classification of Types of Causes 
 Given the interpretive liberties—that are, in Avicenna’s and Aquinas’s opinions, 
clearly rooted in a careful analysis of these theories—that Avicenna and Aquinas take when 
181 
elucidating Aristotelian efficient causation and the production of the universe by 
Neoplatonic emanation, it is worthwhile to discuss whether these theories ought to still be 
termed ‘Aristotelian’ and ‘Neoplatonic’ in Avicenna’s treatment of them. To the extent that 
each may be termed ‘Aristotelian’ or ‘Neoplatonic,’ it is certainly the case that there are 
elements more (or less) in line with the traditional interpretation of those theories. We turn 
first to Avicenna’s treatment of Aristotle’s efficient causation. 
1. Avicenna 
a. Aristotelian efficient causation 
 Avicenna’s metaphysical efficient causation preserves important aspects of Aristotle’s 
efficient causation. First, the agent must precede the effect in some way, whether this is 
ontologically or temporally. Second, the agent is responsible for the effect. Were the agent 
not to act, the effect would not occur (or, at least, it would have to occur some other way). 
The role of the patient, that which underlies the change, is radically different—there simply 
is no patient in some instances of metaphysical efficient causation. The patient, which goes 
from being one way to being another way in typical cases of efficient causation, comes into 
being in metaphysical efficient causation.  
In a larger way, Avicenna’s discussion of metaphysical efficient causation involves 
Avicenna attempting to answer lingering questions raised by Aristotelian scholarship. What, 
exactly, does it mean to bring something into existence? Does Aristotle’s discussion of the 
Unmoved Mover require that something is responsible for preserving the universe?528 
Avicenna draws on these questions raised by medieval interpreters and attempts to use the 
explanations provided by Aristotle as a starting-point for answering these questions. 
                                               
528 See Aristotle, Metaphysics X.7 1072a26-27. 
182 
Avicenna’s account of metaphysical efficient causation helps clarify some of Aristotle’s 
discussions of substantial change: when a new substance is produced, there are patients 
underlying that change, but the metaphysical efficient cause is responsible for producing the 
new substance because it provides the new substance with a new form. While Aristotle may 
not have endorsed this method of dealing with the difficulties surrounding discussions of 
new substances—he seems to have believed that the new material configuration simply 
resulted in the substance having a different (and, hence, new) form—Avicenna’s solution 
draws upon Aristotelian principles and broadens the applicability of those principles. Saying 
that substantial forms are given by metaphysical efficient causes allows Avicenna to posit the 
notion that the entire substance may be given (or produced) by a metaphysical efficient cause. 
Another example may be the role that the Unmoved Mover plays in Aristotle’s philosophy. 
Aristotle uses the Unmoved Mover to explain the origins of motion. Avicenna uses God to 
explain the origins of both motion and existence. 
b. Neoplatonic Emanation 
 Avicenna’s treatment of Neoplatonic emanation similarly involves some 
interpretations, many of which are clearly rooted in previous Neoplatonic thought. It seems 
fair to ask whether the theory of causation Avicenna ultimately espouses—one in which an 
emanator produces new being by will rather than by nature or transcendent necessity—is 
properly termed ‘Neoplatonic’. 
 Much of Avicenna’s explication of the production of the universe via God’s 
emanation closely follows traditional Neoplatonic emanation. An emanator produces a new 
being entirely of its own accord—no pre-existing matter is used to make this new being, and 
no agents outside of the causal chain initiated by the emanator are involved. The emanator 
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may produce being directly or indirectly—directly by immediately producing a being and 
indirectly by initiating a causal chain that results in the production of being(s). Avicenna 
follows the Plotinian tradition of Neoplatonic thought by asserting two things: first, that a 
simple being can produce only one simple being; and second, that there exist mediators 
between what exists in the universe and the first, simple being.529  
Where Avicenna deviates from the Neoplatonic conception of emanation is his 
treatment of the divine will. The Theology of Aristotle, a work that seems to have influenced 
Fārābī’s treatment of emanation, includes several propositions that deny a role for the will in 
the One.530 The “will does not precede the act of the First Agent because (the First Agent) 
acts by its being alone”.531 In this tradition of Neoplatonic thought, the One does not will to 
emanate; it simply is something that emanates.532 Avicenna deviates strongly and noticeably 
from this tradition, arguing instead that God does will to emanate. What complicates this 
explanation significantly is the fact that Avicenna also believes that God’s will is (a) eternal 
and immutable and (b) a corollary of God’s essence. Ultimately, God cannot fail to will to 
emanate given what God is; accordingly, God simply is the sort of being who wills to 
emanate.533 This statement is startlingly similar to Taylor’s analysis of Neoplatonic 
emanation—that the First Agent simply is the sort of being that emanates. Avicenna deviates 
                                               
529 Avicenna, Metaphysics of the Healing IX.4.4. 
530 See, for example, the Letter on Divine Science 105-9, which includes the notion that God acts through being 
alone or Sayings of the Greek Sage, I. 62-3 and I.84-6, which includes the notion that creation is volitionally 
necessary but that God’s acts are higher than natural or volitional necessity (Adamson, Arabic Plotinus, 146-148). 
531 Adamson, The Arabic Plotinus, 132; Taylor, “Primary Causality,” 127-128. 
532 Taylor, 128. 
533 See, for example, Avicenna, Metaphysics of the Healing IX.1. p 300 6-11 and IX.4 p. 326 32-53; Acar, 
“Avicenna’s Position on the Divine Creative Action,” 75. 
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from what is typically emphasized in the Plotinian strain of Neoplatonic thought to 
specifically insert the will into the causal explanation of God’s emanation.534    
2. Aquinas 
a. Aristotelian Efficient Causation 
Regarding how ‘Aristotelian’ Aquinas’s account of metaphysical efficient causation is, 
as with Avicenna, it must be remembered that the medieval intuition that the truths of any 
one philosophical (or religious) theory must cohere with the truths of every other 
philosophical (or religious) theory looms large in the background of Aquinas’s treatment of 
Aristotelian efficient causation. Aquinas’s account of efficient causation echoes Aristotle’s 
account in significant ways. The cause must be prior to its effect in some way. The cause, by 
acting, brings about the effect. When there is a patient upon which to act, the agent activates 
a potentiality in that patient. When there is no patient upon which to act, Aquinas thinks that 
such an agent would still be an efficient cause because the agent’s action is what brings about 
the effect. While retaining many of the major components of Aristotelian efficient causation, 
                                               
534 To say, however, that there are no Neoplatonic discussions of God willing to emanate perhaps 
oversimplifies the historical record, and it is at least possible that Avicenna drew upon some of these references 
when constructing his analysis of the role of God’s will in emanating. For example, in the Enneads, what is 
denied is not strictly that the One has a will but that the One has a will like a human will (Enneads VI 8, 16, 32; 
Chase, 6. Chase references passages mentioned in Taylor, “Primary Causation,” 129-130). A plausible 
interpretation of Plotinus’s Ennead VI.8 is that, as Michael Chase notes, “the will of God or the One is identical 
to his substance, essence, and freedom” (Chase, 7, referencing Plotinus, Enneads VI.8). If the One’s existence is 
intimately related to the One’s will, and the One’s existence itself results in the One emanating, then, by the 
transitivity of identity, the One’s will results in the One emanating (Chase makes a similar argument on p. 7). 
While Avicenna’s description of God emanating due to God’s will to emanate does deviate from the standard 
interpretation of emanation—and that found in Fārābī, for example—it does not necessarily deviate from every 
precursor in Neoplatonic thought (For an overview of al-Kindī’s and al-Fārābī’s emanatory schemes, see Inglis, 
55-58). It emphasizes a strand of Neoplatonic thinking not popularized by Avicenna’s forbearers. However, I 
do not argue specifically that Avicenna follows this interpretation of Ennead VI.8; instead, I merely intend to 
draw attention to the close parallels between these authors. Avicenna may have simply happened to strike upon 
a solution that is not entirely foreign to Plotinus’s thought. It seems, though, that because there is a way in 
which Neoplatonic thought can grapple with issues of the divine will in emanating and affirm a role for the 
divine will that Avicenna’s treatment of this issue fits within the larger Neoplatonic tradition.  
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Aquinas broadens the definition of efficient cause: an agent E is the efficient cause of P if 
E’s action results in some thing P.  
In Aquinas’s famous five ways, it is easy to see the influence of Aristotelian thinking. 
Both the first and the second way to prove God’s existence rely upon Aquinas’s analysis of 
Aristotelian causation. In the first way, God’s existence is proven by appeal to the fact that 
some things are in motion. Recall that Aquinas speaks of change—substantial or accidental 
change, the sorts of efficient causation that Avicenna described as natural efficient 
causation—in terms of motion. Motion simply is, for Aquinas, the activation of some 
potentiality. Because something cannot be both passive and active with respect to the same 
thing—water cannot be both cold and hot, for example—there must be some additional 
agent that activates that potentiality. Something must start the motion, and this something 
will not itself be in motion—otherwise, there would need to be an infinite chain of causes, 
something Aquinas dismisses. So, there must be some first mover, and “everyone 
understands” this mover to be God.535 In this defense of God’s existence, Aquinas relies 
upon his understanding of Aristotelian efficient causation. 
 By appealing to God as an efficient cause, Aquinas, like Avicenna, addresses 
questions raised in response to the Aristotelian corpus. The references to an Unmoved 
Mover in the Aristotelian corpus are provided with argumentative support in Aquinas’s536 
first way. Aquinas stands in a long line of interpreters who attempt to use Aristotelian 
                                               
535 Aquinas, ST Ia.2.3 resp. In the second way, Aquinas again appeals to efficient causation, but this time he 
appeals to God as an efficient cause. Nothing can be the efficient cause of itself, for to do so, it would have to 
exist prior to itself as an effect. Accordingly, there must be some other efficient cause of a thing’s existence. 
Aquinas again rejects a chain of infinite causes, instead asserting that there must be some first efficient cause, 
who is God.  
536 In this, Aquinas is indebted to both Avicenna and Maimonides. See Maimonides, Guide to the Perplexed II.12 
and Avicenna, Metaphysics of the Healing VI.1 p. 195 3-4. 
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thinking to solve puzzles raised by Aristotelian thinking. To do so, he widens the boundaries 
of what counts as an efficient cause, but he uses Aristotelian tools to do so. 
b. Neoplatonic Emanation 
 Regarding how ‘Neoplatonic’ Aquinas’s account of divine emanation is, one 
important element in Neoplatonic emanation is the notion that one simple being can 
produce only one simple being. Aquinas follows the Proclean Neoplatonic tradition, having 
read and commented upon the Liber de Causis, a Pseudo-Dionysian work that adopts and 
adapts numerous propositions from Proclus’s Elements of Theology. Pseudo-Dionysius seems, 
at times, to adopt this principle, but at other times he asserts that the One produces being 
directly, which suggests that the One can produce a multiplicity.537 Aquinas makes no such 
appeal to intermediaries, for he asserts that one simple being can directly produce multiple 
beings, and these multiple beings together reflect the perfection of God.538 Aquinas’s rejection 
of the notion that one simple being can directly produce only one simple being does not 
constitute a direct, abject rejection of Neoplatonic thought, but it does involve Aquinas 
following an under-emphasized aspect of one strain of Neoplatonic thought that seems to 
allow that God can directly produce a multitude of numerically and qualitatively distinct 
beings. 
 What does begin to distinguish Aquinas’s account of emanation from Neoplatonic 
emanation sharply are Aquinas’s treatment of intermediaries and the divine will. Aquinas 
utterly rejects intermediaries in the process of creating ex nihilo by emanating.539 Whereas 
Pseudo-Dionysius had retained intermediaries in his emanative scheme—even a scheme that 
                                               
537 Dionysius [pseud.], Liber de Causis, trans. Taylor, in Taylor, “The Liber de Causis,” 4.1-4, 12, p. 289. 
538 Aquinas, On the Power of God 3.3. 
539 Aquinas, Commentary on the Liber de Causis, proposition 16, p. 107. See also his treatments of propositions 7 
and 9. 
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allows God to produce multiple, qualitatively distinct beings directly—Aquinas rejects a role 
for intermediaries in creative emanation. Aquinas’s account of creative emanation is further 
distanced from Neoplatonic emanation by his insistence that when God emanates, 
producing the celestial and terrestrial realms, God does so by God’s will. Aquinas appeals to 
God’s will and clearly asserts that God has and exercises a will.  
C. Neoplatonic Emanation and Efficient Causation as descriptors of God’s Act 
Both Avicenna and Aquinas demonstrate that they believe these two ways of 
discussing God’s action are important and relevant ways to discuss the origination of the 
universe and what populates it. A relevant question is how, exactly, these ways of talking 
about God’s activity fit together. To examine this, I will consider first how they fit on 
Avicenna’s analysis and then how they fit on Aquinas’s analysis. 
Avicenna makes it clear that it is possible—maybe even desirable—to use the 
language and concepts of efficient causation and Neoplatonic emanation to describe the 
origination of the universe. It seems that Neoplatonic emanation is better able to capture the 
specific causal mechanics of the origination of the universe, and metaphysical efficient 
causation is able to capture the underlying conceptual support for the universe having been 
originated at all. Avicenna clearly finds the mechanics specified by Neoplatonic emanation to 
be helpful in avoiding running afoul both his other closely held (and well argued) 
philosophical beliefs and the Islamic understanding of creation: he can uphold the belief that 
God is the only necessary being as well as the belief that God voluntarily creates the 
universe; God is a simple being that is ultimately responsible for the myriad of qualitatively 
and quantitatively different things in the universe.  
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Aquinas leans the other direction, so to speak, emphasizing God’s role as an efficient 
cause over God’s role as a Neoplatonic emanator. What is important in Aquinas’s 
discussions of creation is being able to show that there can be some act that produces the 
universe and what populates it. It is on this front that metaphysical efficient causation is 
useful to Aquinas in a manner similar to how Neoplatonic emanation was useful to 
Avicenna: it allows Aquinas to explain that God is capable of producing the universe ex 
nihilo. Aquinas adjusts his understanding of emanation to accord with his understanding of 
metaphysical efficient causation, and thus it seems that metaphysical efficient causation is the 
primary way in which Aquinas understands divine creation. 
Ultimately, however, it seems likely that both Avicenna and Aquinas would endorse 
the proposition that Neoplatonic emanation is a species of metaphysical efficient causation. 
Metaphysical efficient causation can be understood as an agent producing something’s being. 
This production of being could be ex nihilo, and Avicenna closely links the preservation of a 
thing’s being with the production of that being, asserting that the agent who truly produces 
something’s being also preserves that thing’s being. For Avicenna, Neoplatonic emanation 
would be a type of efficient causation in which the production involves production by 
procession. God produces the First Intellect through procession, and through 
intermediaries, God produces the universe through procession as well. The Intellects are 
each produced through procession as well. The Giver of Forms is said to emanate the forms 
of newly produced substances—it provides the form to go along with the matter—and this 
is done without any underlying patient; the form is produced by the Giver of Forms and 
joined to the matter, where it inheres.540 Since each of these described instances of 
                                               
540 Avicenna, Metaphysics of the Healing VI.4 p. 202. For an extended discussion, see Kara Richardson, “The 
Metaphysics of Agency: Avicenna and his Legacy,” 68-79. 
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emanation are instances of the production of being and the preservation of being—two 
indicators of Avicenna’s metaphysical efficient causation—it seems that these instances of 
emanation simply are instances of metaphysical efficient causation. Each Neoplatonic 
emanator, then, is also a metaphysical efficient cause.  
Aquinas approaches Neoplatonic emanation differently than Avicenna, but the 
relationship he seems to envision between emanation and metaphysical efficient causation is 
similar to the relationship envisioned by Avicenna. Aquinas reinterprets creative emanation 
to be the voluntary and direct procession of being from God, and this is a production that 
does not require any patient or pre-existing material. When introducing creation in the 
Summa Theologiae,  Aquinas asserts that creation is the emanation of all being by God.541 
Creation, though, is the preeminent example given of an agent causing something ex nihilo, 
so it should perhaps be unsurprising that this creative emanation has the same causal factors 
as metaphysical efficient causation. An agent, who precedes the effect in some way, produces 
something ex nihilo. Aquinas discusses God as a causa agente in his commentary on the Liber de 
Causis in which emanation in the primary method for discussing the production of the 
universe.542 Metaphysical efficient causation and creative emanation can be performed only 
by a fully actualized agent, which means that God is the only agent who can cause in that 
manner. Aquinas seems not to understand there to be a significant difference between 
metaphysical efficient causation and creative emanation—in fact, he seems to think that 
these two terms describe the same type of causation. Creative emanation simply is a type of 
metaphysical efficient causation in which the agent preexists the effect in some way, the 
agent produces something ex nihilo, and this production can be described as a procession. It 
                                               
541 Aquinas, ST Ia.45.1. resp.  
542 Aquinas, Commentary on the Liber de Causis, proposition 26 commentary, p. 144. 
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is important to distinguish, however, that natural emanation—what occurs in the procession 
of the members of the Trinity—is distinct from metaphysical efficient causation insofar as 
the procession of the members of the Trinity is a natural, eternal process that is not, strictly 
speaking, productive of new being. 
IV. Aristotelian Efficient Causation and Neoplatonic Emanation as Creation 
 What must yet be addressed is how, precisely, the causal explanations to which 
Avicenna and Aquinas appeal in their discussions of God creating do or do not align with 
their monotheistic conception of creation. Avicenna and Aquinas both attempt to solve the 
problem of creation by denying any incompatibility between the philosophical theories of 
causation and the monotheistic account of creation. The differences and relative successes in 
their methods of resolving the supposed incompatibilities are explored below. The section 
closes with a discussion of whether Aristotelian efficient causation and Neoplatonic 
emanation can truly be understood as causal explanations for the unique monotheistic 
conception of creating, and in so doing, I respond to some recent challenges raised by 
scholars.  
A. Solving the Problem of Creation 
While both Avicenna and Aquinas address the supposed incompatibilities between each 
philosophical theory and the monotheistic account of creation, I contend that Avicenna 
focuses on the issue of voluntary creation: he presents a Neoplatonic conception of 
emanation in which it is possible for God to emanate voluntarily. I also contend that 
Aquinas focuses on addressing issues of creating ex nihilo: he presents an Aristotelian account 





 I argue that Avicenna’s approach to solving the problem of creation involves him 
focusing primarily upon the issue of voluntary creating. While the main methods used by 
Avicenna when discussing the origins of the universe are rooted in Neoplatonic emanation, 
Avicenna also argues that issues raised by Aristotelian efficient causation suggest that it is 
possible for there to be an efficient cause that acts without a patient. So, Avicenna ultimately 
solves the issues raised by the problem of creation: he argues that Neoplatonic emanation 
can be voluntary, and he argues that Aristotelian efficient causation can be ex nihilo.  
 A potential objection to my assertion that Avicenna solves the problem of creation 
by finding a place for God’s will in emanating is that Avicenna also addresses the issue of 
Aristotelian efficient causation ex nihilo. If Avicenna solves the supposed incompatibilities 
with Aristotelian efficient causation and Neoplatonic emanation, then it seems incorrect to 
argue that Avicenna primarily solves the problem of creation by addressing the issue of 
voluntary creating. This objection relies upon the data I have already presented. 
 In response to this sort of objection, I appeal to Avicenna’s general approach to 
discussions of creation. When Avicenna discusses the origins of the universe in Metaphysics of 
the Healing, he has an extended discussion not of Aristotle’s efficient causation but of 
Neoplatonic emanation. The primary way in which Avicenna discusses how God creates is 
in terms of emanating. Thus, when I assert that Avicenna solves the problem of creation by 
solving the problem of voluntary emanation, I mean that the sharpest problem for Avicenna 
was addressing how his primary means of understanding creating—emanating—could be 
compatible with his theological conception of creating.  
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Also, Avicenna relies upon several non-Aristotelian philosophical influences to 
garner support for his notion that Aristotelian efficient causation must include causation ex 
nihilo. He depends upon philosophical principles that may be latent in Aristotelian thinking 
but that are clearly expressed in Neoplatonic thought—namely, that there is one necessary 
being and that this one necessary being must be indirectly responsible for causing all that 
exists. Avicenna’s main discussions of creating are done in terms of Neoplatonic emanation, 
and components of Neoplatonic thought present in his discussion of Neoplatonic 
emanation affect his understanding of Aristotelian efficient causation as well. Not only does 
Avicenna speak of the mechanics of creating in terms of Neoplatonic emanation, but 
Avicenna also interprets Aristotelian efficient causation in light of Neoplatonic concepts. 
Thus, I argue that while Avicenna does address the purported incompatibilities between 
monotheistic creating and each causal theory, he primarily addresses creation in terms of 
Neoplatonic emanation and sets out primarily to solve the problem of voluntary creation. 
2. Aquinas 
 Aquinas consistently uses the language of efficient causation to describe God 
creating the universe, both in his casual references to divine creation and his more detailed 
analyses of how God created. When discussing creation, Aquinas does not use the language 
of efficient causation exclusively, for he also consistently uses the term ‘emanation’ as a near 
synonym of the term ‘creation’. In his commentary on the Liber de Causis, Aquinas never 
denies that the emanatory scheme described cannot apply to God’s creation, but he similarly 
never endorses the notions that God must create, that God must create by intermediaries, or 
that God does create by intermediaries. So, Aquinas, too, addresses the purported 
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incompatibilities of each philosophical theory and divine creating, arguing that God is an 
efficient cause that creates ex nihilo and that God as an emanator emanates voluntarily. 
 A similar objection to what was raised against Avicenna could be raised here, namely 
that Aquinas addresses the supposed incompatibility of each philosophical theory and divine 
creating rather than simply addressing God as an efficient cause who acts ex nihilo. Since 
Aquinas addresses both theories, it is possible at least that it is wrong to discuss his approach 
as one that is aimed more toward solving one of these incompatibilities. Were Aquinas to 
entirely dismiss talk of creation by emanation, the thesis that Aquinas solves the problem of 
creation by focusing on creation ex nihilo would clearly be correct. Given the fact that 
Aquinas does address creation as emanation as well, the thesis proposed seems not to have 
been proven. 
 I argue that Aquinas primarily addresses the issue of how God can create ex nihilo 
rather than how God can create voluntarily for several reasons. First, Aquinas does address 
whether God acts voluntarily, but interestingly, he never addresses this question specifically 
within the context of emanation (unlike Avicenna, who addresses the voluntariness of God’s 
actions both within and without the context of emanation). One must presume that God 
would emanate by will, for anything God does, God does by will.543  
Furthermore, when Aquinas goes into detail addressing issues surrounding creation, 
a question he addresses explicitly and with great detail is whether the universe is produced ex 
nihilo. According to Aquinas, it is both the case that Christian theology teaches this and the 
case that philosophical reasoning teaches this: God producing the universe ex nihilo is a 
                                               
543 More importantly, Aquinas’s discussion of God emanating because God is good occur within the context of 
final causation rather than efficient causation, suggesting that Aquinas’s primary usage of the language of 
emanation is tied to his understanding of the goal of all created things to return to God and be as much like 
God as possible. See Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles I.37. 
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possible explanation for the origins of the universe in Aquinas’s estimation, and since 
Aquinas denies that an actual infinite chain is possible, it seems that he production of the 
world ex nihilo is likely the best explanation in Aquinas’s estimation (though God creating ex 
nihilo is a matter of faith for Aquinas). His focus in discussions of creation is not to 
demonstrate that God creates by will but instead to demonstrate that God creates ex nihilo.  
Additionally, Aquinas’s understanding of emanation seems to have been influenced 
by his understanding of Aristotelian efficient causation. In his commentary on the Liber de 
Causis, for example, Aquinas appeals to God as a causa agente—an efficient cause—when 
discussing God’s emanation.544 Whereas the distinction between necessary and non-
necessary beings is essential to Avicenna’s understanding of creation, Aquinas instead 
employs the distinction between fully actualized beings and non-fully actualized beings.545 
Even when discussing creating in terms of emanating, Aquinas makes use of Aristotelian 
concepts to elucidate emanating. The philosophical theory that Aquinas uses to understand 
other philosophical theories is Aristotle’s philosophy, which strongly suggests that Aquinas 
approaches solving philosophical problems primarily through the lens of Aristotelian 
philosophy. Thus, it is the case that Aquinas addresses both philosophical theories in the 
context of creating, but he spends much of his time addressing and solving the issue of 
creation ex nihilo in terms of Aristotelian efficient causation. 
B. Application to discussions of Creation 
 A remaining objection to address is whether either Aristotelian efficient causation 
without patients or Neoplatonic voluntary emanation apply to the monotheistic conception 
of creation. In his article on the religious doctrine of creation and conservation in the Concise 
                                               
544 Aquinas, Commentary on the Liber de Causis, proposition 11 commentary, p. 85. 
545 Aquinas, ST Ia. Questions 3-11; Summa Contra Gentiles I questions 14-28 and 37-48. 
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Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, W. Hasker contrasts creation, which involves an act of will 
on God’s part, and emanation, which does not involve an act of God’s will.546 David Burrell 
draws attention to this common way of discussing creating in his Freedom and Creation in Three 
Traditions, noting that creation is free while emanation is necessary.547 So, it seems that it is fair, 
at least, to seek to confirm that the accounts of God’s causing the existence of the universe 
do indeed align with the monotheistic account of creation described in chapter one. In so 
doing, another benefit of this study will be revealed: the explication of Avicenna’s and 
Aquinas’s theories of divine causation in producing the universe helps answer questions 
regarding the nature of creating. This study helps to resolve a dispute between Richard 
Taylor and Michael Chase regarding whether emanation has historically been understood as 
creating. 
1. Creation and Emanation 
 Hasker’s (relatively common) approach to understanding creation and emanation 
relies on three premises: first, that emanation does not involve an act of will; second, that 
monotheistic accounts of creation do involve an act of will; and third, that necessity and 
volition are incompatible. In response to Hasker’s definition of creation as involving God’s 
will, Taylor surveys the Liber de Causis and some of Aquinas’s comments on creation to 
suggest that Hasker’s approach is misguided. Taylor’s response to Hasker’s definition and 
Chase’s response to Taylor help clarify some central issues in the debate about whether 
                                               
546 William Hasker, “Creation and Conservation, Religious Doctrine of”, in Concise Routledge Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (London: Routledge, 2000), 180.. 
547 David Burrell, Freedom and Creation in Three Traditions (Notre Dame: Notre Dame, 1993), 8-9. Elsewhere, 
Burrell challenges the notion that this standard way of approaching the issue of creation is the proper way to 
approach the issue. See his “Creation and ‘Actualism’: The Dialectical Dimension of Philosophical Theology,” 
in Faith and Freedom: An Interfaith Perspective (Malden: Blackwell, 2007), 27. 
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Avicenna’s and Aquinas’s accounts of God’s causing the existence of the universe are 
accounts of God creating. 
 Hasker’s definition presumes—or requires—that the answer is no. However, as a 
historical matter, Hasker’s definition is too presumptive. Taylor argues that the production 
of the universe described in Liber de Causis is indeed a creation account (and that Aquinas 
treats it as such).548 The claim that the emanatory scheme described in Liber de Causis is 
creation is questioned by Michael Chase, who raises several objections to interpreting 
emanation as creation, three of which are important in light of the question regarding 
whether Avicenna’s and Aquinas’s accounts of God’s causation in producing the universe 
are accounts of God creating. First, Chase mentions the problem of free creation in light of 
Taylor’s insistence that emanation is the transcendentally necessary production of being. If 
emanation is necessary, then God does not have the ability to do otherwise, and, Chase 
suggests, God does not create freely.549 Second, Chase notes that Christians have long 
endorsed the belief that God exists before the universe in terms of ontological priority and in 
                                               
548 In the context of Hasker’s definitions, Taylor primarily argues that the Liber de Causis discusses the 
origination of the universe in terms of creation but does not include any statements whatsoever about the 
emanation by which the universe is produced occurring by God’s will. Additionally, he notes that Aquinas gives 
two conditions for creating, and neither of these conditions is that God will to create. Instead, creation must 
occur ex nihilo, and the creator must be ontologically prior to that which is created (Aquinas, In 2 Sent. d.1 q.1. 
a.2 resp; Taylor, “Primary Causation,” 132). Taylor further challenges the premise that necessity and volition 
are incompatible by clarifying what sort of necessity applies to traditional Neoplatonic conceptions of 
emanation. Necessity in emanating is a transcendent necessity—by virtue of existing, the One emanates. Taylor 
distinguishes this from the internal necessity (which does not apply to the One because the One is above 
existence and does not have a form) and external necessity (which does not apply to the One because the One 
is not bound by anything outside itself). Taylor concludes that emanation as described in the Liber de Causis 
certainly is considered to be creation by Aquinas regardless of the facts that emanating does not involve God’s 
will in the Liber de Causis and that God’s emanation is subject to transcendent necessity in the Liber de Causis 
(Taylor, “Primary Causation,” 135). Neither the lack of discussion of the role of God’s will nor the implicit 
denial that God creates without any necessity—which is how Hasker seems to be understanding free 
creation—deter Taylor from concluding that emanation would have been classed as creation by Aquinas and, 
historically, many other monotheists. 
549 Michael Chase, “Abrahamic Creation and Neoplatonic Emanation in Greek, Arabic, and Latin: Reflections 
on a recent paper by Richard Taylor,” 3. 
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terms of temporal priority.550 While Chase focuses on Christian beliefs in this criticism, this 
claim can be applied to Muslims as well.551 Third, Chase notes that it is difficult to address 
whether God acts by will or whether God must create because of the penchant 
Neoplatonists have for asserting that God is above existence or above perfection. Strictly 
speaking, Chase argues, it is incorrect for Taylor to assert that the One needs to do anything 
because it does not have needs. Additionally, Neoplatonists clearly assert that if the One has 
a will, it is not like a human will; this statement, however, does not mean that Neoplatonists 
deny that the One has a will at all.552 Chase supposes that these three issues must be 
addressed before conceding that the emanation described in the Liber de Causis is creation. 
2. Creation and Emanation in Avicenna and Aquinas 
 Chase’s response to Taylor raises several important issues for considering whether 
Avicenna and Aquinas present accounts of emanation that fit with the monotheistic 
conception of creation. Chase mentions free creation, aspects of temporal priority, and 
aspects of the supra conception of the One, particularly issues of the One’s will. These issues, 
in turn, are problematic, as addressed below. These issues appear in Avicenna’s and 
Aquinas’s accounts, and it is helpful to briefly review how each deals with these issues. 
a. Avicenna 
 Avicenna does contend that God’s emanation that results in the existence of the 
universe is a voluntary emanation but that God could not do otherwise; this, in itself, is not 
enough information to assert that Avicenna denies God’s free creation. The reason, 
however, why God could not do otherwise is because God could not will otherwise. 
                                               
550 Chase, 4. 
551 Take, for example, the arguments between Ghazali and Averroës regarding Avicenna’s account of creation. 
Ghazali represents a strong contingent of Muslim theologians who endorsed the view that Allah was 
ontologically and temporally prior to the universe.  
552 Chase, 6-7. 
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Avicenna emphasizes the willed aspect of creating being a free act of God’s. To assert that 
Avicenna denies that God creates freely is to adopt a particular understanding of freedom—
namely, that freedom requires the choice between alternatives. This understanding of free 
action is not the only understanding available, and a common alternative understanding of 
free action is that any action is free should the agent consent to this action. Under this 
compatibilist understanding of freedom, Avicenna’s account is clearly an account of God’s 
free creation.  
 When discussing the age of the universe, Avicenna contends that the universe is 
sempiternal, which means that it has existed as long as God has existed but that it is 
ontologically dependent upon God. Chase’s discussion of temporal priority assumes that 
sempiternity must not be considered compatible with God creating; this issue is a point of 
discussion and disagreement among Muslim (and Christian) theologians, but Chase assumes 
intellectual uniformity on this point. Furthermore, his approach to temporal priority assumes 
a particular relationship between God, time, and the universe. For God to have temporal 
priority, God must exist in time with the universe. This view of God’s relation to time is 
contested—even within the medieval period—and thus it seems best not to include temporal 
priority as a component of creating.553 
 In Avicenna’s account of emanation, he does speak at times of God as though God 
were beyond perfection or beyond being. Avicenna’s account of God’s will fits well with 
what Chase suggests about any Neoplatonic account of God’s will, for Avicenna explains 
that God’s will is not like human will. Thus, he contrasts God’s willing with human willing. 
                                               
553 See, for example, Richard Sorabji’s Time, Creation, and the Continuum: Theories in Antiquity and the Early Middle 
Ages in which Sorabji surveys historical approaches to the relationship between God and time. He also 
addresses issues regarding God’s relationship to creation with regard to time. In Time and Eternity: Exploring 
God's Relationship to Time by William Lane Craig, Craig provides an overview of the different approaches to 
God’s relation to time.  
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Avicenna’s discussion of God’s will is not severely hampered by the Neoplatonic tendency 
to emphasize the otherness of the One. 
b. Aquinas 
 Aquinas, like Avicenna, seems at times to imply that God could not do otherwise 
than create. Aquinas says that God could have created other things or that God could have 
gone about the order of creating in a different manner. God does not will things other than 
God necessarily but instead brings about the existence of other beings as a result of divine 
volition.554 When considering whether God’s volition to create is free, Aquinas discusses 
such freedom in terms of a lack of internal or external constraints, and he finds that God has 
no such constraints. Aquinas, then, uses a different standard for freedom than the ability to 
choose from among options.555 While Aquinas’s account may not include a robust view of 
freedom—that of an agent choosing between viable alternatives, namely to create or not to 
create—Aquinas would have considered his account to be one of a generous God who freely 
and volitionally creates.  
Regarding temporal priority, Aquinas does not endorse the Avicennian sempiternity 
of the universe. Avicenna and Aquinas differ in this regard, for Avicenna believes that the 
immutability of God’s will entails that God must emanate the universe as long as God exists. 
Aquinas believes that God can will to delay God’s action, meaning that it is possible that 
God could be the only being in existence at some point. As Taylor notes, Aquinas mentions 
but does not endorse the view that creation entails temporal priority on God’s part in his 
commentary on the Sentences. Aquinas asserts that it is an article of faith that God existed 
                                               
554 Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles I.81. 
555 See Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles II.28 & 29; On the Power of God 3.16. 
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alone, so he does not add it to his definition of creation in the Sentences.556 Furthermore, it is 
the case that issues of temporal priority in creation depend upon a certain understanding of 
God’s relation to time—and precisely how God relates to time has been a long-standing 
debate among theists.557 
 Finally, Aquinas at times discusses God as being above being or above perfection as 
well, but like Avicenna, he is still able to hold robust discussions of God’s nature and being 
in light of these claims. Regarding God’s will, as mentioned above, Aquinas does not 
specifically discuss God’s will when Aquinas discusses emanating. Though this seems to be 
largely because Aquinas has already settled the issue, arguing that God’s will is involved in 
whatever God does, it is perhaps somewhat telling that Aquinas does not feel the need to 
defend a role for God’s will in emanating given the lack of discussion of God’s will in the 
Liber de Causis. Aquinas does not specify that God’s will is involved in emanating, but he 
argues passionately against (what he takes to be) Avicenna’s position that God’s will is not 
involved in emanating in his On the Power of God.558 Aquinas, like Avicenna, asserts that God’s 
will is not like human will, but he manages to discuss God’s will nonetheless.559 
c. Emanation can properly be termed a type of Creating 
 The assumptions Chase articulates regarding creating, which seem to preclude that 
emanating could be creating, are flawed. Close examination suggests that two of Chase’s 
critiques of understanding emanating as creating rely upon other philosophical assumptions 
that must be justified, for there are multiple understandings of freedom and of God’s 
relation to time. Avicenna and Aquinas are able to explain how God’s will is involved in the 
                                               
556 Aquinas, In 2 Sent. d.1 q.1. a.2 resp; Taylor, “Primary Causation,” 132. 
557 Again, see for example Richard Sorabji’s Time, Creation, and the Continuum: Theories in Antiquity and the Early 
Middle Ages. 
558 Aquinas, On the Power of God 3.15. 
559 Aquinas, ST Ia.19. 
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creative act and how God’s decision to create involves God’s agency (rather than simply 
being a side effect of God’s brute existence). The umbrella of creating, described in chapter 
one, is certainly broad enough to include both Avicenna’s and Aquinas’s account of God’s 
emanating. 
C. Creating is Efficiently Causing 
 The thesis that God producing the universe via efficient causation is not challenged 
in the disagreement between Taylor and Chase, but it is still important to clarify whether 
metaphysical efficient causation meets the requirements of creating. Because an efficient 
cause can be voluntary or natural (and Avicenna and Aquinas explain that God acts 
voluntarily), metaphysical efficient causation clearly meets this requirement. As noted above, 
God is ontologically prior to the universe, and thus metaphysical efficient causation meets 
this requirement of creating as well. Whether metaphysical efficient causation is creating, 
then, seems to depend upon whether it can occur ex nihilo. While both Avicenna and 
Aquinas discuss some metaphysical efficient causes that conserve rather than create (or in 
addition to creating, in some instances), it is true that not every instance of metaphysical 
efficient causation would be creating. However, because metaphysical efficient causation can 
occur ex nihilo, it is possible that it can be creating.  
V. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have addressed the importance of Avicenna’s and Aquinas’s 
answers to the problem of creation for the metaphysics of causation. Understanding how 
Avicenna and Aquinas answer the problem of creation entails understanding what causes 
each believe exist. Avicenna and Aquinas both speak in terms of metaphysical efficient 
causation and emanation, and it is significant that both believe these types of causation to be 
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closely related. It is also important to note that despite these similarities between these types 
of causation, neither entirely subsumes the language of one type of causation under the 
language of another type. Avicenna and Aquinas each seem to believe that something 
important is preserved by holding onto language and concepts associated with each sort of 
cause. Similarly, this study reveals that it is grossly inaccurate to attempt to characterize 
either Avicenna or Aquinas as purely Aristotelian or purely Neoplatonic thinkers. Certain 
aspects of their philosophical thought—including their explications of causation—may be 
more or less Aristotelian or Neoplatonic, but even in such aspects, the two philosophical 




































Acar, Rahim. “Avicenna’s Position Concerning the Basis of Divine Creative Action.” The 
Muslim World  94 (2004): 65-79. 
---. “Creation: Avicenna’s Metaphysical Account.” In Creation and the God of Abraham, eds. 
David Burrell, Carlo Cogliati, and Janet Soskice, 77-90. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010.  
---. Talking about God and Talking about Creation: Avicenna’s and Thomas Aquinas’s Positions. Vol. 
58. Islamic Philosophy Theology and Science: Texts and Studies. Edited by H. Daiber and D. 
Pingree. Boston: Brill, 2005. 
Adamson, Peter. The Arabic Plotinus: A Philosophical Study of the Theology of Aristotle. London: 
Duckworth, 2002. 
---.“Before Essence and Existence: al-Kindi’s Conception of Being.” Journal of the History of 
Philosophy 40 (2002): 297-312. 
Al-Athari, ‘Abdullāh ibn ‘Abdul-Hamīd. Islamic Beliefs: A Brief Introduction to the ‘Aqīdah of Ahl 
as-Sunnah wal-Jamā‘ah. Translated by Nasiruddin al-Khattāb. Riyadh: International 
Islamic Publishing House, 2005. 
Al-Farabi, Abū Naṣr Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad. Kitab as-siyasat al-madaniyya al mulaqqab bi-
Mabadi; al-mawjudat. Edited by F. Najjar. Beruit: Imprimerie Catholique, 1964. 
---. On the Perfect State: Abu Nasr Al-Farabi’s Mabadi’ ara’ ahl al-medina al-fadila. Translated by R. 
Walzer. Oxford: Oxford, 1985.  
---. The Political Regime. Translated by Fauzi M. Najjar. In Medieval Philosophy: A Sourcebook. 
Edited by Muhsin Mahdi. 31-57. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972. 
Aquinas. Aquinas on Creation: Writings on the “Sentences” of Peter Lombard 2.1.1. Translated by 
Steven Baldner and William Carroll. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval 
Studies, 1997. 
---. Commentary on the Book of Causes. Translated by Vincent Guagliardo, Charles Hess, and 
Richard Taylor. Washington: Catholic University of America, 1996. 
204 
 
---. De aeternitate mundi. Edited by Robert Busa, SJ. http: 
//www.corpusthomisticum.org/ocm.html (accessed July 24, 2013).  
---. De Principiis Naturae. Edited by Robert Busa, SJ. http: 
//www.corpusthomisticum.org/opn.html (accessed July 24, 2013). 
---. The Divisions and Methods of the Sciences: Questions V and VI of his Commentary on the De 
Trinitate of Boethius. Translated by Armand Maurer. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of 
Mediaeval Studies, 1986. 
---. Exposition of Aristotle’s Treatise on the Heavens. Book I. Translated by R. F. Larcher and 
Pierre Conway. Colombus: College of St. Mary of the Springs, 1963.  
---. Exposition of Aristotle’s Treatise on the Heavens. Book II-III. Translated by R. F. Larcher and 
Pierre Conway. Columbus: College of St. Mary of the Springs, 1964.  
---. Faith, Reason, and Theology: Questions I-IV of his Commentary on the De Trinitate of Boethius. 
Translated by Armand Maurer. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 
1987. 
---. In Libros Physicorum. Edited by Robert Busa, SJ. http: 
//www.corpusthomisticum.org/cpy03.html (accessed July 24, 2013).  
---. In Librum Beati Dionysii De Divinis Nominibus Expositio. Rome: Marietti, 1950. 
---. On the Eternity of the World. In St. Thomas Aquinas, Siger of Brabant, St. Bonaventure On the 
Eternity of the World. Translated by Cyril Vollert, Lottie Kendzierski, and Paul Byrne. 
Milwaukee: Marquette University, 1964. 
---. On the Power of God. Translated by the English Dominican Fathers. London: Burns, Oates, 
& Washbourne, 1932. 
---. On the Principles of Nature. In Selected Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas. Translated by Robert 
Goodwin. New York: Macmillan, 1965. 
---. Quaestiones Disputatae de Potentia. Edited by Robert Busa, SJ. http: 
//www.corpusthomisticum.org/qdp1.html (accessed July 24, 2013).  
---. Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritate. Edited by Robert Busa, SJ. http: 
//www.corpusthomisticum.org/qdv27.html (accessed July 24, 2013).  
---. Sancti Thomae de Aquino Expositio super librum Boethii de Trinitate. Edited by B. Decker. 
Leiden: Brill, 1959. 
---. Scriptum super Sententiis. Edited by Robert Busa, SJ. http: 
//www.corpusthomisticum.org/snp2001.html (accessed July 24, 2013). 
205 
 
---. Sententia libri Metaphysicae. Edited by Robert Busa, SJ. http: 
//www.corpusthomisticum.org/cmp05.html (accessed July 24, 2013). 
---. Summa Contra Gentiles. Edited by Robert Busa, SJ. http: 
//www.corpusthomisticum.org/scg1001.html (accessed July 24, 2013).  
---. Summa Contra Gentiles. Translated by James F. Anderson. South Bend: University of 
Notre Dame, 1956. 
---. Summa Theologiae. Edited by Robert Busa, SJ. http: 
//www.corpusthomisticum.org/sth0000.html (accessed July 24, 2013).  
---. Summa Theologiae. Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Allen: 
Christian Classics, 1981. 
Aristotle. Metaphysics. In The Complete Works of Aristotle. Edited by Jonathan Barnes. Vol. 2. 
Translated by J.A. Smith and W.D. Ross. Princeton: Princeton University, 1984.  
---. On Generation and Corruption. In The Complete Works of Aristotle. Edited by Jonathan Barnes. 
Vol. 1. Translated by J.A. Smith and W.D. Ross. Princeton: Princeton University, 
1984. 
---. Physics. In The Complete Works of Aristotle. Edited by Jonathan Barnes. Vol. 1. Translated by 
J.A. Smith and W.D. Ross. Princeton: Princeton University, 1984. 
Asclepius. In Metaphysica. Edited by M Hayduck. Berlin: 1888. 
Avicenna. Liber Primus Naturalium de Causis et Principiis Naturalium. Translated by Simone Van 
Riet. Leiden: Peeters & Brill, 1982. 
---. Liber de Philosophia prima Sive Scientia Divina. I-IV, V-X. Edited by Simone Van Riet. 
Leiden: Peeters & Brill, 1980. 
---. Metaphysica. In The Metaphysica of Avicenna: A critical translation-commentary and analysis of the 
fundamental arguments in Avicenna’s Metaphysica in the Danish Nama-i ‘ala’i. Translated 
by Peter Morewedge. New York: Colombia, 1973. 
---. The Metaphysics of the Healing. Translated by Michael Marmura. Provo: Brigham Young 
University, 2005. 
---. The Physics of the Healing. Translated by Jon McGinnis. Provo: Brigham Young University, 
2009. 
---. Ta‘līqāt. Edited by Abdularahman Badawi. Iran: Miktab al-Ilam al-Islami, 1983, 103, 180. 
Translated and quoted in Rahim Acar, Talking about God and Talking about Creation: 
Avicenna’s and Thomas Aquinas’s Positions, Vol. 58, Islamic Philosophy Theology and Science: 
Texts and Studies, Edited by H. Daiber and D. Pingree, 144. Boston: Brill, 2005. 
206 
 
Barnes, Jonathan. Aristotle. New York: Oxford, 1982. 
Barth, Karl. Doctrine of Creation. Volume 3 of Church Dogmatics. Edinburg: T&T Clark, 1958. 
Bechler, Zev. Aristotle’s Theory of Actuality. New York: SUNY, 1995.  
Bertolacci, Amos. The Reception of Aristotle’s Metaphysics in Avicenna’s Kitāb al-Šifā: A Milestone 
of Western Metaphysical Thought. Vol. 63. Islamic Philosophy Theology and Science: Texts and 
Studies. Edited by H. Daiber. Boston: Brill, 2006. 
Bonin, Therese. Creation as Emanation: the Origin of Diversity in Albert the Great's On the Causes 
and the Procession of the Universe. South Bend: Notre Dame, 2001. 
Booth, Edward. Aristotelian Aporetic Ontology in Islamic and Christian Thinkers. New York: 
Cambridge, 1983.  
Burrell, David. “Aquinas’s Appropriation of Liber de Causis to Articulate the Creator as 
Cause-of-Being.” In Contemplating Aquinas: On the Varieties of Interpretation, edited by 
Fergus Kerr, 75-84. London: SCM, 2003.  
---. Faith and Freedom: An Interfaith Perspective. Malden: Blackwell, 2007.  
---. Freedom and Creation in Three Traditions. Notre Dame: Notre Dame Press, 1993. 
Chase, Michael. “Abrahamic Creation and Neoplatonic Emanation in Greek, Arabic, and 
Latin: Reflections on a recent paper by Richard Taylor.” Paper presented at Aquinas 
and the Arabs conference, Paris, France, May 31, 2012. http: 
//academic.mu.edu/taylorr/AAP_Papers/Chase_Paris_31_May_2012.html 
(accessed April 1, 2013). 
Colish, Marcia. “Avicenna’s Theory of Efficient Causation and its Influence on St. Thomas 
Aquinas.” [Previously published in Tommaso d’Aquino nel suo settimo centenario. 
Atti del congress internazionale, Roma-Napoli, 17-24 aprile 1974, I: Tomasso 
d’Aquino nella storia del pensiero. Napoii: Edizioni Domenicane Italiane, 1975, pp. 
296-306.] Studies in Scholasticism. Burlington: Ashgate, 2006. 
Corrigan, Kevin. Reading Plotinus: A Practical Introduction to Neoplatonism. West Lafayette: 
Purdue University, 2004. 
Craig, William Lane. Time and Eternity: Exploring God's Relationship to Time. Wheaton, IL: 
Crossway, 2001. 
Davis, Leo Donald. The First Seven Ecumenical Councils (325-787): Their History and Theology. 
Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 1983. 
de Rijk, L.M. “Causation and Participation in Proclus: The Pivotal Role of Scope and 
Distinction in his Metaphysics.” In On Proclus and his Influence in Medieval Philosophy, 
edited by E. P. Bos and P. A. Meijer, 1-34. New York: Brill, 1992. 
207 
 
Dionysius [pseud.]. The Book of Causes. Translated by Dennis Brand. Milwaukee: Marquette, 
1984. 
Dionysius [pseud.]. Liber de Causis. Translated by Richard Taylor. In The Liber de Causis: A 
study of Medieval Neoplatonism. Ph.D. diss., University of Toronto, 1981. 
Doolan, Gregory T. “The Causality of the Divine Ideas in Relation to Natural Agents,” 
International Philosophical Quarterly 44 (2004): 393-409. 
Elders, Leo. Faith and Science: An Introduction to St. Thomas’s Expositio in Boethii de Trinitate. 
Rome: Herder, 1974. 
Emery, G. La Trinité Créatrice: Trinité et création dans les commentaires aux Sentences de Thomas 
d’Aquin et de ses précurseurs Albert le Grand et Bonaventure. Paris : Librairie Philosophique, 
1995. 
Enuma Elish. In Myths from Mesopotamia: Creation, the Flood, Gilgamesh, and Others. Translated by 
Stephanie Dalley, 228-277. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009. 
Fakhry, Majid. Averroes, Aquinas, and the Rediscovery of Aristotle in Western Europe. Occasional 
Paper Series. Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding. Washington: Georgetown, 
1997. 
Gaskill, Thomas. “Ibn Sina’s Ontology in his Danishnama ‘ala'i: ” Ph.D. diss., Vanderbilt 
University, 1992.  
Gerson, Lloyd. “Plotinus’s Metaphysics: Emanation or Creation?” Review of Metaphysics 46 
(1993): 559-574. 
Grenz, Stanley. Theology for the Community of God. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing 
Company, 1994. 
Hankey, Wayne. “Ab Uno Simplici non est nisi Unum: The Place of Natural and Necessary 
Emanation in Aquinas’s Doctrine of Creation.” In Divine Creation in Ancient, Medieval, 
and Early Modern Thought: Essays Presented to the Revered Dr. Robert D. Crouse, edited by 
Michael Treschow, et. al., 309-333. Leiden: Brill, 2007. 
Hardy, Paul. “Response to Ormsby’s ‘Creation in Time and Islamic Thought.’” In God and 
Creation: An Ecumenical Symposium, edited by David Burrell, 265-275. Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1990. 
Hasker, William. “Creation and Conservation, the Religious Doctrine of.” In Concise Routledge 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 180. London: Routledge, 2000. 
Janssens, Jules. “Creation and Emanation in Ibn Sina.” In Ibn Sina and his Influence on the 
Arabic and Latin World, 455-477. Burlington: Ashgate, 2006.  
Johnson, Ransome. Aristotle on Teleology. Oxford: Clarendon, 2005. 
208 
 
Kretzmann, Norman. The Metaphysics of Creation: Aquinas’s Natural Theology in Summa Contra 
Gentiles II. New York: Oxford, 1998. 
Kretzmann, Norman. “A General Problem of Creation.” In Being and Goodness, edited by 
Scott MacDonald, 215-223. Ithaca: Cornell, 1991.  
---. “Goodness, Knowledge, and Indeterminacy in the Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas,” in 
Journal of Philosophy 80.10 (1983) 631-638.  
---. “The Metaphysics of Providence.” Medieval Philosophy and Theology 9: 2 (Fall 2000): 91-104. 
---. The Metaphysics of Theism. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997. 
Lettinck, Paul. Aristotle’s Physics and its reception in the Arabic world. New York: Brill, 1994. 
Lizzini, Olga. “The Relation between Form and Matter: Some Brief Observations on the 
‘Homology Argument’ (Ilahiyat II.40) and the Deduction of Fluxus.” In Interpreting 
Avicenna: Science and Philosophy in Medieval Islam: Proceedings of the Second Conference of the 
Avicenna Study Group, edited by John McGinnis, 175-188. Boston: Brill, 2004.  
Lloyd, A.C. The Anatomy of Neoplatonism. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998.  
Marmura, Michael. “Avicenna on the Division of the Sciences in the Isagoge of his Shifa,” 
Journal for the History of Arabic Science 4.2 (1980): 239-51. 
---. “The Metaphysics of Efficient Causality in Avicenna (Ibn Sina).” In Islamic Theology and 
Philosophy: Studies in Honor of George F. Hourani, edited by Michael Marmura, 172-187. 
New York: SUNY, 1984.  
---. “Some Aspects of Avicenna’s Theory of God’s Knowledge of Particulars.” Journal of the 
American Oriental Society 82.3 (1962): 121-138 . 
Marrone, Stephen. “Medieval Philosophy in Context.” In Cambridge Companion to Medieval 
Philosophy, edited by A. S. McGrade, 10-50. New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2003.  
May, Gerhard. Creatio ex nihilo: the doctrine of 'Creation out of Nothing' in early Christian Thought. 
Translated by A.S. Worrall. London: T&T Clark International, 2004. 
McGinnis, Jon. Avicenna. Great Medieval Thinkers. Edited by Brian Davies. New York: 
Oxford, 2010. 
McGinnis, Jon and David Reisman, eds. Classical Arabic Philosophy: An Anthology of Sources. 
Indianapolis: Hackett, 2007. 
Meehan, Francis. Efficient causality in Aristotle and St. Thomas. Washington: CUA, 1940.  
209 
 
Mondin, Battista. St. Thomas Aquinas’s Philosophy in the Commentary to the Sentences. Belgium: 
Springer, 1975. 
Morewedge, Parviz. The Metaphysica of Avicenna: A critical translation-commentary and analysis of 
the fundamental arguments in Avicenna’s Metaphysica in the Danish Nama-i ‘ala’i. New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1973. 
---. Neoplatonism and Islamic Thought. New York: SUNY, 1992. 
Muller, Earl. “Real Relations and the Divine: Issues in Thomas’s Understanding of God’s 
Relation to the World.” Theological Studies 56 (1995): 673-695. 
Nasr, Seyyed Hossein. An Introduction to Islamic Cosmological Doctrines. Cambridge: Belknap 
Press, 1964.  
O’Meara, Dominic. Plotinus: An Introduction to the Enneads. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993. 
Ormsby, Eric. “Creation in Time and Islamic Thought.” In God and Creation: An Ecumenical 
Symposium, edited by David Burrell, 246-264. Notre Dame: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1990.  
O’Rourke, Fran. “Aquinas and Platonism.” In Contemplating Aquinas: On the Varieties of 
Interpretation, edited by Fergus Kerr, 247-279. London: SCM, 2003.  
---. Pseudo-Dionysius and the Metaphysics of Aquinas. New York: Brill, 1992.  
Peghaire, Julien. “L’Axiome ‘Bonum est diffusivum sui’ dans le néo-platonisme et le 
thomisme.” Revue de l’Université d’Ottowa (1932): 5-30. 
Plotinus. The Enneads. Translated by Stephen Mackenna and Bertram Samuel Page. London: 
Penguin, 1991. 
Proclus. Elements of Theology. Translated by Erick Robertson Dodds. New York: Clarendon 
Press, 1992. 
---. Platonic Theology. Edited by H. Saffrey and L. Westerink. Paris: 1968. 
The Qur'an Translation. Translated by Abdullah Yusuf Ali. Edited by Sayed A. A. Razwy. New 
York: Tahrke Tarsile Qur’an, 2001. 
Rahman, Fazlur. “Ibn Sina’s Theory of the God-World Relationship.” In God and Creation: 
An Ecumenical Symposium, edited by David Burrell, 38-52. Notre Dame: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1990.  
Remes, Paulina. Neoplatonism. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008.  
Richardson, Kara. “The Metaphysics of Agency: Avicenna and his Legacy.” Ph.D. diss., 
University of Toronto, 2008. 
210 
 
Rota, Michael. “Causation.” In The Oxford Handbook of Thomas Aquinas, edited by Brian 
Davies and Eleonore Stump, 104-115. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013. 
Rota, Michael. “Causation in Contemporary Metaphysics and in the Thought of Thomas 
Aquinas.” Ph.D. diss., St. Louis University, 2006. 
Smith, Gerard. “Avicenna and the Possibles.” New Scholasticism 17 (1943): 340-57. Reprinted 
in Ibn Sina and the Western Tradition: Texts and Studies, Vol 4. Edited by Fuat Sezgin. 
318-335. Frankfurt: Institute for the History of Arabic-Islamic Science at the Johann 
Wolfgang Goethe University, 1999.  
Siecienski, Edward. The Filioqe: History of a Doctrinal Controversy. New York: Oxford, 2009. 
Sokolowski, Robert. The God of Faith and Reason: Foundations of Christian Theology. Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame, 1982. 
Sorabji, Richard. Time, Creation, and the Continuum: Theories in Antiquity and the Early Middle 
Ages. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006. 
Soskice, Janet M. “Creatio ex nihilo: its Jewish and Christian Foundations.” In Creation and the 
God of Abraham, edited by David Burrell, et. al., 24-39. New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010.  
Taylor, Richard C. “Aquinas, the Plotiniana Arabica, and the Metaphysics of Being and 
Actuality.” Journal of the History of Ideas 59 (1998): 241-264. 
---. The Liber de Causis: A study of Medieval Neoplatonism. Ph.D. diss., University of Toronto, 
1981. 
---. “Primary Causality and ibdā‘ (creare) in the Liber de causis,” Wahrheit und Geschichte. Die 
gebrochene Tradition metaphhyischen Denkens. Festschrift zum 7-. Geburtstag von 
Günther Mensching, hrsg. Alia Mensching-Estakhr and Michael Städtler (Würzburg: 
Königshausen & Neumann, 2012), 127-129. 
Te Velde, Rudi. Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas. New York: Brill, 1995. 
Theophilus. Apology to Autolycus II.10. Translated by Marcus Dods. http: 
//www.logoslibrary.org/theophilus/autolycus/index.html (accessed July 24, 2013). 
Wagner, Michael. Neoplatonism and Nature: Studies in Plotinus’ Enneads. New York: SUNY, 
2001. 
Wallace, William. “Aquinas on the Temporal Relation between Cause and Effect.” Review of 
Metaphysics 27.3 Commemorative Issue: Thomas Aquinas 1224-1274 (1974): 569-584. 
Weisheipl, James. “The Commentary of St. Thomas on the De Caelo of Aristotle.” In 
Thomas Aquinas: Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives, edited by Brian Davies, 37-60. 
New York: Oxford, 2002.  
211 
 
Wilberding, James. Plotinus’ Cosmology: A Study of Ennead II.1. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2006.  
Wippel, John. Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas. Vol. 10. Studies in Philosophy and the 
History of Philosophy. Washington: Catholic University of America, 1984. 
---. Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas II. Vol. 47. Studies in Philosophy and the History of 
Philosophy. Washington: Catholic University of America, 2007. 
---. The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas: From Finite Being to Uncreated Being. Washington: 
Catholic University of America Press, 2000. 
---. “Norman Kretzmann on Aquinas’s Attribution of Will and Freedom to Create to God.” 
Religious Studies 39.3 (2003): 287-298. 
---. “Thomas Aquinas on the Distinction and Derivation of the Many from the One: A 
Dialectic Between Being and Nonbeing.” The Review of Metaphysics 38 (1985): 563-590. 
---. “Thomas Aquinas on Creatures as Causes of Esse” International Philosophical Quarterly 40 
(2000): 197-213. 
---. “Thomas Aquinas on the Ultimate Question why there is Anything at all rather than 
Nothing Whatsoever.” Review of Metaphysics 60.4 (2007): 731-753. 
Wisnovsky, Robert. Avicenna’s Metaphysics in Context. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003. 
Wright, John Hickey. The Order of the Universe in the Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas. Rome: 
Gregorian University, 1957.  
Zelder, Beatrice. “St. Thomas Aquinas and Avicenna in the ‘De Potentia Dei.’” Traditio 6 
(1948): 105-159. Reprinted in Ibn Sina and the Western Tradition: Texts and Studies, Vol 
4. Edited by Fuat Sezgin. Frankfurt: Institute for the History of Arabic-Islamic 






































Department of Philosophy 
100 N. University St. 
West Lafayette, IN 47907 
 
EDUCATION 
 Purdue University  
Ph.D. in Philosophy August 2013 
Dissertation: “The Metaphysics of Causation in the Creation Accounts of Avicenna and Aquinas” 
 Committee: Jeffrey Brower (chair), Daniel Frank, Jan Cover, Paul Draper 
 
Fuller Theological Seminary 
M.A. in Theology 2008 
Areas of Concentration: Philosophical Theology and Historical Theology 
 
University of Sioux Falls 
B.A. in Theology and Philosophy; B.A. in History 2005 
summa cum laude 
SPECIALIZATIONS AND COMPETENCIES 
Areas of Specialization: Medieval Philosophy, Metaphysics   
Areas of Competence: Ethics, Philosophy of Religion, Early Modern Philosophy, Ancient 
Philosophy   
PRESENTATIONS 
 “Creation as Emanation in Aquinas,” Aquinas and ‘the Arabs’, Sorbonne  June 2013 
AWARDS 
Graduate School Summer Research Grant, Purdue University 2013 
Committee for the Education of Teaching Assistants award for Teaching Excellence  
 Department of Philosophy, Purdue University 2013 
Graduate School Summer Research Grant, Purdue University 2012  
Graduate School Summer Research Grant, Purdue University 2010  
Ross Fellowship, Purdue University 2008-2009 





Assistant Professor 2013-present 
Armstrong Atlantic State University, Savannah, GA 
 
Graduate Instructor 2010-2013 
Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN 
 
Teaching Assistant 2009-2010 
Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN 
 
Teaching Assistant 2007-2008 
Fuller Theological Seminary, Pasadena, CA 
TEACHING EXPERIENCE 
Principles of Logic (PHIL150, Purdue University) Spring ‘12 
Critical Thinking (PHIL120, Purdue University) Spring ‘11 
Ethics (PHIL111, Purdue University)  Fall ‘10, Sum. 
‘11, Spring ‘13 
Introduction to Philosophy (PHIL110, Purdue University) Fall ’11, ‘12 
Teaching Assistant: Ethics (PHIL111, Purdue University) Fall ‘09 
Teaching Assistant: Introduction to Philosophy  Spring ‘10 
 (PHIL110, Purdue University)  
Teaching Assistant: Women in Church History and Theology  Spring ‘08 
 (CH575, Fuller)  
Teaching Assistant: Medieval and Reformation Theology (CH503, Fuller) Winter ‘08 
Teaching Assistant: Systematic Theology (ST501, Fuller) Fall ‘07 
ACADEMIC TRAINING 
Graduate Teaching Certificate 2013  
Certificate awarded for completion of 6+ hours of professional 
workshops on teacher preparation, a lecture practice and 
evaluation, and classroom evaluation. 
Purdue Center for Instructional Excellence Teaching Assistant Training 2008 
A one-day professional workshop with sessions about lecture 
preparation, building student rapport, and other topics related 
to becoming a successful teaching assistant. 
LANGUAGES 
Latin — read with proficiency 





MEMBERSHIPS AND SERVICE 
American Association of Philosophy Teachers 
American Philosophical Association 
Society of Medieval and Renaissance Philosophers 
American Academy of Religion 




Metaphysics (Michael Bergmann) 
Aquinas’s Metaphysics (Jeffrey Brower) 
Aristotle’s Metaphysics (Pat Curd); Audited 
 
History of Philosophy 
Medieval Jewish and Islamic Philosophy (Dan Frank)  
Early Modern Philosophy: Descartes (Michael Jacovides) 
Medieval Philosophy (Nancey Murphy) 
Studies in Medieval Christian Thought (Jeffrey Brower); Audited 
Comprehensive Examination in History of Philosophy: Ancient, Medieval, and Early Modern 
 
Philosophy of Religion 
Philosophy of Religion (Nancey Murphy) 
Theological Uses of Postmodern Philosophy (Nancey Murphy) 
Anglo-American Postmodernity (Nancey Murphy) 
 
Ethics 
Mind and Morality (Daniel Kelly) 
Plato’s Ethics (Dan Frank) 
Philosophical Ethics (Nancey Murphy) 
 
Logic, Language, and Philosophy of Science 
Symbolic Logic (Dolph Ulrich) 
Twentieth Century Analytic I: Frege to Wittgenstein (Rod Bertolet) 
Philosophy of Biology (Martin Curd and Daniel Kelly) 
 
Epistemology 
Epistemology (Michael Bergmann) 
Belief and Control (Matthias Steup) 
 
REFERENCES 
Dr. Jeffrey Brower—Purdue University Department of Philosophy (Dissertation Chair) 
Dr. Jan Cover—Purdue University Department of Philosophy  
Dr. Dan Frank—Purdue University Department of Philosophy 
Dr. Pat Curd—Purdue University Department of Philosophy  
Dr. Daniel Kelly—Purdue University Department of Philosophy 
 
